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PRELUDE
Sy Burr-Naughton knew he was in Heaven: Suspended a few centimeters above the warm sands of Bora Bora. Shaded by gently
swaying boojum trees. To the far right, a slow-motion sunset behind
the rugged Pamirs. The latest release of the Leyden Jar Lids (this
hour’s hottest music) vibrating everything at 121 dB. Watching his
bank balance swell on the video hanging over the waves as hundreds of music lovers simultaneously downloaded digital tracks
from his Web site in Ulaan Batur.

* Assistant Professor, Indiana University-Purdue University, Fort Wayne. J.D.,
University of Oregon; LL.M. in Taxation, George Washington University. This Article is
published as edited by Edward Comey and Katherine Walker.
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Heaven departed abruptly when the bank-balance screen went
black, expanded to block out the ocean, then came back to life with
a vision of Tax Farmer Aiya Havya in her favorite persona—shiny
black body with bright red figure-eight spots and eight long green
legs. Her virtual authorization document scrolled down a side
screen in seven languages. Very quietly, but with finality, the surround-sound speakers conveyed her message: “You’re busted. The
Icecap County consumption tax for seventeen of the last 21,354
downloads was not transferred within the required 73.6 seconds.
You’re down as of NOW.”
A jabba subroutine shot out a virtual white sticky line that
grabbed Sy’s leg and pulled him into—Tax Court. The collection
clerks chatted in a language he did not recognize as the ALJ sent
the command to subtract the tax and a quintuple fine from Sy’s account.
Within seconds, Sy was asking the nonvirtual blank basement
wall in Brasilia: “Where the h*** is Icecap County?”

Reality? No. Probability? Maybe. Possibility? Definitely.
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of “The Internet” is engendering debates in a multitude of realms—economic, intellectual, moral, political, legal, tangible, virtual, and others. Many, if not most, of these debates are based
on the premise that the Internet is something sui generis, totally new
in the universe.1 As they do with any person, event, or thing, political
governments seek to impose their authority on the Internet and persons interacting with and through it.
Even while contending that the Internet is a new thing, those
governments (not often prone to innovation) are refurbishing old
rules and arguments. 2 In significant ways, those efforts must fail due
to inherent characteristics of the Internet, principally its diffuse nature and the functional irrelevance of political boundaries. Regulating the Internet presents governments with a unique dilemma. Any
measure that might effectively limit access and flexibility affects everyone, even governments—and governments may be more dependent
on the communications infrastructure than any other person, entity,
or group. Unfortunately, this internal conflict of interest has not fostered entirely rational responses.

1. See, e.g., Marcelo Halpern & Ajay K. Mehrotra, From International Treaties to
Internet Norms: The Evolution of International Trademark Disputes in the Internet Age, 21
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 523, 534 (2000) (discussing the debate that exists about whether to
apply traditional legal concepts or new legal analysis in light of the new technology).
2. See generally Yocahi Benkler, How (If at All) to Regulate the Internet: Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking Forward, 71 U. COLO. L. REV . 1203 (2000) (discussing congressional attempt to regulate the internet).
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Collecting taxes is a traditional government activity. Tax revenue
is a subject near and dear to every politician, government official,
and bureaucrat. With few exceptions, taxation is the means whereby
governments confiscate desired resources. Tax proceeds pay elected
officials’ and bureaucrats’ salaries, build edifices and monuments,
fund government programs and, in general, make government functions possible. This extraction of wealth, quite naturally, tends to irritate those who create the wealth that is extracted, that is, the taxpayers. Thus governments (and particularly elected officials) constantly seek new and better3 means of extracting the maximum
amount of wealth with the minimum amount of taxpayer irritation.
As any basic text teaches, any thing or event can be used as a basis
for taxation. Therefore, it should be no surprise that the evolution of
the Internet has drawn the attention of those who benefit from increased tax collections.
Debates concerning taxation and the Internet may not be as generally publicized as debates concerning Internet pornography and
censorship (publicity is not something tax collectors generally seek),
but the tax issues are perhaps more serious and may have greater
long-term impacts. Despite the potential for long-term effects, to date
the controversies over taxes and the Internet have exponentially
produced more heat than light.
This Article reviews the legal background and milieu of the cu rrent debates in the United States in relation to taxation and Internet-mediated transactions. 4 Part II provides a brief, nontechnical
overview of the Internet and Internet-mediated activities. Part III
discusses the history and current status of legal restraints on tax collecting within the United States. 5 Part IV discusses the application of
the state use-tax rules to Internet-mediated transactions. Internetrelated tax issues may have far-reaching results, not because of any
inherent importance, but because of the perceived impact of Internet
commercial transactions on state tax revenues and the precedent
that might be established for other types of Internet regulation. Part
V concludes that there is more than one potential solution, each with
negative aspects.
3. “Better” in this context means less frequently noticed by voters.
4. The term “Internet-mediated” activities is used here to describe all activities that
persons carry on, in whole or in part, using the Internet as a communications medium.
“Internet transactions” or “Internet-related transactions” seems to emphasize the medium
over the message. It is the actions of persons and entities that are at the center of controversy.
5. The current U.S. tax debate essentially ignores the fact that the Internet is a
global phenomenon. Any U.S.-based solution will eventually have to take that reality into
account. Acknowledging that this narrow focus is a shortcoming, no matter what proposals
may be made on an international scale, they must be acceptable under U.S. law before they
can be implemented in the United States. Therefore, the international scene is generally
left for discussion in other articles.

652

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:649

No matter which potential solution or combination of solutions is
chosen, it will have impacts far beyond use-tax collections. The participants in the current political debate, particularly state tax officials, must look beyond their narrow, short-term agendas. If they do
not, the result will have a negative, long-term impact that will soon
eliminate any short-term gains and may cause the revenue losses
they are trying to prevent.
II. THE CONTEXT
A. The Communication Web—Reality and Virtual Reality
The evolving communications medium commonly known as the
Internet has been described in many places. 6 It is beyond the scope of
this Article (and its author’s competence) to provide a technical description of the Internet’s components and system. However, a layperson-level description is necessary for the following discussion.
Some of the terms (jargon) used in the Internet context are casually
defined in Appendix A. However, it is important to note that the term
“browser” has two meanings, one being a computer program that allows a person to access the Web and the other being the person using
the program. 7 This discussion concerns interactions by persons
rather than computer programs, so “browser” will be used in the second sense.
The history of the Internet is relatively short and well documented.8 The Internet evolved from a U.S. Defense Department project, which had as one purpose the protection of government computer systems and communications in the event of nuclear war. 9 One
of the essential characteristics of the desired system was survivability, that is, that the loss or destruction of any particular part or parts
of the system would not disable the entire system. 10 At least in retrospect, a highly decentralized system was the most obvious and logical
choice. Thus, the system that evolved into the Internet does not have
a central control point, or even a limited number of major control
points. 11
6. See, e.g., JANE ABBATE , INVENTING THE INTERNET (1999); J.P. CHRISTOS
MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., HISTORY OF THE INTERNET: A CHRONOLOGY, 1843 TO THE PRESENT
151-236 (1999). See generally CHARLES JONSCHER, THE EVOLUTION OF WIRED LIFE : FROM
THE ALPHABET TO THE SOUL-CATCHER CHIP —HOW INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES CHANGE
O UR WORLD (1999) (providing a broader history of communication and related technology);
see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-53 (1997).
7. See infra Appendix A.
8. See sources cited supra note 6.
9. See ABBATE , supra note 6, at 8-9.
10. See id.
11. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 853; see also ABBATE , supra note 6, at 113, 127-30,
156-61.

2001]

PREYING ON THE WEB

653

Instead, it is a “system of systems” through which a communication from one point to any other point may take an essentially infinite number of paths, bypassing any disruptions or roadblocks. 12 In
fact, a single communication is divided into a number of discrete portions (“packets”), each of which may take a different route from origin to destination.13 This is really the heart and genius of the system.
A message traversing the Internet goes through a number of switching points. 14 At each point, the message is passed on toward its destination via one of the routes available from that particular point. 15 If
one route is unavailable or overloaded, another route is automatically chosen.16 Since the Internet operates at near-light speed and
very high information-content levels, a route unavailable one moment may be available the next. 17
There are a number of potential analogies to the Internet network. One that should be readily comprehensible to a majority of
persons is a city street grid. Assume for the moment that there is a
city that has a total of forty two-way streets, twenty that run north
and south, parallel to each other, and twenty that run east and west,
parallel to each other and perpendicular to the other twenty streets.
The outermost streets in each direction (numbers one and twenty)
form a closed square. Each of the twenty north-south streets intersect with each of the twenty east-west streets, creating 400 intersections, most with four potential entrance and exit routes.
Now assume that there is a traveler at the far northeast corner of
the street grid who wishes to travel to the far southwest corner.
There are no restrictions on which streets our hypothetical traveler
can take to reach the goal. At each intersection, the traveler can
choose to go straight through, turn right, turn left, or reverse direc12. See ABBATE , supra note 6, at 127-30.
13. See id. at 26-27.
14. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831-32 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Another aspect of the system may not be so innovative, but is equally necessary.
That is the ability of computers connected with the system to communicate, without regard
to the make, model, or operating system of any particular computer. As different companies developed computers, their basic programming and operational aspects differed, so interaction between computers was limited or impossible. See ABBATE , supra note 6, at 48.
Since the military and educational establishments used a wide variety of computers, a
common “protocol” or language had to be developed to make the system operational. See id.
at 49. The most well known version of that common language is known as “hypertext
mark-up language,” or “HTML.” See MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 126-27. The existence of HTML, together with some visionary ideas about the system’s potential, led to
the “browser” programs that made the “World Wide Web” not only feasible, but popular.
See id. As the Internet has become more widely used, newer and more sophisticated software has been, and will continue to be, developed. See id. at 165-67 (describing Java). The
Internet’s popularity and new programming is mutually reinforcing. See generally id. at ch.
8. As the Internet becomes easier to use, and thus more used, the incentive to provide more
advanced programs is increased, which triggers even greater popularity.
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tion (but must wait for the traffic signal). Our hypothetical traveler
moves at near-light speed between intersections but must sometimes
wait for subjective years at busy intersections. It should be rather
obvious that the number of potential routes is effectively infinite.
While it may often be desirable for the traveler to take the most direct route, assume that time and distance traveled are not significant
factors. 18 The hypothetical traveler could go back and forth between
two intersections or around a single block as often and as long as desired, though that would not be very efficient.
The Internet system is similar to the hypothetical street grid. The
differences are that the Internet system is not closed, there are hundreds of thousands of intersections, and a communication may have
many more than four potential exit routes from any intersection. For
all practical purposes, there is an infinite number of potential routes
between any two Internet terminals.
A second defining characteristic of the Internet is that communications between any two computers with access is effectively instantaneous, 19 and the near-light-speed travel makes distance an insignificant consideration. 20 The communication may be text-only (e-mail
and usegroups), vocal (similar to standard telephone), or vocal and
visual (“teleconferencing”).21 In addition, it may be one-way, two-way,
or multiple-way (“chat rooms”). 22 As transmission and computer capacities increase, it is probable that teleconferencing will soon emulate in-person, arms-length (no touch or smell yet) communication.
All of these communications are mediated by computers—at least
one at each end of the communication.23 The direct transmissions are
actually between computers.
In the Internet, and elsewhere, computers can and do exchange
meaningful information without the participation of a human operator. 24 This point is important because a significant portion of Internet
communications involve exchanges between a person at her or his
computer and a distant computer that is not directly attended by a
18. At over 186,000 miles per second, light can travel around the globe more than
seven times in a second. The difference in travel time between an electronic signal traveling 15,000 miles and one traveling 15 miles is probably not perceptible by unaided human
senses.
19. See ABBATE , supra note 6, at 1.
20. This assumes that there are no delays in transmissions through the Internet.
That assumption may not be realistic, due to the maximum possible speeds with which
various components can handle messages and the ever-increasing number of users clogging
switching points.
21. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997).
22. See id.
23. There are router-computers at each of the switching and transmission points, but
their function is normally directory, totally independent of the message’s content and the
parties’ physical location, and completely transparent—the user(s) neither knows nor cares
how many routers are involved or where they are.
24. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 852.
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human.25 The physical location to which communications are transmitted is functionally irrelevant and normally unrecorded. 26 The extent to which the distant computer “interacts” (sends information to,
and accepts information from, the computer user) varies substantially. That variation has become significant for jurisdictional purposes.
As anyone familiar with commercial activities might surmise, the
Internet’s potential for commercial activities was quickly recognized
and exploited. Low-cost transmission of information is “natural” for
the Internet, and “e-mail” remains one of the most used Internet
functions. The development of Internet Web sites exponentially expanded the commercial potential of electronic communications. Using
the Web, digital information (computer programs, digitalized text,
graphics, audio, and video) can be marketed, sold, and delivered to
multiple purchasers—regardless of date, time, or place—without employing any sales or delivery staff. The computer does it all, with appropriate programming of course. Instead of the traditional sales
employees, a Web site owner employs computer-programming and
maintenance personnel.
The commercial use of the Internet caused the Internet’s rapid
growth.27 It is likely that if its subject matter had been limited to research and intellectual pursuits, the Internet would still exist but the
number of sites and users would be a small fraction of what it is today. Commercial use has also caused most of the Internet-related legal controversies. 28
Despite the Internet’s relatively recent advent, there has been
significant discussion concerning it. Much of the discussion deals
with a hypothetical realm frequently referred to as “Cyberspace.”29

25. For example, a person doing legal research contacts a computer containing legal
information, such as statutes or court decisions, “searches” that computer’s data for the desired information and retains a copy of selected information on his or her personal computer. There are, no doubt, persons controlling or attending the distant computer, but none
of them participate in the legal researcher’s activities.
26. Some Internet-related transactions require that the information recipient identify
his or her physical location. For example, the sale of a physical item requires that the
seller obtain a physical address for the item’s delivery. However, that is not an inherent
requirement of the communicatio n itself but is necessary for other purposes. For the sale of
digitalized information (such as a computer program), the physical location of the buyer is
totally irrelevant; the digital information is transmitted directly to the computer and the
buyer pays via a credit card whose issuer need not be, and probably is not, in the same political jurisdiction as the buyer. See, e.g., E-Data Corp. v. Micropatent Corp., 989 F. Supp.
173, 177 (D. Conn. 1997).
27. See ABBATE , supra note 6, at 197-200.
28. See, e.g., Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119
(W.D. Pa. 1997) (involving a claim of trademark infringement in the use of a domain
name).
29. See, e.g., William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World
Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV . 197, 198 (1995); Howard B.
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“Cyberspace” is a term coined and popular in science fiction. 30 It is an
intangible, but perceptually real, “place” where electronic communications take place, one that has no physical existence, and therefore
no physical boundaries. In popular thought, Cyberspace is perceptually separate from the physical reality in which human bodies exist
and in which nations and states have physical (and jurisdictional)
boundaries. Because of that conceptualization, there has been significant discussion on how, and indeed if, traditional physical-reality
governments can control or influence Cyberspace-related events. 31 In
significant respects, this Article is a part of that discussion.
However, Cyberspace as envisioned and discussed does not exist
on the Internet. In science fiction’s Cyberspace, a corporeal person
has sensory inputs solely from Cyberspace, that is, he or she subjectively appears to enter a totally different reality (sometimes called
“virtual reality”) where electronic data is perceived though all that
person’s senses (sight, touch, taste, feel, sound, and so forth). Discussions, particularly political ones, based on this unrealized, subjective
Cyberspace tend to lose touch with the actual physical reality that
still exists, the one in which Internet users still physically exist and
interact. 32
Regardless of how it may be perceived by a participant or imagined by a tax official, today (and for the foreseeable future) the Internet does not exist detached from mundane physical reality. Internet
Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More Is Required on the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV . 925, 926 n.9 (1998).
30. See, e.g., WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 5 (Ace ed. 1984) (“[The hero] . . . jacked
into a custom cyberspace deck that projected his disembodied consciousness into the consensual hallucination that was the matrix.”). And in the same source “quoted” from a “kid‘s
show”:
“Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts . . . A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every
computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged
in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights,
receding . . . .”
Id. at 51. For a “more advanced” version, see ALEXANDER BESHER, RIM (Harper Pape rbacks ed. 1996), in which the “virtual” world is intermingled with the “real” world and both
become surreal. Cyberspace novels are so popular that they have become their own subgenre. See also Cybermania, University of Illinois English Dep’t, at http://128.174.194.59/
cybermania (visited Mar. 27, 2000) (describing movies about Cyberspace and related concepts).
31. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV . 1367 (1996) (arguing that Cyberspace should have its own
distinct law separate from “physical geographically-defined territories”).
32. Some science fiction novels are based on the proposition that a human personality
(soul?) can be converted to digital information and exist totally independent of the human
body, whether the physical body continues to exist or not. A variation, or companion,
theme with similar results is the existence of a self-aware computer (“artificial intelligence” or “AI”) that exists solely in cyberspace. See, e.g., G REG EGAN, DIAS PORA (1998). So
far as the author is aware, no one has yet succeeded in transferring a human personality to
digital format or in creating a self-aware computer.
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transactions involve communication between two computers that
physically exist at some identifiable, geographic locations. The persons directing the transmissions and owning the computers also
physically exist at identifiable locations. The government where the
computer and/or participants exist has the ability to enact and attempt enforcement of rules concerning those persons’ actions. The
real question is whether governments can reach through Cyberspace
to regulate the actions of persons.
There is an additional way in which the Cyberspace construct is
misleading, but it nevertheless seems to be a foundational premise of
some court decisions. 33 In science-fiction Cyberspace, a “cybervoyager” perpetually physically travels to cyber-locations and interacts with data, computers, and other cyber-voyagers. 34 Some commercial Web sites are referred to as “malls,”35 invoking the image of a
typical suburban mall where physical persons physically go to view,
touch, and smell physical items and to interact with physical sales
persons to purchase those items. In the image, sellers and purchasers engage in meaningful interaction, consciously and intentionally
dealing with known persons. That analogy is based on the still science-fictional Cyberspace. Except perhaps in a very limited manner
in chat rooms, the cyber-mall is not consistent with what really happens on the Internet.
A more accurate analogy would be a vending-machine site (or a
public library’s rack of mail-order catalogs). Return to the hypothetical driver in the hypothetical forty-street village. As he is driving, he
observes a billboard advertising goods or services he might wish to
purchase. The driver changes routes to arrive at the advertised location.36 Arriving at the location, the driver observes hundreds or thousands of vending machines with pictures or descriptions of wares for
sale. The driver-now-shopper moves around viewing the displays,
comparing prices and descriptions (but not touching, tasting, or
smelling), and he decides to purchase an item. He enters a credit
card number into the vending machine’s data-processing program
and indicates the desired product. After confirming the validity of the
entered data, the machine delivers the requested product either directly or starts the process through which a physical-reality product
33. See, e.g., Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn.
1996); discussion infra notes 203-229 and accompanying text. But compare Cybersell, Inc.
[Ariz.] v. Cybersell, Inc. [Fla.], 130 F.3d 414, 415 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the notion that a
corporation could be subject to personal jurisdiction because “cyberspace is without bo rders”).
34. See, e.g., G IBSON, supra note 30, passim.
35. See, e.g., skymall.com, at http://www.skymall.com/1-800-SKYMALL/WebObjects/
Store (visited May 15, 2001).
36. The driver may have started the trip with this destination in mind. That would
not alter the usefulness of the analogy.
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is delivered to a location chosen by the shopper. The shopper returns
to being a driver and goes somewhere else.
Notice that in all of this, the driver-shopper was the only person
“present.” The only interaction was with automated machinery. The
machine does not care nor need to know the true identity or location
of the person pushing the buttons. The seller and its employees do
exist, but they are all on the other side of the machines—wiring
vending machines, changing descriptions and prices, and manipulating digital and physical products—not interacting directly with the
shopper. The seller’s purposeful acts are limited to opening the site,
programming it to accept information (which may include product
orders and how to collect payment for products sold), and arranging
delivery in accordance with instructions given to the machine.
Some might object to this analogy as being too impersonal, that
the seller really does have and need particular information about the
buyer and her or his physical location. But those objections are easily
met. Without mutual physical presence, the seller can never know
who the physical purchaser really is and even in a physical shopping
mall, the purchaser’s identity is really irrelevant, so long as the
seller has adequate assurance of payment before delivering the
goods. A seller is also indifferent about the delivery of physical goods,
so long as delivery costs are paid. The delivery location, which may
be only a reshipment point (and the final destination somewhere else
entirely), is totally immaterial to the seller. 37
It is true that information about Internet users is obtained (frequently without the user’s knowledge or permission) and collated
with information from other sources, enabling Internet sellers to
identify the user and his or her physical location. But some Internet
sellers do not collect customer information (and they should be
praised). 38 In addition, users can provide misleading information, and
programs exist that can totally frustrate efforts to track and identify
Internet users. 39 For example, Internet users who purchase by credit
card can be identified through the card number, but “e-cash” purchasers cannot. 40 With respect to the need for identity information,
37. The destination location is contractually insignificant as well. The standard legal
rule is that title, risk of loss, etc., pass to the buyer when the seller delivers goods to the
carrier, and thus, the sale is complete at the seller’s location. See, e.g., Butler v. Beer
Across America, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1264 n.6 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (discussing Internetmediated sale of beer to a minor).
38. See, e.g., E-Data Corp. v. Micropatent Corp., 989 F. Supp. 173, 175 (D. Conn.
1997).
39. See, e.g., Mike Bunker, Privacy Tools Usher in Era of Net Anonymity, MSNBC, at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/347298.asp (visited Dec 2, 1999) (describing the “Freedom”
system developed by Zero-Knowledge Systems, which reportedly creates an impenetrable
online anonymity for the Internet user).
40. “E-cash” is similar to the widespread long-distance telephone card that “stores”
prepaid funds and deducts the cost of calls. There is no need to identify the user because
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the Internet marketplace is more like a Central Asian cash bazaar
than it is like a mid-American suburban mall.
But despite all that, Cyberspace is not an unusable concept. Geographic location is not relevant to Internet communications—even
transmissions between physical computers located in the same political jurisdiction may be routed across political boundaries or circumvent them via satellite. The geographic location of other computers
involved in an Internet-mediated transaction is not relevant to the
persons involved.41 The technical “address” of any particular Internet-connected computer is frequently not known to, or of any concern
to, an Internet user. 42 Thus, to the extent that Internet-mediated
transactions transcend traditional political and geographic boundaries, traditional legal concepts such as jurisdiction and venue may
appear unfair or unreasonable, and may ultimately prove unworkable.
B. Taxes—Confiscation in Many Guises
The means governments have devised to obtain funds may seem
infinite, but there are recognized categories of types of taxes. A full
description of all types of taxes is beyond the scope of this Article.
payment is assured without that information. While the first ventures in e-cash may not
have been great successes, more recent ventures may fare better. Mondex International
Ltd. is a subsidiary of MasterCard International. It provides credit cards, debit cards, and
e-cash cards that can be used on the Internet. See Mondex on the Internet, at
http://www.mondex.com/mondex (last visited Feb. 16, 2000). The on-line advertising states:
“On the Internet, no-one need know who you are when using Mondex. When goods and
services are purchased using Mondex there is no record held of the transaction, allowing
the user the privacy normally only afforded with physical cash.” Id. Tax officials are worried by e-cash because it provides no information useful in auditing taxpayers or tracing
purchasers’ locations. See INLAND REVENUE , H.M. CUSTOMS & EXCISE, ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE : THE UK’S TAXATION AGENDA, CHALLENGES TO TAX COMPLIANCE 53 (Nov.
1999) (U.K.) [hereinafter UK’S TAXATION AGENDA], http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/
taxagenda/ecom.pdf (visited Mar. 28, 2000).
41. Even if a person wishes to communicate with a particular person or company that
is at a specific geographic location, that does not mean the computer which holds that person’s or company’s data (Web site program) is at the same geographic location. The server
containing a San Diego, California, company’s Web site could be in Texas, Tijuana, or
Transylvania—and the person accessing that Web site would neither know nor care.
42. Internet IP addresses, see Appendix A, are a series of numbers and periods without any obvious geographic reference. Those addresses are associated with “domain
names,” which are “normal” words and periods. A person wishing to “visit” a particular
computer via the World Wide Web enters a domain name, which is converted to an IP address. Domain names may give some indication of the nature of the organization that operates a particular Web site. Many domain names end in “.com” [commercial], “.gov” [government], “.org” [nongovernmental organization], or “.edu” [educational organization].
Many non-U.S. domain names now include a two-letter abbreviation of the domain’s physical (political) location, e.g., “.vz” [Venezuela], “.cn” [China], “.ru” [Russia], and “.kz” [Kazakhstan]. However, despite the potential for some identification of the site’s location or
character, the Internet user is indifferent to that identification; the actual location of the
Web site computer need not coincide with the domain name. See MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 189-90, 194-96.
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However, a general description of tax types and their operation is a
necessary foundation for the following discussions. For that purpose,
a consistent terminology is helpful. all taxes can be basically described using four terms or concepts: (1) taxable event, 43 (2) measure,44 (3) rate,45 and (4) incidence.46 One should keep in mind that all
taxes, regardless of category or character, are involuntary transfers
of wealth from the taxpayer to the government which cannot be enforced beyond the taxing authority’s jurisdiction or in violation of its
own laws. 47
The taxable event is the identified objective happening or condition that triggers a legal duty to pay taxes. 48 It may be a transfer of
property (including money), the creation of a tangible item, or merely
the existence of an item or condition at a specified time and place. 49
The incidence of the tax determines who is legally responsible to pay
the tax amount to the government.50 Note that the incidence of the
tax is not necessarily on the person who bears the economic burden
of the tax.51 Also, significantly for some taxes, the person who actually submits the taxes to the government may not be the one on
whom the tax is incident. 52 The measure of a tax is a number associ43. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc, 514 U.S. 175, 190 (1995)
(describing the taxable event of sales tax).
44. See, e.g., id. at 200 (describing measure of tax as “value of the service pu rchased”).
45. See, e.g., id. at 178 (describing the rate).
46. See, e.g., American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451, 455-57 (1965) (discussing the incidence of motor fuel tax).
47. See, e.g., Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 347 (1954).
48. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc, 514 U.S. 175, 190 (1995)
(describing the taxable event of sales tax as “compris[ing] agreement, payment, and delivery of some of the services in the taxing State”).
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451, 455-57 (1965) (discussing the
incidence of motor fuel tax).
51. See id. Frequently, it is difficult to determine who ultimately bears the economic
burden of a particular tax. A corporate income tax is legally incident on the corporation
earning income. See I.R.C. § 11 (1994). However, the paying corporation will take that tax
into account when establishing a price for its products. If all the tax costs are passed on as
part of the sales price, the economic burden is actually on the person buying things from
the corporation. Of course, if the immediate buyer is not a consumer, that cost may be
passed further along to the buyer’s customers. However, if a corporation cannot increase
its prices for competitive reasons, the economic burden of the tax may be passed on to the
corporation’s shareholders via a lower dividend. If the corporation does not have a net income, part of the economic burden may be effectively passed to the government imposing
income taxes, via a “net operating loss” deduction. In that event, the ultimate economic
burden is borne by taxpayers, who have to cover the shortfall. Tracing the economic burden
can be much more complicated. Consider, for example, a situation in which the economic
burden of a sales or VAT tax is imposed on building materials used in the construction of a
commercial building.
52. In many situations, the person having the legal obligation to transmit tax funds to
the government is not the person upon whom the tax is incident. A frequent example is the
“withholding” of income tax payments from employees’ pay. See I.R.C. § 3402 (1994). In the
United States, sales taxes are imposed on the retail purchaser (customer), but the retail
seller is required to collect the sales tax from the purchaser and remit the funds to the gov-
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ated with the taxable event that is one component of the tax-amount
calculation. 53 The number may be units of production, number of
items, number of dollars (or other currency), or determined by any
other means as a measure related to the taxable event. 54 The rate of a
tax is the second component of the tax-amount calculation.55
In the United States, the primary transaction or “consumption”
tax, the “sales and use tax,” is treated separately from other transaction-measured excise taxes. 56 “Value added taxes” (“VAT”) are also
generally treated as a distinct category.57 However, sales, use, and
VAT taxes should be considered a single category here because most
of their respective attributes are similar if not identical.
Almost all U.S. states impose a retail sales tax.58 Most frequently, the sales tax is imposed on all retail sales of tangible propernment. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 175
(1995). The obligation to submit exists even if the seller does not collect the funds from the
purchaser-taxpayer. See id.
It is easy to see why a government might prefer that the person having the burden of
submitting the tax funds not be the person on whom the tax is incident. For example, in
the employer-employee situation, the employer is obligated to pay the employee a particular amount. The requirement that the employer pay a portion of that amount to the government does not increase the amount the employer pays out, so there is no particular reason for the employer to be reluctant to pay. The employer’s net cost is the same either way.
However, an employee who receives 100% of her earnings would presumably have a much
greater resistance to paying some of those funds to the government. Another incentive toward “third-party” payment is the number of remitters with whom the government must
deal. If consumers were required to pay sales taxes directly to the government, the government would have to deal with all consumers on an individual-transaction basis, which
would be an accounting and enforcement nightmare. When the retail seller is required to
remit the taxes, the number of responsible remitters is significantly reduced, and the
amount to be paid can be calculated from the retailer’s total sales, rather than by individual transactions.
53. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc, 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995)
(describing measure of tax as “value of the service purchased”).
54. See, e.g., id.
55. If the measure of the tax is not a currency amount, the rate is a currency amount.
See, e.g., National Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 360 (1869) (describing a tax on
corporate shares with a rate of 50¢ per share). For example, if there is a tax based on the
number of widgets produced per year, the tax rate would be a currency amount, perhaps
$0.005 per unit. The taxpayer (or government) would multiply the number of units produced (e.g., 1,000,000) by the tax rate to determine the amount of tax due (1,000,000 ?
$0.005 = $5,000). If the measure of the tax is a currency amount, the rate is normally a
percentage. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 178 (describing sales tax measured by gross receipts and having rate of 4%).
56. See, e.g., II JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION,
at pt. V.
57. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 12.01.
58. See id., supra note 56, at ¶ 12.01, tbls. 12.1-12.9 (3d ed. 1998). In many states, local governments or government agencies have the option of imposing an additional sales
tax either for general revenue purposes, or to support particular government activities. See
id. Sales tax rules and rates vary from state to state, and rates may vary substantially
from location to location within a single state, causing problems for everyone, but especially for out-of-area sellers (discussed in Part IV, infra). The complexity of sales taxes is
only partially revealed by the fact that it takes Hellerstein nine multi-page tables, each
with tens of footnotes, to describe their characteristics.
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erty. 59 It is common, however, for retail sales of food and medication
to be exempt from the sales tax.60 The measure of a transaction tax is
the price paid and the rate is generally expressed as a percentage, for
example, four percent of the price. One common characteristic of
sales taxes that has created significant controversy with respect to
Internet-mediated sales is the distinction between incidence and the
responsibility to submit.
Typically, since the buyer has the legal obligation to pay a sales
tax, it is “incident” on the buyer. However, for rather obvious administrative purposes, the seller is required to collect the sales tax (on
the state’s behalf) and pay the collected amount to tax authorities. 61
Thus, actions to collect unpaid sales taxes are against the seller, not
the responsible taxpayer.62 As discussed further below, this separation between responsible taxpayer and responsible tax remitter can
create significant problems, particularly when the two parties are
from (or in) different jurisdictions.
A typical VAT tax is like sales taxes, with one significant distinction. A VAT tax is generally imposed on all sales, not just retail sales
to consumers. If Country A has a 5% VAT tax and Country B has a
5% sales tax, the total tax collected would be equal. However, Country A’s VAT tax would produce tax revenues at an earlier time.63
59. See id. at ¶ 12.04[1].
60. See id. at ¶ 12.04[7]. The exemption of food and medicine sales is usually justified
on a “tax equity” basis, that is, that persons with lower income spend a greater proportion
of their incomes on “necessary” food and medicine, therefore exempting those sales shifts
the tax burden more to persons who have the wherewithal to pay. Sales taxes in general
are frequently criticized as being “regressive,” meaning that persons with lower incomes
spend a greater percentage of that income on sales taxes than those with higher incomes.
See id. at ¶ 12.03. Exempting food and medicine reduces the “regressive” character of the
tax. A similar argument has been made to justify the imposition of sales taxes on services,
that is, that persons with higher incomes spend a greater proportion of their income for
services, therefore taxing sales of services reduces the regressive nature of sales taxes and
may even make them progressive. See id. (discussing the progressive/regressive nature of
sales tax).
61. See id. at ¶ 12.01.
62. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 175 (1995).
63. See, e.g., Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Concerning Taxes and Other Obligatory Payments to the Budget, Edict N 2235, arts. 53-73 (QSE trans. Aug. 1999) (as
amended) (Kaz.). Suppose that the item ultimately sold to a retail purchaser is a $200
leather jacket, produced in the jurisdiction where the final sale takes place. In Country B,
the purchaser would pay $10 in sales tax. The full amount would be received by the government after the retail sale. However, in Country A, there would typically be many VATtaxable transfers before the retail sale. When the cow is sold, VAT tax is paid (on the part
of the price attributable to its hide). When the meat-processing company sells the hide to
the leather-making company, VAT tax is paid. When the leather is sold to the garment
maker, VAT tax is paid. At each step between raw material production and final retail
sale, VAT tax is paid and the government receives tax revenue. VAT taxes are usually prevented from becoming a tax on a tax on a tax by allowing a deduction for VAT taxes previously paid. Cumulatively, Country A receives VAT tax revenues equal to five percent of the
jacket’s retail sales price, but most of those revenues are received be fore the retail sale
takes place. And, of course, the earlier tax revenues are received, the better the govern-
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With respect to submission of VAT tax revenues, the obligation
probably could, with equal administrative burden, be placed on either the purchaser or seller, except for the final retail sale. A VAT
tax carries a higher administrative cost to taxpayers: The credit for
prior VAT payments requires that all purchasers track the VAT-tax
portion of each purchase price, allocate the VAT tax paid to the various components of items purchased,64 and pass the information on to
its customers. 65 In contrast, a sales tax only requires the final seller
to determine the tax due, which is a single-step multiplication calculation.
“Use” taxes are companions for sales taxes. Use tax is due whenever a consumer possesses or uses an item in a taxing jurisdiction if
(a) the item would have been subject to sales tax if sold in that jurisdiction, and (b) no such sales tax was paid.66 A credit is given for
sales tax paid to other jurisdictions to eliminate double taxation.67
Use taxes are due from, and payable by, the in-jurisdiction user. 68
With respect to every significant factor, except taxable event, sales
taxes and use taxes are identical. That includes use-tax rules that
impose on the seller a collection and remission obligation. Those usetax collection rules are at the center of the current controversy (and
this discussion). Most sellers on whom these duties might be imposed
do not operate or reside in the taxing jurisdiction. Thus arises the
question of jurisdiction to impose or enforce those rules.
III. LIMITS ON STATE ACTION—ONLY T HE P ROPER PREY
A. Fundamental Principles
Internet-mediated activities emphatically present one very fundamental question: Over whom and what can a government legitimately exercise power? The Internet’s nature limits solving legal issues in a solely domestic context for at least two reasons. The first is
technical. Closing or restricting a transmission route is automatically
treated as an error and alternate, unrestricted routes are chosen.
Even if all current transmission routes could be restricted, in the

ment likes it. VAT taxes are frequently much higher than retail sales taxes, but they can
be completely hidden by not imposing VAT on retail sales to consumers, or requiring the
retail seller to include the VAT in its sales price (that is, not separately stated).
64. What portion of a cow’s purchase price is allocable to its hide? What portion of
1000 pounds of refined copper is in an electric motor?
65. See generally James M. Bickley, The Value-Added Tax: Concepts, Issues and
Experience, 47 TAX NOTES 447 (1990).
66. See, e.g., Henneford v. Silas Mason, 300 U.S. 577, 581-85 (1937).
67. See id.
68. See id.

664

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:649

near future satellite systems reaching every part of the globe will be
operational. 69
The second reason is inherent in the Internet’s functionality. All
Internet sites are functionally equidistant from all other sites. Any
attempt to regulate one site, or one category of sites, must apply to
all sites or it will be of no effect. 70 Thus, an attempt to impose rules
on Internet communications, or persons using the Internet, automatically involves persons and events wherever (geographically) the
Internet can be accessed. Action by even the smallest local government can have world-wide repercussions.
Since the mid-1600s, European countries have accepted the principle that each country has objectively identifiable geographic
boundaries and exercises sole sovereignty within those boundaries. 71
During the twentieth century, that principle became a foundational
rule of international relations. 72 A corollary of that principle is that
no country can legitimately “interfere” in the internal affairs of another country, that is, internal sovereignty necessarily limits a country’s power outside its borders. 73
These principles would be easier to apply if no event or person
ever crossed national boundaries. Unfortunately for easy realization
of political theory, electronic communications can easily cross geographic boundaries, regardless of the wishes and regulations of geography-bound governments. One of the Internet’s most fundamental
and powerful features is its ability to transmit information almost
instantaneously to any location in the world, totally disregarding political geography and ideology.
When these principles of international law were initially developed, high-speed communications meant fast horses and sailing
ships. With a modicum of diligence, a government could detect any
69. Low orbit satellite (LOS) systems currently being developed will have that capability. No radically new technology is required. See About Teledesic: Fast Facts, at
http://www.teledesic.com/about/about.htm (visited Mar. 28, 2001) (indicating that Internetin-the-Sky network services are scheduled to begin in 2005).
70. Regulating an individual browser’s actions automatically applies to all sites he or
she can access. Any geographically limited regulation can be avoided by moving a Web site
to a physical computer in another geographic area.
71. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia ending the Thirty Years War is generally cited as
the initial formal expression of the “new” regime of absolute internal state sovereignty
within fixed geographic boundaries. See, e.g., THOMAS R. VAN DERVORT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND O RGANIZATION 10-13 (1998).
72. See, e.g., id. at ch. 3.
73. See, e.g., DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING
FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO- OPERATION AMONG STATES, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR,
25th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). The U.N. Charter states:
“[S]tates shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.” U.N. CHARTER art.
2, para. 4. That limitation also applies to states of the United States with respect to other
states. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
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meaningful penetration of national boundaries in either direction.
Today, electronic communications cross political boundaries undetected, or can avoid them entirely via satellite. Obviously, technology
did not leap from sail to satellites in one bound. As international
communications and transportation technology advanced, many legal
controversies were raised and resolved. Some of those resolutions are
embodied in generally accepted rules for when a government can legitimately exercise its authority, even though that may have an impact (intended or unintended) beyond the country’s geographic borders. 74
Some of those rules are set forth in agreements between countries
concerning matters of mutual interest, such as taxation, exchange of
ambassadors, extradition of criminals, and so on.75 Other rules are
solely “domestic” in a legal sense but are “international” in the sense
that the domestic rules apply to transborder situations or events. 76
Many rules are based on enlightened self-interest. An example from
the legal context: Assume a court of Country A has entered a judgment in favor of one of its nationals against a national of Country B,
but there is no way to enforce the judgment in Country A. To obtain
satisfaction, the judgment creditor must go to Country B. If Country
B recognizes and enforces the Country A judgment, it will be much
easier for the judgment creditor to obtain satisfaction.77 It is more
likely that Country B officials and courts will recognize the Country
A judgment if Country A officials recognize Country B judgments,
that is, there is reciprocity. Thus, it is in each country’s self-interest
for its domestic law to recognize other countries’ official acts. 78
Another situation in which the domestic law may impact “international” situations is where some act or event, which takes place outside the country’s boundaries has an impact within the country’s
74. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1987) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT]. Section 404 identifies crimes such as piracy, slave trading, hijacking aircraft, genocide, and war crimes as being subject to “universal jurisdiction.” Id.
75. See generally id. § 111.
76. The principle of “comity” is an example of how this type of rule operates. See, e.g.,
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (“[Comity] is the recognition which one nation
allows [to] another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws.”).
77. If there is no such recognition, the judgment creditor may be required to go
through the entire legal process of Country B, with the possibility of losing and becoming a
judgment debtor rather than a judgment creditor, not to mention the additional time, effort, and cost.
78. Of course, there are limits to this type of comity recognition. It is highly unlikely
that a judgment based on testimony induced by overt physical torture would be enforced in
a country where such means of obtaining testimony were considered inherently unreliable.
In Hilton, the Court refused to enforce a French judgment under comity principles because
the proven law of France was that U.S. judgments did not receive reciprocal treatment in
French courts. See 159 U.S. at 228.
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boundaries. A classic example: A person standing in Country X
shoots an arrow that comes down in Country Y, striking Zerba, a local resident. Country Y clearly has geographic jurisdiction over the
arrow-landing event and, in most cases, would claim jurisdiction over
the person who loosed the arrow, even though that person was never
in Country Y.79
In addition to the geographic component, it is generally recognized
that any country has jurisdiction over its nationals, wherever the national may be in the world. 80 That is the usual rationalization for the
privilege of expatriates to pay tax in their “home” country on income
earned in another country.81 Of course, that does not preclude the
country where the national is physically present from also exercising
jurisdiction.
B. Due Process Restraints on Government Action
These international law principles are inherent in the legal relationships between states within the United States. 82 They are reinforced by constitutional obligations to satisfy due process requirements, not to unduly interfere with interstate commerce, to recognize
other states’ acts, and so forth. While thus acknowledging the relevance of fundamental international law principles, due to space con79. In most situations, a claim of jurisdiction would require that the archer have some
intent to at least let loose the arrow in the direction of the international border under conditions where a reasonable person might foresee the arrow crossing the boundary. See
FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 74, at § 402. Most U.S. states exercise longarm jurisdiction over persons who commit a tort outside the state which has an impact
within the state. See id. In the criminal law context, the U.S. Supreme Court has gone
even further, allowing the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident alien for a crime
committed in the defendant’s home country, despite the fact that the defendant had been
forcibly taken in his home country and unwillingly transported to the United States in violation of general international law principles. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504
U.S. 655, 663 (1992).
80. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1994); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932);
FED. R. C IV . P. 4(i).
81. See, e.g., FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 74, at § 412. That is, in
turn, the reason for many treaties dealing with “double taxation” and for domestic rules
that allow some adjustment for foreign taxes paid. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 164, 901 (1999)
(addressing deduction and credit, respectively).
82. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977). Shaffer reviewed the watershed decision of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), in relation to state court in rem jurisdiction and found that the strictly territorial aspects of Pennoyer were inconsistent with
contemporary due process theory. While Shaffer held that Pennoyer had become outmoded
with respect to state court personal jurisdiction, it did not even hint that the mutually exclusive sovereignty of states aspect of Pennoyer was changed. The state sovereignty principles there enunciated include: “The first of those principles was that ‘every State possesses
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.’ The
second was ‘that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or
property without its territory.’” Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 197 (quoting Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722).
Those principles remain fundamental to the U.S. federal system. However, as will be discussed later, they are often applied in a Commerce Clause context rather than as due process principles.

2001]

PREYING ON THE WEB

667

siderations if nothing else, addressing international Internet-related
issues must be deferred. This discussion will concentrate on domestic
legal rules.
The U.S. Constitution prohibits federal and state governments
from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property” without due
process of law. 83 One aspect of due process is the internal sovereignty
principle and its corollary of external impotence. Entering a judgment against a person over whom the court has no jurisdiction does
not fulfill the Constitution’s due process requirement. 84 Consistent
with international law traditions, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled very
early that a court can render judgment against a person present
within the territorial boundaries of that court. 85 The more difficult
question, and the one relevant to this discussion, concerns persons
who are not, and have never been, present within the acting government’s territory.86
As a preliminary matter, it must be noted that there are two types
of jurisdiction over nonresidents: “specific” and “general.” In brief, a
state court exercises “specific” jurisdiction when the subject matter of
the suit relates to (“arises out of”) the nonresident defendant’s contact with the forum state. 87 A state court must have “general” jurisdiction over a nonresident when the action does not relate to the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum state.88 The exercise of
general jurisdiction requires “continuous and systematic general
business contacts” between the nonresident and the forum state. 89
This distinction was alluded to in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,90 but it was discussed in more detail in Helicopteros Nacionales
de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall.91
1. Judicial General Jurisdiction
Helicopteros is normally considered the “landmark” case on judicial general jurisdiction. In that case, the defendant was a corpora-

83. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV (applicable to federal and state governments, respe ctively).
84. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 198-99; Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734-35.
85. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 724.
86. These persons and entities are usually labeled “nonresidents,” although this is
somewhat misleading because jurisdiction over persons within the territory is not limited
to those who reside there. See id.
87. The plaintiff’s contact with the forum state is only incidentally related to the inquiry because by commencing the action, the plaintiff has consented to the court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984).
88. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9
(1984).
89. Id. at 416.
90. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
91. 466 U.S. at 414.
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tion organized and having its principal office in Columbia. 92 Its business was contract helicopter transportation in South America.93 The
cause of action arose from a helicopter crash in Peru in which U.S.
citizens died. 94 The helicopter crashed during a flight under a contract with a Peruvian “consortium” that was the “alter ego” of a
Houston, Texas, joint venture.95 The plaintiffs, none being Texas
residents, filed a wrongful death action in Texas, naming Helicopteros as a defendant. 96 The plaintiffs contended that Helicopteros had
sufficient contacts with the state to allow Texas courts to exercise jurisdiction, which the Court understood as contending that “general”
jurisdiction existed. 97
Helicopteros’ acts in Texas consisted of negotiating (not signing) a
general transportation contract related to the fatal flight, purchasing
(over about seven years) a number of helicopters from a Texas manufacturer, and sending some employees to Texas for training or orientation. 98 Over the years, the Texas purchases exceeded $4 million,
and Helicopteros received from Texas banks payments of over $5 million on the transportation contract. 99 The Court held that Helicopteros did not have sufficient contacts with Texas to support general
jurisdiction. 100
To illustrate the type of situation in which general jurisdiction
could be exercised, the Court turned to Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.101 In Perkins, the president and general manager of
the defendant Philippine corporation effectively operated the corporation out of an office in Ohio during the Japanese occupation of the
Philippine Islands. 102 The corporation’s records were kept in the Ohio
office, directors’ meetings were held there, general bank accounts
were in Ohio, and salary and other payments were made from
there.103 It was rather obvious that the corporation conducted essentially all of its business (curtailed as it was by the war situation)
92. See id. at 409.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 410.
95. See id. at 409-10.
96. See id. at 412.
97. See id. at 415-16. The single -justice dissent in Helicopteros argues that the Court
should have considered the possibility of exercising specific jurisdiction because the cause
of action “[arose] out of” or “related to” Helicopteros’ activities in Texas. Id. at 424-28
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The plaintiffs’ allegations with respect to Helicopteros, however,
seem to be limited to an allegation that its pilot was negligent, see id. at 426 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), which could only have very tenuous and indirect connections with his employer’s Texas contacts.
98. See id. at 410-11.
99. See id. at 411.
100. See id. at 418-19.
101. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
102. See id. at 438-39.
103. See id. at 447-48.
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from the Ohio office.104 Under those circumstances, the Court found
that the exercise of general jurisdiction did not violate due process
principles. 105 To reach that conclusion, the Court found that the corporation had “continuous[ly] and systematic[ally]” carried on its general business activities in Ohio.106 In contrast, the in-state activities
in Helicopteros were all related to purchasing helicopters, which was
part of its business operations only in the sense that it had to have
helicopters to provide helicopter transportation.107 The Court held
that those were not the kind of systematic general business contacts
that would satisfy due process requirements with respect to general
jurisdiction. 108
If a clear distinction can be drawn between Perkins and Helicopteros, it is that in Perkins, the corporation’s in-state activities were as
broad and continuous as they would have been if the corporation had
been a legal resident of the state, that is, the forum-based activities
related to the whole of the company’s commercial operations. But in
Helicopteros, the corporation’s activities were limited to one contract
negotiation and some equipment acquisitions; its general management and business operations were somewhere else. 109 The key to
general jurisdiction is, therefore, “continuous and systematic” activities within the forum state that are not objectively different from the
activities of a resident corporation.
2. Judicial Specific Jurisdiction
The requirements for exercising specific jurisdiction are less demanding, principally because there is a direct connection between
the subject matter of the litigation and the forum state, that is, the
act or its effect occurs within the forum’s geographic jurisdiction even
if the defendant was not personally there. Whether due process requirements are satisfied is determined on a case-by-case basis.
The modern line of cases dealing with specific jurisdiction over
nonresidents starts with the Supreme Court’s 1945 decision in International Shoe.110 That case involved the State of Washington’s attempt to collect its unemployment tax from International Shoe in
state courts. 111 International Shoe contended that the Due Process
Clause precluded Washington from exercising jurisdiction because
104. See id.
105. See id. at 438.
106. Id.
107. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416.
108. See id.
109. Since both corporations were alien corporations, it is unlikely that any distinction
could be made if the defendant in a similar case were a U.S. corporation not resident in the
forum state.
110. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
111. See id. at 311.
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the company was not legally “present” in Washington.112 That contention first raised somewhat of a philosophical problem: since a corporation has no physical existence, how can it be said to be present
anywhere? The Court answered in the only realistic manner, stating
that a corporation’s presence (in its home state or elsewhere) could
only be established through the activities carried on for it by corporeal persons acting on its behalf.113 In that context, what was International Shoe’s presence in Washington State? It had no offices in
the state, no contracts were entered into in the state, no goods were
legally delivered in the state, and no purchase contracts were legally
created in the state. However, during the years in question, International Shoe had eleven to thirteen salesmen who operated solely
within the state; who resided there; who solicited orders there; who
rented motel, hotel, and display rooms there; and who were compensated by commission based on their in-state sales. 114 The continuing
and active presence of physical persons in Washington State working
on International Shoe’s behalf was obvious, and the tax the State
was attempting to collect was directly related to those persons’ presence and actions in the State. Specifically addressing the due process
issue, the Court stated:
[Due process] demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the
context of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there. An “estimate of the inconveniences” which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its “home” or principal place of business is relevant in this connection.
“Presence” in the state in this sense has never been doubted
when the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on,
even though no consent to be sued has been given. . . .
....
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary
line between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not merely, as has sometimes
been suggested, whether the activity, which the corporation has
seen fit to procure through its agents in another state, is a little
more or a little less. Whether due process is satisfied must depend
rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the
112. See id. at 315-16. International Shoe also contended that the tax was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, but that contention was easily overcome due to
federal legislation that expressly required employers to pay state unemployment taxes,
even if they were engaged solely in interstate commerce. See id. at 315; see also I.R.C. §
3305(a) (1994).
113. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17.
114. See id. at 313.
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fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.115

The Court summarized its holding:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.”116

Dissenting, Justice Black was of the opinion that International
Shoe’s contentions had so little merit that the appeal should be dismissed as unsubstantial. 117 Black contended that the Due Process
Clause was not intended to preclude a state from being able to tax
and sue the persons or entities that deal with its citizens within its
borders and that the Court should adopt that as a “workable standard.”118 Black went on to state:
The Court has not . . . [adopted a workable standard], but instead
has engaged in an unnecessary discussion in the course of which it
has announced vague Constitutional criteria applied for the first
time to the issue before us. It has thus introduced uncertain elements confusing the simple pattern and tending to curtail the exercise of State powers to an extent not justified by the Constitution.119

Based on subsequent cases, Justice Black’s criticism about vagueness
and uncertainty have proven true. However, his prediction that those
problems would curtail state powers has not yet proven true.120
Since 1945, there have been numerous court decisions discussing
due process and judicial specific jurisdiction over nonresidents. A
relatively small number are consistently cited in Internet-related
cases and deserve brief mention here. One that requires only a mention is the Court’s recognition that technological “progress” has increased the flow of commerce between states, increasing the call for
broader jurisdiction over nonresidents while at the same time making defense of actions in foreign tribunals less burdensome. 121
115. Id. at 316-19 (citations omitted).
116. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
117. See id. at 322 (Black, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 323.
119. Id.
120. Justice Black’s comments concerning the vagueness implicit in such terms as “fair
play” and “contrary to natural justice” have significant merit. It is still possible that some
future composition of the Court could result in very restricted interpretation of those
terms. As everyone knows, what is “fair” is a matter of opinion depending more on who is
asked than on any discernable objective reality.
121. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); see also McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). Most court decisions expounding on that theme,
particularly the “burden” part, seem to ignore the cost in time and effort involved in out-of-
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In 1985, the Court made it clear that a nonresident could be subject to a state’s jurisdiction even though the nonresident was never,
personally or through agents, physically present in the forum state.
In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 122 the parties negotiated a contract for the franchise of a Burger King restaurant located in Michigan.123 The defendants were Michigan residents. 124 The negotiations
leading to the contract and the operation of the restaurant occurred
over a two- to three-year period.125 The significant in-person contacts
took place in Michigan at Burger King’s district office. 126 However,
the principal Burger King agents involved were always at Burger
King’s international headquarters in Florida and, according to the
company, these Florida-based agents made all of the significant decisions and contacts. 127 Burger King commenced a breach of contract
action in Florida.128
The defendants initiated contact with the knowledge that Burger
King’s principal offices were in Florida and that detailed control of
the restaurant’s operations would issue from Florida.129 The Court
emphasized that the defendants chose not to deal with a strictly local
operation, instead, they “’reach[ed] out beyond’ Michigan and negotiated with a Florida corporation for the purchase of a long-term franchise and the manifold benefits that would derive from affiliation
with a nationwide organization.”130 For a forum’s court to exercise
specific jurisdiction, “it is essential . . . that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws.”131 And “[s]o long as a commercial actor’s
efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State,
we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical
contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.”132
town litigation. Even though it is possible to travel almost anywhere in the world in a matter of hours, and communicate around the world in a matter of seconds, that does not mean
transportation, lodging, and communications costs are zero. Those costs can be thousands
of dollars, which may be minuscule for a multinational conglomerate, but extremely significant to a small business with a Web site.
122. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
123. See id. at 466-67.
124. See id. at 466.
125. See id. at 466-67.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 464-67. One of the defendants attended a brief training course in Florida, but that was given little significance in the Court’s decision. See id. at 479 & n.22.
128. See id. at 468.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 479-80 (quoting Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647
(1950)).
131. Id. at 474-75 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
132. Id. at 476 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-90 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774-75 (1984); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220, 222-23 (1957)). In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 306-08
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Thus, the most important factor for judicial specific jurisdiction is
that the nonresident’s voluntary action was taken with the knowledge that it may have an impact on persons or events in a particular
state. In that context, a 1958 statement by the Court is significant:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact
[between the nonresident defendant] and the forum state]. . . . [I]t
is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.133

It is, therefore, not sufficient if the defendant’s “contact” with the forum is the plaintiff’s (or third party’s) volitional act which relates to
the defendant. The defendant must take some volitional act that
could have some effect in the forum state. Merely making information available to a forum resident would not appear to satisfy this requirement, 134 but entering into a contract might.
One of the questions raised by this requirement (that is, that the
in-state contacts be due to the defendant’s acts, not acts of others)
concerns acts by one person (the defendant) which might result in
events or acts by others at some other location. In World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,135 Seaway Volkswagen, Inc., operated
only in New York, where it sold a vehicle to the Robinsons, who resided in New York at the time. 136 The Robinsons left their New York
home for a new home in Arizona and, on the way, were involved in an
accident in Oklahoma.137 A products liability action was filed in
Oklahoma against everyone involved in the manufacture and sale of
the vehicle, including the retailer (Seaway) and the regional distributor (World-Wide).138 Seaway and World-Wide challenged the Oklahoma court’s jurisdiction on due process grounds. 139 The plaintiffs
contended, in essence, that jurisdiction was proper because, inter
alia, by its nature the product involved (a motor vehicle) is inherently
mobile and any vehicle-seller could foresee at the time of sale that
(1992), a decision very relevant to Internet-mediated commercial sales, the Court held that
sending hundreds of catalogs and fliers to state residents, making millions of dollars worth
of sales to those residents, and shipping the sold goods to that state was sufficient for due
process purposes to allow the state’s courts to exercise jurisdiction over the seller.
133. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citations omitted); see also WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
134. This would be emphatically true if the defendant was not aware of the other
party’s geographic location at the time the information is provided.
135. 444 U.S. 286.
136. Id. at 288.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 288-89.
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any particular vehicle could cause injury to persons in Oklahoma, regardless of where the original sale took place.140 The Court made it
quite clear that foreseeability alone is not sufficient to allow a state
to exercise jurisdiction. 141 But foreseeability is not totally irrelevant:
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not
the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum
State. Rather, it is that the defendant’s conduct and connection
with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there. The Due Process Clause, by ensuring
the “orderly administration of the laws,” gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit .142

Further:
Hence, if the sale of a product . . . is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its product in
other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of
those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been
the source of injury to its owner or to others. The forum State does
not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts
personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased by consumers in the forum State.143

Due process requires that the defendant take some purposeful, forum-related action before jurisdiction can be exercised. If foreseeability of possible injury were the key criterion, “[e]very seller of chattels
would in effect appoint the chattel his agent for service of process.
His amenability to suit would travel with the chattel.”144
140. See id. at 295.
141. See id. The Court elaborated:
If foreseeability were the [only] criterion, a local California tire retailer could
be forced to defend in Pennsylvania when a blowout occurs there, see Erlanger
Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956); a Wisconsin seller of a defective automobile jack could be hauled before a distant
court for damage caused in New Jersey, see Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc.,
372 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (D.N.J. 1974); or a Florida soft-drink concessionaire
could be summoned to Alaska to account for injuries happening there, see
Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 170-71 (D.
Minn. 1969). Every seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his
agent for service of process. His amenability to suit would travel with the chattel.
Id. at 295-96.
142. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 297-98 (citing, for comparison, Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961)) (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 296.
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The dissents in World-Wide Volkswagen raise an issue that may
be crucial with respect to Internet-mediated transactions. Justice
Marshall’s dissent emphasizes the fact that the defendants (an
automobile wholesaler and an automobile dealer) were part of a nationwide distribution organization and derived substantial benefit
from that membership, both in increased sales and in repair revenues.145 With respect to the Court’s statement that a person should
be able to structure his activities to avoid particular jurisdictions,
Justice Marshall’s dissent states:
I sympathize with the majority’s concern that the persons ought to
be able to structure their conduct so as not to be subject to suit in
distant forums. But that may not always be possible. Some activities by their very nature may foreclose the option of conducting
them in such a way as to avoid subjecting oneself to jurisdiction in
multiple forums.146

Manifestly, the “quality and nature” of commercial activity is different, for purposes of the International Shoe test, from actions from
which the defendant obtains no economic advantage: commercial activity is more likely to cause effects in a larger sphere, and the actor
derives an economic benefit from the activity. That makes it fair to
require him to answer for his conduct where its effects are felt. The
profits may be used to pay the costs of suit and, knowing that the activity is likely to have effects in other states, the defendant can readily insure against the costs of those effects, thereby sparing himself
much of the inconvenience of defending in a distant forum. 147
Based on Justice Marshall’s reasoning, a person who is somehow
commercially associated with a group that has other associates in
other areas would be subject to jurisdiction wherever those other associates are. Becoming part of a global manufacturing and distribution network, according to this logic, would support jurisdiction
wherever that network reached, that is, throughout the globe. That
particular issue soon came to the forefront.
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,148 Asahi Metal Industry Company, a Japanese corporation, manufactured valve assemblies in Japan that were used in motor vehicle tires. 149 It sold a
very small portion of its production to Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial
Company, a Taiwanese company which incorporated the assemblies
into motorcycle tires. 150 Some of those motorcycle tires were sold in
145. See id. at 313-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun joined Justice Marshall’s dissent and wrote one of his own. See id. at 317-19.
146. Id. at 316.
147. See id. at 316-17.
148. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
149. Id. at 106.
150. See id.
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the United States (separately or as part of a new motorcycle).151 One
of those tires allegedly failed, and the injured parties brought suit. 152
Cheng Shin cross-claimed against Asahi, seeking indemnification. 153
There was no question that Asahi had not done business with any
U.S.-based company (with respect to the particular accident or otherwise). 154 From the evidence, however, it was possible that Asahi
could have foreseen that some of its product might eventually be present in the United States. 155 Cheng Shin’s contention was that Asahi
knowingly placed its product in “the stream of commerce”; therefore,
Asahi was subject to suit wherever that stream may carry those
products. 156
Asahi produced a complicated group of opinions. Eight Justices
agreed with Part II-B of Justice O’Connor’s opinion, which held that
subjecting Asahi to this cross-claim in California would “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” 157 and, therefore,
violate due process requirements. 158 Thus, regardless of any other
conclusion, the California court’s judgment against Asahi was reversed.159
Part II-A of Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion dealt with the
“stream of commerce” theory.160 The point of contention was the
statement in World-Wide Volkswagen that “[t]he forum State does
not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into
the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”161 Justice O’Connor’s opinion states that something more is required than placing an item in
151. See id. at 105-06.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 106. Since the primary action had been settled, the only remaining
question was Asahi’s liability to Cheng Shin, which may have influenced the Court’s decision concerning the “fairness” of the litigation in California.
154. See id. at 108.
155. See id. at 107.
156. See id.
157. Id. at 113.
158. See id. at 113-16.
159. See id. at 116.
160. See id. at 108-13. Four Justices joined Part II-A (Rehnquist, O’Connor, Powell,
and Scalia). See id. at 105. Four other Justices agreed that placing an item in the stream of
commerce is sufficient for due process purposes as long as that person knows the item is
marketed in the forum state. See id. at 116-21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, concurring
in judgment) (Blackmun, Marshall, and White, JJ., joining). The latter opinion argues that
even if the O’Connor opinion correctly states the law, it misapplies the facts. See id. Justice
Stevens wrote a separate opinion, also joined by Justices Blackman and White, taking the
position that the “stream of commerce” discussion was unnecessary to the decision and
that the O’Connor opinion misapplied the facts. See id. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part, concurring in judgment).
161. Id. at 109 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 29798 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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the stream of commerce with the awareness that the stream may
carry it to a forum state. 162 The defendant must take some purposeful
action directed at a particular forum state:
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising in
the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice
to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through
a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.163

The substance of Justice O’Connor’s “something more” is knowing action intending to derive benefit from the market in a particular area
or state, something more geographically directed than merely selling
something to a distributor who, in turn, sells the item to someone
else, who then sells to someone else, and so on.
Justice Brennan’s opinion argues that Justice O’Connor’s opinion
misconstrues World-Wide Volkswagen.164 It contends that WorldWide Volkswagen only distinguishes between situations in which the
preconsumer distribution system takes a product to a particular
state and situations in which the postdistribution consumer takes
that action.165 Thus, according to Brennan’s interpretation, if the defendant places an item into a commercial distribution system that
distributes things in known locales, the defendant is amenable to
suit in any forum that system reaches: the act of inserting an item
into the stream is considered to be purposefully directed toward everywhere the stream (knowable to the actor) reaches. 166 This logic
would appear to support jurisdiction even when the particular offending item could have only been brought into the forum State by a
consumer, which is inconsistent with World-Wide Volkswagen .
Another incarnation of the action-directed-toward-the-forum rationale was originally applied in a contract setting,167 but it has more
162. See id. at 112.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 116.
165. See id. at 118-20.
166. See id. This reading of World-Wide Volkswagen seems inconsistent with that decision, however, because the defendants in that case did participate in a stream of commerce
that did include the forum state. The Brennan opinion is consistent with World-Wide
Volkswagen only if the “stream of commerce” considered is that which exists downstream
from the actor’s location.
167. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221-22 (1957). That case
involved an insurance contract that had been sold to a California resident and later assigned to an insurance company that had no other contact with California. See id. at 222.
When the beneficiary filed suit in Texas to enforce a judgment previously obtained in California, the insurance company contended that the California court had not had jurisdiction
to issue the judgment, because the company had not done business in California; the Texas
court refused to enforce the judgment. See id. The Court on appeal held that the Due Process Clause did not preclude jurisdiction because, while the policyholder lived in California,
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often been applied more often in intentional tort cases. For example,
in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,168 the action was commenced in
New Hampshire by a New York resident. 169 The allegedly defamatory
article was in a magazine that had a substantial distribution in New
Hampshire, and the Court found that the plaintiff would suffer at
least some of the resulting damages in that state.170 The defendant
had a monthly circulation of thousands of magazines over a number
of years in New Hampshire. 171 The Court held that by so distributing
the offending publication in New Hampshire, the defendant had
committed the tort in that state, which was, with respect to the alleged tort, sufficient purposeful contact with the state to allow its
courts to exercise jurisdiction without violating due process principles. 172
Calder v. Jones173 presented the obverse situation. Actress Shirley
Jones commenced a defamation action in California against a reporter and the editor/owner of the National Enquirer based on an article in that publication.174 The defendants contended that the California courts could not exercise jurisdiction over them because they
had not acted in California and had not taken any relevant actions in
that state. 175 The Court disagreed. A plaintiff’s contacts with a forum
may be “so manifold” that they might permit jurisdiction where it
might not otherwise exist. 176 Specifically, the Court noted that the
plaintiff was a resident of California, that her work and the industry
in which she worked were centered in California, and that the alleged tort, if proven, would have its primary impact in California. 177
The defendant’s alleged actions were “expressly aimed at California”
where the plaintiff lived and worked, and when the defendants acted,
they knew that any damages that might be caused would be suffered
in California. 178 Since the publication had its largest circulation in
California, the Court held that the defendants knowingly caused injury there and, therefore, could reasonably anticipate being haled
into a California court. 179

the insurance company corresponded with the policyholder and collected premium payments from her. See id. at 221-23.
168. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
169. Id. at 772.
170. See id. at 776.
171. See id. at 772.
172. See id. at 779.
173. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
174. See id. at 784-85.
175. See id. at 789.
176. Id. at 788.
177. See id. at 788-89.
178. Id. at 789.
179. See id. at 790.
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C. Due Process and Internet-Mediated Activities
1. Judicial Specific Jurisdiction and Internet Sites
There are a number of court decisions discussing personal jurisdiction, and thus due process requirements, in litigation involving
Internet-mediated communications or transactions. Though these
decisions are not tax cases, they are relevant because a taxenforcement action is subject to the same due process rules concerning jurisdiction over the defendant. Most of the reported decisions
are from trial courts, but a few appellate courts have issued opinions.
With respect to persons who cannot be served in the forum state,
trial court jurisdiction must be authorized by the state’s long-arm
statute. However, many, if not most, states’ statutes authorize, either
expressly or by court interpretation, for long-arm jurisdiction over
nonresidents to the fullest extent possible under the Due Process
Clause.180 Thus, the Supreme Court decisions in the preceding section provide the benchmarks for the decisions in this section.
The fact-dependent nature of due process considerations and the
wide variety of Internet sites make it difficult to establish clear categories of cases. To the extent that categories are beginning to appear,
the distinctions are principally based on the level of Web site “interactivity.” As discussed in Part II, a principal functional feature of the
Web is that information can be obtained from, and transmitted to, a
Web site. 181 The Web site program regulates the degree to which a
browser can submit information. If a browser can submit informa180. See, e.g., Dainippon Screen Mfg. Co. v. CFMT, Inc., 142 F.3d 1266, 1270 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (California law); Genetic Implant Sys., Inc. v. Core-Vent Corp., 123 F.3d 1455, 1458
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (Washington law); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th
Cir. 1996) (Ohio law); Butler v. Beer Across America, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1266 (N.D. Ala.
2000); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, L.L.C., 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 328 (D.S.C. 1999); Millennium Enter., Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 909 (D. Or. 1999); Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F. Supp. 481, 486 (W.D.N.C. 1997); SF Hotel Co., L.P. v. Energy Invest., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1032, 1033 (D. Kan. 1997); Telco Communs. Group, Inc. v.
An Apple a Day, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 404, 405 (E.D. Va. 1997); Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F.
Supp. 327, 330 (D.N.J. 1997); CD Solutions, Inc. v. Tooker, 965 F. Supp. 17, 19-20 (N.D.
Tex. 1997); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1997);
Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1997 WL 733905, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1330-31 (E.D. Mo.
1996); EDIAS Soft. Int’l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int’l, Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 416 (D. Ariz. 1996);
Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 620 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Inset Sys., Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996); Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One,
Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351, 1352 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Minn. App. 1997), aff’d by an evenly divided court, 576
N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998) (addressing state complaint alleging deceptive trade practices,
false advertising). But see Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL) (AJP), 1997
WL 97097, at *9 (S.D. N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (holding that the New York statute does not extend jurisdiction to the full extent of the Due Process Clause); Cortlandt Racquet Club, Inc.
v. O Saunatec, Ltd., 978 F. Supp. 520, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same).
181. See discussion supra Part II.
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tion, the Web site program may take some action based on what is
submitted. A Web site that allows a two-way exchange of information
is generally called “interactive.”182
With respect to state jurisdiction based on Internet-mediated activities, a growing number of court decisions183 have used the analytical structure articulated in 1997 by the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v.
Zippo Dot Com, Inc. 184 Zippo Manufacturing alleged that its trademark had been infringed by Zippo Dot Com by using “zippo” in its
Internet domain names.185 Zippo Dot Com challenged the court’s personal jurisdiction, alleging that it had insufficient contacts with
Pennsylvania to satisfy either Pennsylvania statutory requirements
or the Due Process Clause.186
Zippo Dot Com operated an Internet-based subscription news service; subscribing required payment by credit card, arranged either
through the Internet or telephone.187 Of Zippo Dot Com’s 140,000 customers, approximately 3000 were Pennsylvania residents. 188 In addition, Zippo Dot Com had service contracts with seven ISPs that were
physically in Pennsylvania.189 Zippo Dot Com had no offices, employees, or agents in Pennsylvania at any time; however, its Californiabased Web site was accessible from Pennsylvania.190
In its reference to Supreme Court decisions on the subject, the
district court emphasized the point that the actions of the defendant
to “reach out” to the forum state must be such as to make the defendant “reasonably expect to be haled into court there.”191 The court
said that its review of the then-few decisions on point indicated that
the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be exercised is “directly
proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that
an entity conducts over the Internet.”192 The court then set out the
three categories that later decisions have used:

182. See, e.g., Techencyclopedia (searchable dictionary), at http://www.techweb.com/
encyclopedia (visited May 13, 2001).
183. See, e.g., Mink v. AAAA Dev., LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997). See generally Search Force, Inc.
v. DataForce Int’l, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 771, 776-78 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
184. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
185. Zippo Dot Com had, through the normal Internet domain name registration process, exclusive rights to domain names “zippo.com,” “zippo.net,” and “zipponews.com”. See
id. at 1121 & n.3.
186. See id. at 1119.
187. See id. at 1121.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. Id. at 1123 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980)).
192. Id. at 1124.
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1.
Entering into contracts with forum state residents that involve knowing and repeated Internet transmission of files to that
state.
2.
Passive websites that do no more than make information
available.
3.
Websites that are interactive, where the Internet user can
exchange information with the website’s host computer.193

With respect to the first category, the court indicated that there was
a clear basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. 194 With respect to the
second category, the court said there was not sufficient grounds for
the exercise of jurisdiction outside the Web site owner’s state. 195 With
respect to the third category, the court said the propriety of exercising jurisdiction “is determined by examining the level of interactivity
and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on
the Web site.”196
The court reviewed a number of cases with these categories in
mind.197 It concluded that Zippo Dot Com’s relationship with Pennsylvania fell into the first category, that is, knowingly doing business
with state residents via the Internet. 198 The court expressly rejected
Zippo Dot Com’s argument that its contacts with the state were “fortuitous” (because it did not actively solicit business in the state but,
instead, Pennsylvania residents found its Web site and initiated contacts). 199 The court held that who initiated a particular contact was
not important because Zippo Dot Com consciously chose to do business with state residents by processing the Pennsylvania residents’
applications and assigning them passwords. 200
The simplicity of the Zippo decision’s three categories is appealing, its format familiar to lawyers and judges. Unfortunately, it
really does not help very much. With respect to the first, there are
obviously situations in which a person or company “does business”
across state lines via communication media rather than personal
presence. But the fact that one communication medium (for example,
the Internet) is used rather than another (for example, the telephone,
U.S. mail, or Airborne Express) is not particularly relevant. As for
the second category, it is equally as obvious that there are Web sites
193. Id.
194. See id. (citing CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996)).
195. See id. (citing Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996)).
196. Id. (citing Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996)).
197. See id. at 1124-25.
198. See id. at 1125-27.
199. See id. at 1126.
200. See id. at 1126. The court observed that if Zippo Dot Com had wanted not to be
subject to Pennsylvania jurisdiction, all it had to do was not sell services to Pennsylvania
residents. See id.
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that are just “there.” Those Web sites may contain information, but
two-way communication (or communication directed to a particular
person) does not exist. Those sites might be equated with a roadside
billboard in the owner’s state. The fact that some person from another state looks at a photograph of the billboard is not sufficient to
support jurisdiction over the billboard owner in the photo-viewer’s
home state.
With those two rather obvious categories out of the way, the third
category includes all Web sites which have some level of interactivity. Zippo’s third category includes the vast majority of Web sites,
probably approaching 100% of commercial Web sites. The variation
among Web sites is great and the degrees of interactivity are so
many that establishing a limited number of categories is risky; using
only three, as Zippo does, seems to be an excessive oversimplification.
When trying to categorize the cases, there is one group that
stands somewhat apart from all the others. These decisions expressly
or implicitly conclude that a Web site: (a) is, per se, a powerful and
continuing business solicitation, purposefully directed at every person with access to the Internet; and therefore, (b) is purposefully directed at each jurisdiction in which persons with Internet access reside. 201 Those conclusions are used to support a decision that the
court has jurisdiction over the nonresident Web site owner. 202 While
these decisions also find, or assume, that the Web site has resulted in
some commercial contact with forum residents, the decisions state or
imply that commercial contact is not critical.
The decision effectively leading the pack of cases extending jurisdiction to wherever the Internet reaches is Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.203 Both corporations involved in the case were
computer-related businesses. 204 Inset Systems, Inc., registered

201. See, e.g., Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 743 (W.D. Tex. 1998)
(discussing a gambling Web site having actual interaction with a forum resident); Hasbro,
Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 44 (D. Mass. 1997) (discussing how a company must take action to avoid Web site interaction with a specific jurisdiction if it is to
avoid being subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts there); IA, Inc. v. Thermacell Tech.,
Inc., 983 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328,
1332 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (using minimal interaction with forum residents to support a prior
conclusion that jurisdiction was proper based solely on the existence of indiscriminately interactive Web site); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn.
1996). But cf. Gary Scott Int’l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714, 716-17 (D. Mass. 1997)
(discussing additional evidence of some sales and intention to sell to forum businesses);
Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (declining to find jurisdiction solely based on Web site, but treating a general informational site as directed toward
forum residents).
202. See cases cited supra note 201.
203. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
204. See id. at 162-63.
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“INSET” under the Federal Trademark Act. 205 Later, Instruction Set,
Inc. (“ISI”) obtained “INSET.COM” as its Internet domain address. 206
ISI also published its telephone number as “1-800-US-INSET.”207 Inset sued ISI alleging wrongful infringement of its trademark. 208
The relevant portion of the Connecticut long-arm statute allows
the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations in actions arising from business solicited in that state “if the corporation had repeatedly so solicited business.”209 The Inset Systems Court found the
statute’s requirements met Conneticut’s long-arm statute because
the Internet, and thus ISI’s domain name and Web site, could be accessed from Connecticut:
[S]ince March, 1995, ISI has been continuously advertising over
the Internet, which includes at least 10,000 access sites in Connecticut. Further, unlike hard-copy advertisements . . . which are
often quickly disposed of and reach a limited number of potential
consumers, Internet advertisements are in electronic printed form
so that they can be accessed again and again by many more potential customers.210

The district court relied on two of its prior decisions dealing with
print advertisements placed in newspapers or other print publications known to be circulated in the state. 211 The district court equated
an Internet Web site with advertising in a publication having a
known circulation. In effect, if not expressly, the court held that establishing an Internet Web site constitutes “purposefully availing”
oneself of the privilege of doing business wherever there are others
who can access the Internet. 212 Despite the obvious possibilities, the
district court did not rely on Calder.

205. See id. at 163.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 162.
209. Id. at 163 n.2 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-411(c)(2)).
210. Id. at 164.
211. See id. (citing Whelen Eng’g Co. v. Tomar Elecs., 672 F. Supp. 659 (D. Conn.
1987); McFaddin v. National Exec. Search, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Conn. 1973)).
212. See id. at 165. The court stated:
In the present case, Instruction [ISI] has directed its advertising activities via
the Internet and its [ISI’s] toll-free number toward not only the state of Connecticut, but to all states. The Internet as well as toll-free numbers are designed to communicate with people and their businesses in every state. Advertisement on the Internet can reach as many as 10,000 Internet users within
Connecticut alone. Further, once posted on the Internet, unlike television and
radio advertising, the advertisement is available continuously to any Internet
user. ISI has therefore, purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing
business within Connecticut.
Id. Sort of like the man who says he loves all of the women in the world and is thereby legally engaged to marry each of them!
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A few subsequent cases have reached a similar result. In Maritz,
Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.,213 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri concluded that jurisdiction was proper
under the “commission of a tortious act” provision of the Missouri
long-arm statute. 214 An additional factor in Maritz favored jurisdiction: the defendant’s Web site was interactive and was programmed
to automatically respond to all inquiries. 215 The district court equated
the failure to restrict the Web site’s response with a conscious decision to purposefully transact business in every jurisdiction reached
by the Internet. 216
Likewise, in Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc.,217 the U.S. District Court for Massachusettes held it had that jurisdiction under the
Massachusetts long-arm statute 218 in an action alleging trademark
infringement.219 Hasbro, owner of the registered trademark “Clue®,”
alleged that its rights were infringed by Clue Computing’s use of the
web address “clue.com,” which Clue Computing had registered with
appropriate authorities. 220 To support its holding that jurisdiction
was proper, the Hasbro Court relied on the Web site; eight telephone
calls made over three years time from Clue Computing to Massachusetts telephone numbers; Clue Computing’s purchase of software
from a Massachusetts vendor (amount and cost unstated), and Clue
Computing’s provision of training services (not in Massachusetts) to
employees of Digital Equipment (headquarters in Massachusetts)
under a subcontract with another nonresident company, Professional
Training Services. 221 The Web site advertised Clue Computing’s services; listed the company’s address, telephone number, and e-mail
address; and allowed a site visitor to “instantly” send e-mail by
“clicking” a location on the web page.222 The Hasbro Court emphasized advertising text on Clue Computing’s Web site that described
Clue Computing as a “virtual company” able to provide services
“anywhere on the planet.”223

213. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
214. See id. at 1331 (citing MO. REV . S TAT. § 506.500.1(3)).
215. See id. at 1333.
216. See id.; see also Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 3-5 (D.D.C. 1996)
(discussing a company’s Internet site plus advertisement in a local newspaper as activities
designed to purposefully avail itself of the forum’s privileges).
217. 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997).
218. MASS. G EN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3 (West 1997).
219. See Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 43-44.
220. See id. at 38.
221. See id. at 37.
222. See id. at 38.
223. Id. The advertising apparently listed Digital Equipment as one of Clue Computing’s clients, see id. at 44, though that is somewhat inconsistent with the desription of the
indirect relationship between the two companies. See also Gary Scott Int’l, Inc. v. Baroudi,
981 F. Supp. 714, 716 (D. Mass. 1997) (basing jurisdiction on general Web site advertising,
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The district court provides a long discussion of cases concerning
Web sites, due process in general, and the Massachusetts long-arm
statute. 224 However, the basis for its conclusions can be stated rather
simply: connecting a Web site to the Internet is “placing a product
into the ‘stream of commerce.’”225 But the Asahi plurality opinion requires “something more” than that as a basis for jurisdiction; that
“something more” can be advertising in the forum state, which “indicate[s] an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum
State.”226 The district court found that Clue Computing “purposefully
directed” its advertising to Massachusetts because it directed its advertising at all states without expressly excluding Massachusetts. 227
After expressing “concern” about cases holding that jurisdiction can
be based on the mere existence of a Web site, 228 it went on to hold jurisdiction proper because, supposedly, here there were additional
facts: “soliciting business” in Massachusetts and “injury” in Massachusetts. 229
The district court’s attempt to justify its conclusion is at best,
weak. The Hasbro decision is, in effect, the same as the others: the
existence of a Web site constitutes purposeful advertising in every
jurisdiction from which it can be accessed, unless that jurisdiction is
somehow purposefully excluded. How a Web site owner might purposefully exclude a jurisdiction, however, is unclear. Equally problematic is the court’s reliance on the location of the injury. Any plaintiff that can allege an injury would suffer that injury wherever the
plaintiff was located.
A second theory used in cases finding Due Process satisfied with
even minor forum-state contact is that the defendant was (or probably was) aware of the plaintiff’s location before the alleged intentional tort was committed. 230 Some of these cases deal with trademark infringement, while others deal with defemation, but they all
generally rely on Supreme Court defamation cases such as Calder v.
Jones.231

plus one sale to a forum resident and an expressed intent to sell to a client that did business in the forum state (and many other states)).
224. See Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 40-46.
225. Id. at 41 (citing Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996)).
226. Id. at 42 (quoting Asahi Metals Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112
(1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion)).
227. Id. at 44.
228. Id. at 46 (citing Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn.
1996); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybe rgold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996)).
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., Telco Communs. v. An Apple a Day, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va.
1997).
231. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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In Calder, the Court noted that the defendant’s connection with
the forum state is the key consideration, but that, under some circumstances, the plaintiff’s connections with the state are relevant. 232
In Calder, the plaintiff was the special, intended focus of the defendants’ alleged tortious activities233 and the defendants were very
aware of where the plaintiff resided.234 Nevertheless, the Calder
Court still emphasized the defendant’s conduct and the defendant’s
knowledge of the plaintiff’s situation. 235
In Telco Communications v. An Apple a Day, Inc.,236 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia relied on Calder to extend tort jurisdiction to persons who merely cause comments to be
posted on Internet sites that may be accessible from the forum state.
In Telco, the defendant posted press releases with Business Wire requesting distribution in three states, not including Virginia.237 Evidence indicated, however, that Business Wire advertisements (which
the court apparently assumed the defendant had read) indicated that
it was distributed to a wide audience, including Internet sites such as
America Online (AOL), as well as other Virginia locations. 238 The district court expressly agreed with the Inset Systems conclusion that
posting an advertisement, even indirectly, on the Internet constitutes
purposefully doing business wherever the Internet reaches. 239
In Bochan v. LaFontaine,240 the same court held that posting allegedly defamatory comments on Internet newsgroup sites constituted the commission of a tort in Virginia because the acting person
used AOL services and AOL is a Virginia-based company.241 A second
defendant, who did not have an AOL account but did have an Internet Web site (albeit unrelated to the alleged defamation), was held on
the authority of Telco to be subject to jurisdiction with respect to the
alleged defamation.242 While the Bochan Court did mention Calder
232. See id. at 788.
233. See id. at 789.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 788.
236. 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997).
237. See id. at 407.
238. See id.
239. See id. at 406. Since the defendant posted two or three press releases, that satisfied the “regularly” soliciting business or “persistent course of conduct” requirements of the
Virginia long-arm statute. Id. at 405-07 (quoting VA. CODE ANN § 8.01-328.1(A)(4)).
240. 68 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Va. 1999).
241. Id. at 699 (citing VA. CODE ANN § 8.01-328.1(A)(3)).
242. See id. at 700-02; see also Telco Communs. v. An Apple a Day, Inc., 977 F. Supp.
404 (E.D. Va. 1997); Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43, 45 (D. Conn. 1997) (discussing stock
fraud via postings to Prodigy “discussion group,” including personalized messages to plaintiff); EDIAS Software Int’l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int’l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 418 (D. Ariz. 1996)
(discussing how the defendant posted allegedly damaging statements on Internet sites,
knowing that the plaintiff’s forum-based business would be damaged); Panavision Int’l,
L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (explaining how “cybersitter” pu rposefully registered the plaintiff’s name as domain name solely for the purpose of coercing
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in a footnote, it did not expressly place much reliance on that
case. 243
The decisions finding due process satisfied by the mere existence
of information available through the Internet and accessible from the
forum state have been criticized as contrary to logic and inconsistent
with well-established rules to the effect that national advertising is
not sufficiently focused to support jurisdiction in any particular forum. 244 In the Internet context, those decisions are particularly objectionable because their logical result would be that all established
rules limiting personal jurisdiction would be instantly eliminated by
connecting even the least interactive Web site with the Internet; all
Web site owners would be subject to worldwide jurisdiction.
It should come as no surprise that other courts have reached a different conclusion. In Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,245 the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that a Web site’s
existence was not sufficient to bring the out-of-state Web site owner
within the scope of New York’s “doing business” long-arm statute. 246
While the Web site had been established to promote future business
activities, no business had been conducted through the site by the
time litigation had started. 247 The parties did admit, though, that
New York residents both could and had visited the site. 248 The district court likened the Web site to an advertisement in a national
publication not targeted at a particular state, which does not satisfy
the statutory requirement for doing business in New York.249 In a
the plaintiff to buy him off). But see Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 728
(E.D. Pa. 1999) (determining that listserv and USENET postings are no different from
passive Web site and do not support a conclusion that a plaintiff directed its efforts toward
a forum).
243. See Bochan , 68 F. Supp. 2d at 698 n.16. In Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F.
Supp. 481 (W.D.N.C. 1997), the court went even further, first assuming that significant
numbers of forum residents had visited the defendant’s Web site, then holding that the defendant purposefully directed his business activities toward the forum. See id. at 487.
244. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. [Ariz.] v. Cybersell, Inc. [Fla.], 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir.
1997); S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540 n.3 (E.D.
Pa. 1999) (characterizing Inset Systems as “ancient”); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut,
L.L.C., 34 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D.S.C. 1999); Edberg v. Neogen Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.
Conn. 1998); Osteotech, Inc. v. Gensci Regeneration Sciences, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 349
(D.N.J. 1998); CFOs 2 Go, Inc. v. CFO 2 Go, Inc., No. C97-4676 SI, 1998 WL 320821 (N.D.
Cal. June 5, 1998); E-Data Corp. v. Micropatent Corp., 989 F. Supp. 173 (D. Conn. 1997);
Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL) (AJP.), 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
26, 1997); Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (N.D. Ill.
1997); Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997).
245. No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL) (AJP), 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
246. Id. at *12 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1)). The district court also held that the
Web site, even if it infringed the plaintiff’s trademark, constituted neither the commission
of a tort in New York nor the commission of a tort outside New York by a person who regularly does business in New York. See id. at *13 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2)-(3)).
247. See id. at *1.
248. See id.
249. See id. at *9-*12.
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footnote, the district court also noted that national advertisements
had been found not to meet the minimum contacts requirements of
the Due Process Clause. 250
A significant majority of Internet-related decisions refer to, or are
similar to, Zippo and use its three-category approach. Zippo category
one, represented by Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,251 includes
information-only sites not aimed at a large geographic area. The site
information content is of interest only in a limited geographic area
and there is little, if any, interactivity.252 A number of cases relying
on Zippo have held that the relevant Web site was passive, merely
providing information, and insufficient to support jurisdiction.253
The second Zippo category, represented by CompuServe, Inc. v.
Patterson,254 includes full-service Web sites that are highly interactive, are capable of completing all “normal” business transactions via
250. See id. at *11 n.13; see also Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356,
1364-65 (W.D. Ark. 1997) (agreeing that establishing a Web site does not support a conclusion that a Web site owner has placed its products in the stream of commerce sufficiently
to justify jurisdiction in a forum, where there are no other contacts).
251. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d , 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997). A New York
jazz club sued a Missouri jazz club alleging trademark infringement. See id. at 297. The
latter’s Web site was purely informational, with a calendar of events and an explanation of
how to obtain tickets, which could not be done through the Web site. See id. The defendant
night club’s market was obviously local.
252. See id. Such sites are similar to an advertisement in a Midwest U.S. local shopping circular that was inadvertently left in an airplane seat pocket and later read by a
bored Argentine passenger sitting in an airplane presently number 17 in line for takeoff
from JFK International on its way to Helsinki.
253. See, e.g., S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537,
541 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding Web site was essentially passive, even though one could send
e-mail and order advertising video through the site); Patriot Sys., Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21
F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1324 (D. Utah 1998) (concluding that since no details of Web site were
given, it was “passive advertisement” merely providing information); American Homecare
Fed’n, Inc. v. Paragon Scientific Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114 (D. Conn. 1998) (holding
Web site passive because it did not list any products for sale, nor did it provide any process
for ordering products, downloading files, or visiting other sites); Barrett v. Catacombs
Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 727 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding Web site was informational, contained no contracts to sell or solicitation, and was apparently not interactive). The Barrett
case also held that posting messages to USENET discussion groups and listservers is insufficient to support jurisdiction in a particular state because such postings are merely
available to anyone who wishes to read them and the person posting a message has no control over where it goes. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 728; cf. Graphic Controls Corp. v.
Utah Med. Prods., Inc., No. 96-CV-0459E(F), 1997 WL 276232, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 21,
1997), aff’d on other grounds, 149 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that simply making
information available nationwide via Internet does not demonstrate purposeful availment
of any particular state’s benefits; therefore, Internet site and toll-free telephone number
were treated equally).
254. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). CompuServe involved a multi-year series of business
dealings between a Texas resident (defendant) and an Ohio-based Internet service provider, which included a series of messages going both ways, files uploaded from Texas, and
the defendant selling his software programs through the plaintiff’s service. See id. at 126061. This was not a situation in which the plaintiff stumbled onto the defendant’s Web site;
rather, it was an on-going business relationship not significantly different than many nonInternet-mediated relationships. See id.
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the Internet, and have in fact mediated a number of commercial contacts with residents of a forum state. 255 One case using this analysis
concluded that the defendant’s Web site fell in the second category
comprising highly interactive commercial sites. 256 In GTE New Media
Services, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp.,257 the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia found that the relevant Web sites encouraged
Internet users to submit data (that is, information requests) and responded by providing the information.258 The Web sites involved were
Internet-based “Yellow Pages,” which are essentially identical with
the traditional paper “Yellow Pages.”259 The court found that the sites
were commercial in nature because the price the defendants could
charge for advertising was directly related to the number of persons
who used the sites. 260 Despite the court’s language, this decision
should not be read as holding that the Web site alone was sufficient
to justify exercising jurisdiction. What the court held was that the
defendants made money from forum-based advertisers because the
Web site was successful in attracting nonpaying users; therefore, the
Web site’s role was merely a factor in establishing contract prices. 261
Zippo’s third and final category includes Web sites falling in between the other two categories, that is, having some interactive features but not constituting a full-service, on-line business location. It
should be of little surprise that most cases fall into this third category, requiring further analysis. For example, in ESAB Group, Inc. v.
Centricut, L.L.C.,262 [ESAB Group II] the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Carolina held there was not a sufficient basis for
exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a patent infringement case. 263 In that case, the Web site was interactive to the
point that it allowed customers to place orders, but only after the

255. Such sites might be compared with a software development company’s combined
development center and retail store. A customer can wander in, try out software, and purchase a copy, then go to the development center and submit his own software for evaluation, signing the related contracts and communicating with company experts.
256. See GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C.
1998).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 38.
259. See id. at 32-33.
260. See id. at 39.
261. See id. at 38-39. The court said that the Web sites were “highly interactive” and
had a significantly commercial quality and nature. See id. at 38. That may, on the surface,
be correct. However, the interactivity is limited to allowing site visitors to choose the information they receive, just as a library patron might choose the hard-copy Yellow Pages
for a particular city, consult its index, and then turn to a specific page. The interactivity
did not involve any commercial-type transaction between the site visitor and the site owner
and there was no need for the site to obtain or retain the site visitor’s location.
262. 34 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D.S.C. 1999).
263. Id. at 334. In addition to having an interactive Web site, the defendant had actually sold a product directly to a forum resident. See id. at 329-30.
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customer called a toll free number and established an account. 264
Evidence indicated that this method was established specifically to
avoid doing business in the forum state. 265 The court, referring to
Zippo and other cases, held that merely categorizing a Web site as
interactive is not determinative; instead, the important issue is
whether the commercial activity relates to the forum state, whether
conducted via the Internet or otherwise.266
In Millennium Enterprises, Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P.,267 the
U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon considered whether the
defendant’s interactive Web site (plus one plaintiff-arranged sale to
Oregon) was sufficient to support jurisdiction over the South Carolina defendant.268 The district court’s opinion contains an exhaustive
review of the Internet-related court decisions up to that time and
reached the well-reasoned conclusion that jurisdiction could not be
exercised in Oregon.269 In the process, the district court held that for
due process purposes “doing business” in a jurisdiction requires
knowing and repeated contacts over time, and that publishing an
Internet Web site does not alone constitute knowing contact with any
particular state. 270 While establishing a Web site might make it foreseeable that persons in other jurisdictions might purchase products
through the Web site, foreseeability alone does not confer jurisdiction.271
Nor, the court held, does the fact that someone who accesses a
Web site can purchase a compact disc render the Web site owner’s
actions “purposefully directed” at the forum from which access was
made.272 It is the conduct of the defendants, rather than the medium
utilized by them, to which the parameters of specific jurisdiction apply.273 The district court’s opinion is clearly consistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s due process decisions, particularly in respect to the
264. See id. at 327.
265. See id.
266. Id. at 330-31. The court noted that basing jurisdiction solely on the existence of a
Web site would subject any Web site owner to worldwide jurisdiction and would “eviscerate” existing personal jurisdiction requirements. See id. at 331 n.4 (citing Edberg v. Neogen Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 104, 115 (D. Conn. 1998)).
267. 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Or. 1999).
268. Id. at 913-14.
269. See id. at 923-24.
270. See id. at 920-21.
271. See id. at 921 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980)).
272. Id. at 922.
273. See id. After reviewing the content of the Web site, the district court concluded
that if the site targeted any particular area, it was the area around the defendants’ retail
outlets in South Carolina. See id.; see also Scherr v. Abrahams, No. 97C 5433, 1998 WL
299678, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 1998) (holding that the ability of Web site viewers to add
their e-mail address to Web site’s electronic mailing list, without action by Web site owner,
is insufficient to support a conclusion that the owner targeted the viewer’s state of residence).
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observation that what is required is some conscious choice by the defendant to act within (or act in a way that may have an impact in)
the forum jurisdiction.
There is apparently some comfort in “following” Zippo’s lead and
assuming it provides some structure. However, as noted above, the
almost infinite variability of interactivity places all but the clearest
cases in the third, middle category and Zippo’s substance is reduced
to a recognition that there are clear cases on either end of a broad
spectrum with an erratic progression from one end to the other. Perhaps the most one can say about how the decisions sort out along the
spectrum is that as a site’s interactive capability increases, the possibility of a court’s finding jurisdictional requirements satisfied also
increases. However, there is a parallel and, perhaps, more important
trend for the evidence of actual contacts by forum residents to increase as a Web site’s interactivity increases. Thus, in cases where
the court has found due process requirements satisfied, it is highly
likely that evidence of successful commercial contacts with the forum’s residents exists. 274
Given the relatively low level of interaction required to satisfy judicial specific jurisdiction due process, one might wonder at the significant percentage of cases that result in a “no jurisdiction” conclusion. Upon some reflection, however, one should realize that Internet
connections become an issue only when the evidence of “real world”
contacts with the forum is weak or nonexistent. If there are numerous and obvious real world contacts, the issue of jurisdiction will
probably not arise or, if it does, there is no need to resort to evidence
of cyberspace contacts. As the real world evidence gets weaker, cyberspace contacts are presented to reinforce the weak spots. The desired end is proving that the defendant has had relevant, knowing
contacts with the forum state. While that can be accomplished with
evidence of communications only (clearly demonstrated by Burger
King),275 it takes a significant level of communication to equal the
weight of even a temporary physical presence.
With those qualifications in mind, some generalizations are possible. It is unlikely that a court will determine it can exercise personal
274. See, e.g., Westcode, Inc. v. RBE Elec., Inc., No. CIV.A.99-3004, 2000 WL 124566
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2000); Stomp, Inc. v. NeatO, L.L.C., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (C.D. Cal. 1999);
Park Inns Int’l, Inc. v. Pacific Plaza Hotels, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 762 (D. Ariz. 1998); American Network, Inc. v. Access America/Connect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y.
1997). But see Millennium Enter., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 907 (finding that the defendant’s
interactive site allowed customer purchases but the only forum-connected sale was arranged by plaintiff’s attorneys); E-Data Corp. v. Micropatent Corp., 989 F. Supp. 173, 17677 (D. Conn. 1997) (finding that the defendant’s site was a full-service “store” selling licenses to use its photographs and that it did not need or record identifying information of
customers; and finding, therefore, no evidence of forum-state contact).
275. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (rejecting notion
that physical presence is necessary).
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jurisdiction over a Web site owner if the Web site just provides information,276 even if that information includes a toll-free number to
contact the site owner 277 or the ability to contact the site owner via an
e-mail link. 278 If the subject Web site has low interactivity or there is
little evidence of actual forum contacts, a significant factor appears
to be how the “advertising” aspect of a Web site is viewed by the
court. In Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,279 the court went
to significant lengths to emphasize the power and persistence of webbased advertising, as compared to other types of national advertising
(for example telephone “yellow pages,” television, radio, and newspapers, all which have limited availability), attempting to justify the
conclusion that the Web site purposefully targeted each jurisdiction.280 On the other hand, most courts that have held they could not
exercise jurisdiction equated Web site advertising with other types of
nationwide advertising that has consistently been held not to “target”
any particular jurisdiction. 281
276. See, e.g., American Homecare Fed’n, Inc. v. Paragon Scientific Corp., 27 F. Supp.
2d 109 (D. Conn. 1998); Patriot Sys., Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (D. Utah
1998); No Mayo—San Francisco v. Memminger, No. C-98-1392 (DJH), 1998 WL 544974
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1998); SF Hotel Co., v. Energy Inv., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Kan.
1997); Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,
No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL) (AJP), 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1977). But see, e.g., GTE
New Media Servs., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 27, 38 (D.D.C. 1998) (explaining
that the site in question was “interactive” only in the sense that browsers could “search”
for information from a relatively large database).
277. See, e.g., Edberg v. Neogen Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Conn. 1998); Graphic
Controls Corp. v. Utah Med. Prods., Inc., No. 96-CV-0457E(F), 1997 WL 276232 (W.D.N.Y.
May 27, 1997), aff’d, 149 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998). But see, e.g., IA, Inc. v. Thermacell
Techs., Inc., 983 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Gary Scott, Int’l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F.
Supp. 714 (D. Mass. 1997).
278. See, e.g., Mink v. AAAA Dev’t, L.L.C., 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999); 3D Systems,
Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Cybersell, Inc. [Ariz.] v. Cybersell, Inc. [Fla.], 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997); Brown v. Geha-Werke GmbH, 69 F. Supp.
2d 770 (D.S.C. 1999); Osteotech, Inc. v. Gensci Regeneration Sciences, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d
349 (D.N.J. 1998). In Butler v. Beer Across America, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1268 (N.D. Ala.
2000), the district court concluded that even though the Web site allowed the purchase of
products, there were insufficient forum contacts because the number of actual orders from
forum residents were so minuscule.
279. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
280. Id. at 165; see also Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo.
1996); State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. App. 1997), aff’d by an
evenly divided court, 576 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998) (emphasizing the 24-hour, long-term
availability of Web site advertising).
281. See, e.g., ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, L.L.C., 34 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D.S.C. 1999);
VP Intellectual Properties, L.L.C. v. Imtec Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269 (D.N.J. 1999);
Edberg v. Neogen Corp. 17 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Conn. 1998); Osteotech, Inc. v. Gensci Regeneration Sciences, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D.N.J. 1998); CFOs 2 Go, Inc. v. CFO 2 Go,
Inc., No. C97-4676 SI, 1998 WL 320821 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 1998); E-Data Corp. v. Micropatent Corp., 989 F. Supp. 173 (D. Conn. 1997); Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327
(D.N.J. 1997); Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) (N.D. Ill.
1997); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL) (AJP), 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 26, 1997). But see Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 45 (D. Mass.
1997) (holding that establishing a Web site injected the contested trademark “into the
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If there is evidence of actual contact with forum residents, the
possibility of a positive jurisdictional finding increases, 282 but if those
contacts are sporadic or not economically significant a negative finding is still possible. 283 In Maritz, for example, one of the cases where
the court found jurisdiction existed, the court placed significant
weight on the fact that the Web site computer was programmed to
respond “indiscriminately” to browsers’ requests. 284
In situations of high interactivity, courts are more likely to find
jurisdiction exists, both because evidence of actual forum contacts is
more likely to exist and because the Web site is designed to transact
business without regard to customer location. The importance of evidence of actual contacts was demonstrated in E-Data Corp. v. Micropatent Corp.285 In that case, the Web site was highly interactive;
browsers could chose, order, pay for, and receive the company’s principle product, digitalized photographs. 286 However, the Web site did
not require or retain customers’ location; the only retained record
was the charge-card transaction number.287 The court held that jurisdiction had not been established despite the site’s interactivity
level. 288
Conversely, Web site limitations can reduce the potential for jurisdiction. JB Oxford Holdings, Inc. v. Net Trade, Inc.,289 a recent
case decided by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
stream of commerce” and only slight additional forum contacts were sufficient to establish
jurisdiction; some active measure must be taken to “avoid” forum state).
282. See, e.g., Vitullo v. Velocity Powerboats, Inc., No. 97 C 8745, 1998 WL 246152
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 1998); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D.
Pa. 1997); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997); Gary
Scott Int’l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714 (D. Mass. 1997); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc. 947 F.
Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996). In Superguide Corp. v. Kegan , 987 F. Supp. 481 (W.D.N.C.
1997), the district court based its finding that jurisdiction existed on the assumptions that
a significant number of forum residents had accessed the Web site and that they then interacted with it. See id. at 487 (“While the number of hits to defendant’s website originating in North Carolina is not now before the court, a reasonable inference which arises is
that such are numerous inasmuch as North Carolina is one of the populated states . . . .”).
If one makes an unfounded assumption that the court’s assumptions are supportable, the
court’s decision is not unusual.
283. See, e.g., Mink v. AAAA Dev., L.L.C., 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999); JB Oxford
Holdings, Inc. v. Net Trade, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (S.D. Fla. 1999); CFOs 2 Go, Inc. v.
CFO 2 Go, Inc., No. C97-4676 SI, 1998 WL 320821 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 1998); Transcraft
Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (N.D. Ill. 1997); cf. Pres-Kap,
Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (holding regularly accessing Florida database does not support jurisdiction when enabling lease contract
and all other contacts centered in New York and the location of the database computer was
unimportant and may not have been known to the defendant).
284. See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc. 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
285. 989 F. Supp. 173 (D. Conn. 1997).
286. See id. at 174-75.
287. See id. at 175.
288. See id. at 177.
289. 76 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
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Florida is a good example. In that case the Web site expressly identified the states in which the site owner did business, and Florida was
not included.290 The court held there was no jurisdiction.291
It is difficult to draw an overall conclusion from these cases, but
here is perhaps one. Plaintiffs must still prove that the defendant did
something that could reasonably be expected to engender legal problems in the jurisdiction where the litigation was commenced. No case
eliminates this fundamental requirement for judicial jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process Clause.
2. Judicial General Jurisdiction and Internet Sites
As discussed in Part III.B, there is a constitutionally significant
distinction between judicial “general” jurisdiction and judicial “specific” jurisdiction. Due process requirements for the latter may be
satisfied with a few acts directly connected with the subject matter of
the action and the forum. 292 In contrast, judicial general jurisdiction
must be based on evidence that shows a regular, significant, ongoing
relationship with the forum, a relationship much the same as a resident’s, such that it is reasonable for the forum to exercise jurisdiction
with respect to any and all matters. 293 Only a few decisions discuss
general jurisdiction in an Internet context.
In cases where a Web site only provided information about the
site owner and its products, the best-reasoned decisions have treated
it as “mere” advertising which does not begin to meet the “continuous
and systematic” type of forum activities necessary to establish general jurisdiction.294 The result has been the same when the Web site
allows preparation and printout of an order form for mailing, fax, or
direct e-mail. 295 Even in cases involving highly interactive Web sites,
the usual conclusion has been that general jurisdiction is not estab290. See id. at 1365, 1367.
291. See id. at 1368.
292. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
293. See discussion supra Part III.B.1; see also, e.g., Atlantech Distribution, Inc. v.
Credit Gen. Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 534, 536 (D. Md. 1998) (citing ESAB Group, Inc. v.
Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 623 (4th Cir. 1997)).
294. See, e.g., Westcode, Inc. v. RBE Elec., Inc., No. CIV.A.99-3004, 2000 WL 124566
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2000); Atlantech Distribution, 30 F. Supp. 2d 534; Weber v. Jolly Hotels,
977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997). In Atlantech Distribution, the court stated:
To subject [defendant] Colonial Mechanical to general personal jurisdiction
based on its Internet presence would mean that it would presumably be subject
to general personal jurisdiction in every jurisdiction in the country, thereby allowing a plaintiff to sue it for any matter anywhere in the nation. This the constitution does not permit.
Atlantech Distribution, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
295. See, e.g., Mink v. AAAA Dev., L.L.C., 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999); VP Intellectual
Properties, L.L.C. v. Imtech Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 1999). Cf.
McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1826, 1996 WL 753991 (S.D.
Cal. Aug. 5, 1999).
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lished. For example, in Coastal Video Communications Corp. v.
Staywell Corp.296 the court characterized the Web site as the effective
equivalent of having in-state salesmen or a physical store, but it still
found general jurisdiction had not been proven because “there must
be proof that the website is actually reaching a portion of the state’s
population.”297
In ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, L.L.C.,298 the Web site provided
product and ordering information, and a customer could submit orders through the Web site if it had previously established an account
by non-Internet contact. 299 In addition, there was evidence of actual
mail-order sales to forum residents, but those represented less than
one-tenth of a percent of the defendant’s sales. 300 The district court
stated:
This court finds . . . that merely categorizing a web site as interactive or passive is not conclusive of the jurisdictional issue. General
in personam jurisdiction must be based on more than a defendant’s
mere presence on the Internet even if it is an “Interactive” presence. 301

Only one case has been found in which the court found general jurisdiction existed based, in part, on the defendant’s Web site. In
Mieczkowski v. Masco Corp.,302 the U.S. District Court for the East296. 59 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D. Va. 1999). In describing the Web site, the district court
stated that the defendant:
[H]as established an on-line storefront that is readily accessible to every person
in Virginia with a computer, a modem, and access to the World Wide Web.
Thus, instead of using physical assets such as sample-bearing salesmen, or traditional business offices . . . [defendant] Krames is able to provide the same
level of service via the Internet’s instant connections.
Id. at 569.
297. Id. at 571 (citing Loumar v. Smith, 698 F.2d 759, 763 (1983)). The court granted a
motion to engage in discovery to learn if there had been actual contacts with forum residents. See Coastal Video, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 572; see also, e.g., Origin Instruments Corp. v.
Adaptive Computer Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 397 CV2595-L, 1999 WL 76794 (N.D. Tex. Feb.
3, 1999) (holding a Web site highly interactive because it provided the ability to purchase
and download software). In Westcode, Inc. v. RBE Electronics, Inc., No. CIV.A.99-3004,
2000 WL 124566 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2000), the court bluntly stated: “A corporation or individual is not subject to general jurisdiction in a foreign forum simply by virtue of an Inte rnet presence.” Id. at *5 (dicta). Note that being “effectively equivalent to a physical store”
for Due Process Clause purposes is not the same thing as establishing a nexus for Commerce Clause purposes.
298. 34 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D.S.C. 1999).
299. See id. at 327.
300. See id. at 326. In a previous decision involving the same parties, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had held that no general jurisdiction had been established
based on the defendant’s in-forum activities, but in that case the existence of the Web site
had not been included in the evidence. See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, L.L.C., 126 F. 3d
617 (4th Cir. 1997).
301. ESAB Group, 34 F. Supp. at 330 (citations omitted); see also Origin Instruments,
1999 WL 76794, at *2 (discussing highly interactive Web site that allowed purchase and
download of software products).
302. 997 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
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ern District of Texas considered a product liability action very similar to World-Wide Volkswagen. A Virginia couple purchased a bunk
bed from a Washington, D.C., retailer.303 The product had been
manufactured by defendant Rose Furniture, a North Carolina company.304 Twelve years later, in North Carolina, the couple sold the
bed to another North Carolina couple, who moved to Texas a year
later. 305 There, fourteen years after the bed was originally sold, the
second couple’s son died when he became entangled between the bed
railings. 306 The action against Rose Furniture (and others) alleged
that the death was caused by defective product design.307 The North
Carolina defendant contended that the Texas courts (and, therefore,
the federal court sitting in diversity) did not have jurisdiction. 308 The
district court first discussed whether “specific jurisdiction” existed
and concluded it did not because there was no evidence that it was
foreseeable that this bed would be taken to Texas. 309
The district court went on to consider whether there were sufficient contacts between the defendant and Texas to support general
jurisdiction. The defendant had no offices, employees, agents, or
property in Texas and was not licensed to do business there. 310 However, the defendant had had business dealings with Texas residents,
including the following: (1) selling $5.7 million worth of products over
six years; (2) consummating over 250 transactions worth $717,000 in
1997 (apparently the year of filing); (3) receiving 3.2% of its gross income from Texas sales over a four-year period; (4) mailings to previous Texas-resident customers twice a year; (5) purchasing 0.2% of its
furniture from a Texas manufacturer during the preceding three
years; and (6) maintaining a Web site accessible to approximately 2.2
million Texas residents. 311
With regard to the Web site, the court found that it was much
more than a “traditional” advertisement. 312 At the Web site, persons
could browse through the furniture selections, obtain information
about specific items (construction, materials, price), print out (but
not electronically submit) an order form, check prior orders’ status,

303. See id. at 783.
304. See id.
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. See id.
309. Id. at 785. The similarity between this case and World-Wide Volkswagen was too
obvious to allow a different conclusion concerning special jurisdiction.
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. See id. at 787.
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and communicate with sales representatives by e-mail. 313 In addition,
the defendant responded to all inquiries through the Web site.314
In considering its conclusion, the district court reviewed a number
of prior decisions dealing with Web sites and jurisdiction. It found
Rose Furniture’s Web site akin to the one involved in Maritz, in that
both sites were interactive, soliciting business generally (without discrimination based on location), and promoting the owners’ business. 315 In its conclusion, the district court stated:
The Court need not decide today whether standing alone the Web
site maintained by the defendant is sufficient to satisfy a finding of
general jurisdiction. Nor must it look only to the traditional business contacts that the defendant has with the State of Texas.
Rather, it is the combination of the two that leads the Court to the
conclusion that the defendant maintains substantial, continuous
and systematic contacts with Texas sufficient to subject it to [general] personal jurisdiction.316

The court’s reasoning would have been more convincing if there had
been evidence of Internet-mediated sales to Texas residents, or even
that a number of Texas residents had actually communicated via the
Web site. 317
It is not obvious that the defendant’s non-Internet contacts with
Texas would satisfy the general jurisdiction requirements discussed
in Helicopteros.318 Rose Furniture did have continuing “traditional”
contacts with Texas over a period of time and those were part of its
regular business activity, selling furniture.319 It is also true that the
defendant’s forum contacts in Helicopteros were less regular and
were auxiliary to its regular business of flying helicopters in South
America. 320 On the other hand, Rose Furniture did not have any offices or other physical presence in the forum state, which contrasts
with the defendant in Perkins,321 where the defendant had its principal officer, office, and management operations in the forum state. 322

313. See id.
314. See id.
315. See id. at 788 (discussing Inset Sys. Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161
(D. Conn. 1996); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996)).
316. Mieczkowski, 997 F. Supp. at 788.
317. See Coastal Video Communs., Corp. v. Staywell Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D.
Va. 1999). In Coastal, a customer could complete a purchase transaction; thus, the court
said the site was the effective equivalent of a “brick and mortar” store in the forum. See id.
at 569. However, there was no evidence concerning the extent of the defendant’s actual
contacts with forum residents, through the Web site or otherwise, and the court held that
it did not have sufficient information to rule on the issue of general jurisdiction. Id. at 572.
318. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
319. See Mieczkowski, 997 F. Supp. at 787.
320. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 410-11.
321. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
322. See id. at 447-48.
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If the allegedly defective product had been sold in Texas (either via
the Web site or the “traditional” distribution process), there is no
question that Rose Furniture’s actions would support specific jurisdiction. But there is little to suggest that combining two routes to
specific jurisdiction can create a sufficient basis for general jurisdiction.
Mieczkowski illustrates one problem with finding a Web site’s existence as a sufficient basis for specific jurisdiction; this same problem was discussed by the U.S. District Court for Oregon in Millennium Enterprises, Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P. 323 The Web site in
Millennium was slightly more interactive than the one in
Mieczkowski because a browser could complete a purchase through
the Web site.324 The district court held that it did not have general
jurisdiction over the defendant, which was clearly supported by the
fact that there had been only one sale to a forum resident, and that
was “arranged” by the plaintiff.325 The court concluded that a Web
site, per se, was insufficient to support judicial specific jurisdiction;
because is no deliberate action by the Web site owner within the forum. 326 In the process the district court astutely observed:
[A] Web site is not automatically projected to a user’s computer
without invitation as are advertisements in a newspaper or on the
television and radio. Rather, the user must take affirmative action
to access either a passive or interactive Web Site. . . . Thus, contrary to the scenario described in Inset, information published on
Web sites is not thrust upon users indiscriminately.
....
Absent actual exchanges or transactions with residents of the forum or evidence that local residents were [purposefully] targeted,
the distinctions between specific and general jurisdiction become
blurred. . . . Web sites are accessible day and night to all who possess the necessary technological know-how and equipment. Thus,
if an interactive Web site can constitute “purposeful availment” of a
forum [for specific jurisdiction purposes] simply by being continuously accessible to residents of that forum, surely that contact can
be considered as “continuous and systematic” for purposes of general jurisdiction. Taking this reasoning to its logical conclusion, a
plaintiff could sue a foreign defendant in any forum and claim jurisdiction based on the defendant’s interactive Web site, even if the
cause of action is unrelated to the Web site. Such results hardly
conform with notions of “fair play and substantial justice.” The

323. 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Or. 1999).
324. Id. at 908-09. During the period from March through September, 1998, 0.01% of
the defendant’s sales were through the Web site. See id.
325. See id. at 909-10; see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
326. See Millennium, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 922.
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grasp of personal jurisdiction was never intended to reach so far
and so wide.327

The district court clearly identified the most significant objection
to determining that the existence of a Web site, by itself, is a sufficient basis for permitting general jurisdiction in a particular forum:
there is no rational way to limit the logic to one forum. Any logic
supporting the conclusion would apply equally to any forum from
which the Internet can be accessed, that is, the entire world. Such a
conclusion is contrary to the theories that underlie both due process
requirements and generally accepted international law principles.
D. Commerce Clause Limitations
Justice Frankfurter penned some lines that need to be kept firmly
in mind when reviewing court decisions concerning constitutional issues in general, and Commerce Clause-related state tax issues in
particular:
Constitutional provisions are often so glossed over with commentary that imperceptibly we tend to construe the commentary
rather than the text. We cannot, however, be too often reminded
that the limits on the otherwise autonomous powers of the states
are those in the Constitution and not verbal weapons imported
into it. “Taxable event,” “jurisdiction to tax,” “business situs,” “extraterritoriality,” are all compendious ways of implying the impotence of state power because state power has nothing on which to
operate. These tags are not instruments of adjudication but statements of result. . . .
. . . Ambiguous intimations of general phrases in opinions torn
from the significance of concrete circumstances, or even occasional
deviations over a long course of years, not unnatural in view of the
confusing complexities of tax problems, do not alter the limited nature of the function of this Court when state taxes come before it.
. . . We must be on guard against . . . [relying on] formulas that are
not compelled by the Constitution but merely represent judicial
generalizations exceeding the concrete circumstances which they
profess to summarize.328

As can be seen in the following discussion, what started (and remains) a jurisdictional (due process) issue has “imperceptibly” con327. Id. at 922-23 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). To the same effect regarding
“global” jurisdiction, see Cybersell, Inc. [Ariz.] v. Cybersell, Inc. [Fla.], 130 F.3d 414 (9th
Cir. 1997); Atlantech Distrib. Inc. v. Credit Gen. Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (D. Md.
1998); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Playboy Enter., Inc. v.
Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See also McDonough v.
Fallon McElligott, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1826, 1996 WL 753991 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5,
1996) (general jurisdiction based only on Web site would “eviscerate” personal jurisdiction
requirements).
328. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940).
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verted to a Commerce Clause issue by reference to formulae and
“magic words.”
1. In General
As noted earlier, resolving due process issues does not exhaust the
constitutional limitations on taxing Internet-mediated activities. Article I, section 8, of the United States Constitution grants to Congress the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. 329 As
long ago as 1824, Supreme Court opinions noted the “negative” or
“dormant” aspects of the Commerce Clause, that is, the fact that this
delegation of power to Congress precludes states from enforcing rules
that interfere with interstate commerce. 330 The limitations apply to
all types of state rules, including tax rules. 331
Legal theory concerning how to determine if a state act is invalid
due to Commerce Clause limitations has undergone somewhat erratic changes, similar to theories relating to other aspects of the relationship between state and federal regulation of commercial activities. 332 The narrow definition of “interstate commerce” that prevailed
before the 1930s fixed a definite line between intrastate and interstate activities and rather inflexible rules concerning state taxation.
In 1888, the Supreme Court held that “no State has the right to lay a
tax on interstate commerce in any form.”333 The sea-change reinterpretation of “interstate commerce” in the 1930s required a reevaluation of the relationship between state regulation and interstate
commerce.334 As will be seen, however, the changes have not resulted
in a revision of all pre-1930s rules.
Current Commerce Clause theory allows state regulation of persons and things involved in interstate commerce so long as the regulation does not discriminate against or “unduly burden” interstate

329. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
330. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 231-32, 239 (1824) (Johnson, J.,
concurring).
331. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995).
332. See generally I JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE
TAXATION ch. 4 (3d ed. 1998) (offering a detailed discussion of historical and modern application of the Commerce Clause to state tax issues) [hereinafter STATE TAXATION].
333. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888). A few years later that statement was somewhat modified to preclude only direct burdens on interstate commerce. See
Sanford v. Poe, 165 U.S. 194 (1897).
334. If there had been no revision of the rules concerning state regulation, the adoption
of the “affectation” doctrine concerning federal jurisdiction with respect to interstate commerce would have virtually eliminated state regulation of any commerce-related activity. A
seminal statement of that reevaluation in the state tax arena is Justice Rutledge’s opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part in three companion cases: McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335
(1944); and International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944).
That opinion is published following the International Harvester decision at 322 U.S. at 349.
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commerce.335 The watershed case for current state taxation theory is
the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady.336 In that case, the Court articulated a four-part test to determine if a state tax runs afoul of the Commerce Clause. Under that
test, a state tax is not invalid “when [1] the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4]
is fairly related to the services provided by the State.”337 The application of this test has not been easy or straightforward.
The fourth factor is rarely a problem because there is no requirement of economic parity between taxes paid and services provided, 338
and the existence of general government functions (police, courts,
roads, and so on) has been found adequate justification for almost
any level of taxation.339 With respect to the third factor (discrimination) the pre- and post-Complete Auto cases have been fairly consistent. State taxation unconstitutionally discriminates when it imposes
greater burdens on interstate activities than it does on in-state activities. 340 Thus a tax on the value of corporate shares that imposes a
significantly higher tax with respect to foreign corporations is invalid. 341 It is possible to impose one tax on domestic taxpayers and a different tax on out-of-state taxpayers, but the state must show economic equivalence, which has proven very difficult in practice. 342 The
combination of sales and use taxes has survived scrutiny even
though use taxes, taken alone, would clearly discriminate against interstate commerce.343 Use taxes are imposed on goods used in a taxing jurisdiction if the state’s sales taxes were not paid when those
goods were purchased.344 The most frequent reason for not paying local sales taxes is purchase outside the jurisdiction. Use taxes are
saved from invalidation by allowing a credit for sales taxes paid to
other jurisdictions. 345
A tax that does not discriminate may still place an undue burden
on interstate commerce, principally through multiple taxation. The

335. See generally Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159
(1983); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’nr of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
336. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
337. Id. at 279.
338. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 199 (1995).
339. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626, 629 (1981).
340. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 341 (1992).
341. See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 333 (1996).
342. See, e.g., South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999); Oregon Waste
Sys. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
343. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
344. See, e.g., id. at 580-81.
345. See id. at 583-84; see also Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175,
199 (1995).
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multiple-taxation issue is directly addressed under the second Complete Auto factor (“fairly apportioned”), by determining if the tax is
“internally consistent” and, if so, whether it is “externally consistent.”346 (One must take these two terms as “words of art” and not
seek a close definitional relationship between the terms and the inquiries they label.) For the “internal consistency” test, one assumes
that every state adopts an identically worded tax.347 The tax is acceptable if no double taxation would result. 348 For example, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.,349 the state imposed a
sales tax on bus transportation tickets sold in the state for transportation originating in the state. 350 This passes the internal consistency
test because those combined events can only happen in one state.351
The “external consistency” test is not so straightforward. Its expressed purpose is to transcend formal names and designations to
determine if the value being taxed, or part of it, might also be taxed
in another state. 352 If potential double taxation exists, the tax is invalid. Failing the external consistency test can be avoided by apportionment, credits, or some other method.353 However, problems arise
when formalities and labels are completely cast aside for economic effects.
In Jefferson Lines, the tax was imposed on the buyer, measured by
the ticket’s gross price. 354 Labels aside, the passenger’s transportation expense is the transportation company’s gross income, an
equivalence too obvious to ignore. Before Jefferson Lines, the Court
had considered a New York gross income tax, as applied to bus
transportation companies, in Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Mealey.355 The Court invalidated the tax in Central Greyhound because it was not apportioned; the transportation company’s gross income was earned as its buses traveled through various states. 356 The
place where the income was received (ticket purchased) was not
where the income was earned (moving passengers).357 States other
than New York could justifiably tax gross income earned in that
346. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 199; see also Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989);
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
347. See Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185.
348. See id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 177-78.
351. See id. at 185.
352. See id.
353. See id.; see also, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298
(1994) (formula allocation of worldwide income); Container Corp. of America, 463 U.S. 159
(same); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937) (facially discriminatory use tax
saved by credit for out-of-state sales tax paid).
354. See Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 177-78.
355. 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
356. See id. at 663.
357. See id. at 660-61.
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state, thereby duplicating the New York tax.358 While the “external
consistency” test had not then been articulated, the Court invalidated the tax on Commerce Clause grounds due to the potential for
multiple taxation.359 The Court noted that apportioning the gross income based on passenger miles within the state could avoid the problem. 360
The dissent in Jefferson Lines, logically, points out that the Oklahoma tax and the New York tax were both on the gross ticket price. 361
The dissent states: “[A]s a practical matter, in respect to both taxes,
the State will calculate the tax bill by multiplying the rate times
gross receipts from sales; the bus company will pay the tax bill; and,
the company will pass the tax along to the customer.”362 In other
words, under the external consistency test, as articulated in theory,
the tax in Jefferson Lines is not distinguishable from the tax in Central Greyhound. One difference the dissent did not note was that in
one (Jefferson Lines—sales tax) the tax is separately stated in the
customer’s bill, while in the other (Central Greyhound—gross receipts) the tax is hidden in the ticket price.
The Jefferson Lines majority distinguished the two taxes on formalities, the taxable event (purchasing a ticket versus providing services) and the taxpayer (ticket purchaser versus service provider). 363
The majority supported that distinction and stated:
[O]ur cases are implicit with the understanding that the Commerce Clause does not forbid the actual assessment of a succession
of taxes by different States on distinct events as the same tangible
object flows along. . . . In light of this settled treatment of taxes on
sales of goods and other successive taxes related through the
stream of commerce, it is fair to say that because the taxable event
of the consummated sale of goods has been found to be properly
treated as unique, and internally consistent, conventional sales tax
has long been held to be externally consistent as well.364

The Court went on to justify similar treatment for sales taxes on services, even when some portion of those services may be performed
outside the taxing state. 365 Perhaps the key point in the majority’s
distinction of Central Greyhound is that in Central Greyhound the
Court understood the New York gross receipts tax to be “simply a variety of tax on income, which was required to be apportioned to reflect the location of the various interstate activities by which it [is]
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

See id. at 662.
See id. at 661-63.
See id. at 663.
Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 203-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 204.
See id. at 186-87.
Id. at 187-88 (citations omitted).
See id. at 192.
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earned.”366 In other words, an “income tax” is distinct from a “sales
tax” for Commerce Clause external consistency purposes, even if the
two are economically equivalent.367
This extended discussion of Jefferson Lines is not intended as
criticism. Rather, it demonstrates that despite the theory of the
Commerce Clause “external consistency” test, traditional distinctions
between various types of taxes (income, property, excise, sales, and
so forth) will not be ignored. Reading between the lines of the majority’s opinion in Jefferson Lines reveals why that is so. If all labels are
ignored, there could be only one tax along the stream of commerce
from the raw materials producer to the final consumer. That, obviously, would invalidate entire tax structures through which state and
federal governments obtain operating funds.
2. Commerce Clause and Consumption Taxes
The most controversial aspect of taxing Internet-mediated activities relates to consumption taxes. In the United States, that currently means sales and use taxes. It appears that use taxes will
provide the battleground and baseline for Internet-related tax controversies, and perhaps for jurisdictional issues in general. Solutions reached with respect to consumption taxes fixing where Internet-mediated transactions and activities occur can be applied to
other taxes and regulations. 368 Perhaps unfortunately, sales and use
tax problems are not being approached with an open mind. Instead,
state and local tax authorities view them as merely another round
in their decades-long struggle to impose collection and payment obligations on mail-order sellers. 369 The fact that the states have generally lost the battles in that arena may account for the strident,
emotional character of their positions concerning Internet-based
sales. 370 And it was in a 1992 mail-order use tax case, Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 371 that the Supreme Court re-

366. Id. at 190. The majority gives traditional labels and treatment precedence over
functional economic e quivalence.
367. Perhaps one could infer, in theory, that the external consistency test can be failed
only by two or more taxes formally imposed on a single taxpayer. While that may seem a
rather long leap in logic, there is little else to distinguish Jefferson Lines from Central
Greyhound.
368. Unfortunately, Jefferson Lines might be used to rationalize employing inconsistent rules for different taxes.
369. See, e.g., Jeri Clausing, Foes of Internet Tax Ban Vow to Fight On, N.Y. TIMES ON
THE WEB, Apr. 4, 2000, at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/04/capital/04capital.
html (last visited Apr. 6, 2000). The article quotes Shawn Bullard, Associate Legislative
Director, National Association of Counties: “This was only one of many battles that we’ve
fought, and we are getting ready to fight again.” Id.; see also Appendix B.
370. See Appendix B.
371. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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minded 372 states and taxpayers of the distinction between Due Process and Commerce Clause limitations on state taxation. 373
For reasons not altogether obvious, sales and use taxes have been
treated as inherently distinct from other taxes. 374 Perhaps that is
only because they are consumption taxes imposed on the consumer. 375
As demonstrated in Jefferson Lines, the sales-and-use-tax combination rather easily satisfies the discrimination and “multiple burden”
tests. However, they have generated a series of cases concerning not
upon whom the tax can be imposed, but concerning who can be required to collect and remit taxes imposed on someone else. As will be
seen, this distinction has not been consistently recognized; the retail
seller/tax collector is often treated, if not referred to, as the taxpayer.
a. The Jurisprudence.—One surveying the current political and
legal discussions might conclude that the issues are new, and that
the only significant consideration is the technological changes over
the past thirty or so years. Actually, there is very little about the controversy that is new or has not been discussed many years ago. About
the only new thing is the amount of state revenue silicon-seers say is
involved. Starting further back, closer to beginnings, allows a more
objective consideration and reveals some explanations of otherwise
perplexing questions.
The current debate swirls around state officials’ contention that
they have, or should have, the right to compel all sellers to collect
state consumption taxes from purchasers and to remit the tax
amount (collected or not) to the purchasers’ state of residence. 376 If
forced to more precisely define the issue, state tax officials admit that

372. The term “reminded” is used purposefully. See Justice Rutledge’s opinion concerning the three companion cases, McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); General
Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); and International Harvester Co. v.
Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944), stating:
[T]hough overlapping, the two conceptions [Due process and dormant Commerce Clause] are not identical. There may be more than sufficient factual connections . . . between the transaction and the taxing state to sustain [a] tax as
against due process objections. Yet it may fall because of its burdening effect
upon the commerce. And, although the two notions cannot always be separated,
clarity of consideration and of decision would be promoted if the two issues are
approached . . . at least tentatively as if they were separate and distinct, not intermingled ones.
General Trading, 322 U.S. at 353.
373. See discussion supra note 372.
374. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175 (1995).
375. Other excise taxes with a similar economic effect are imposed on a taxable event
earlier in the distribution chain and are not separately stated on the consumer’s sales invoice. See infra text accompanying notes 381-386. If sales taxes were imposed on the seller
and not separately charged to the buyer, the Court would have had a more difficult problem in Jefferson Lines.
376. See generally infra Part III.B.2.b.
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the question is whether a state has the power to compel out-of-state
sellers to collect use taxes from that state’s residents. 377
The practice of having tax revenues collected and submitted by
someone other than the taxpayer is not new or limited to sales and
use taxes. The advantages are obvious: (1) the person with the duty
to remit is more likely to pay, since the funds paid are not the remitter’s (it is always easier to spend other persons’ money); (2) the number of persons with whom the tax authorities must deal is greatly reduced; and (3) there may be administrative problems collecting from
the taxpayer which are avoided when dealing with a third party. It
seems this final reason was among the earliest recognized. As early
as 1869, the Court noted that it was “common” in New England
states to require corporations to pay the tax levied on the shareholders and that, with respect to nonresident shareholders, “it is the only
mode in which the State can reach their shares for taxation.”378 The
Court found no constitutional impediment to a state requiring the officers of a national bank to withhold and pay state property taxes assessed against shareholders measured by their shareholdings. 379 That
method of collecting tax with respect to corporations has persisted for
at least a century.380
With the proliferation of automobiles and the resulting need for
road maintenance funds, states sought any viable means of collecting
funds and distributing the cost; road users were many and varied;
determining actual usage could be complicated and subject to manipulation. A rather elegant structure was created. The typical motor
fuel (or “gasoline”) tax was imposed on the persons who used it for
motor vehicle transportation, with the tax fixed at a specified price
per gallon.381 To cut collection costs, states imposed the duty to pay
taxes as far back the distribution chain as possible (refiner, importer,
distributor, retail dealer, in that order of preference), with the requirement or permission to pass the tax down to the ultimate consumer. 382 Since the tax was for road maintenance, the common gaso377. Of course if states have that power, they can enforce sanctions against sellers who
do not comply. Those sanctions are, invariably, that the seller pay the amount it “should”
have collected, plus penalties, interest, etc. See, e.g., Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S.
340, 341, 344 (1954).
378. National Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 361 (1869).
379. See id.; see also Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 443 (1910) (bank acts
as agent for shareholders); First Nat’l Bank v. County of Chehalis, 166 U.S. 440 (1897).
380. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435
(1944); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
381. The various states’ gasoline taxes had (and have) minor differences, but the general scheme and manner of tax collection were essentially identical. Some of the cases that
support the text description are the following: Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hopkins, 264 U.S. 137
(1924); Standard Oil Co. v. Kurtz, 330 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1964); Anastasio v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
42 A.2d 149 (Conn. 1945); Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 205 N.W. 72 (S.D. 1925); and Standard Oil Co. v. Brodie, 239 S.W. 753 (Ark. 1922).
382. See, e.g., Kurtz, 330 F.2d at 181-82 (describing tax on dealer).
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line tax allowed exemptions for farmers, stationary engine use, and
the like. 383 Because the tax was initially paid on all gasoline, exempt
users were required to individually apply for refunds from the state
(administrative convenience for the exempt consumer was apparently not a high-level consideration).384 When it was contended that a
state’s gasoline tax infringed on interstate commerce, the short answer was that the tax was on the privilege of using state highways,
which only happened after the gasoline had completed its interstate
journey.385 Similar schemes are used to collect other excise taxes. 386
When the persons required to collect the gas tax complained that
they were actually paying taxes imposed on other persons, the response was that the involuntary tax collectors were not being taxed
but merely being regulated.387 The Supreme Court expressly noted:
“[A] State which has, under its constitution, power to regulate the
business of selling gasoline . . . is not prevented by the [U.S. Constitution’s] due process clause from imposing the incidental burden.”388
By 1934, the Supreme Court could blithely say that the collection
method was “a common and entirely lawful arrangement.”389 However, when a state tried to impose the tax collection and payment obligation with respect to a sale that took place entirely outside the
state and was unconnected with the state, the Court held that tax
did not meet due process requirements. 390
The only located decision that specifically mentions accounting
duties with respect to interstate commerce is Bowman v. Continental
Oil Co.,391 decided in 1921. Continental imported gasoline into the
state and sold some in the same containers in which it was imported
(5.5% of sales) and the remainder from “broken” containers. 392 Since
1921 was before greater flexibility of definition was introduced, the
Court held that sales in the original containers were “in interstate
commerce” at the time of the sales and thus not subject to the state’s
gasoline excise tax.393 After reviewing the New Mexico statute, the
Court found that the statute itself was not separable (interstate ver383. See, e.g., Jones, 205 N.W. at 73-74.
384. See, e.g., id.
385. See Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 93 (1934).
386. See, e.g., Heyman v. Mahin, 275 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1971) (cigarette tax).
387. See, e.g., Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hopkins, 264 U.S. 137 (1924); Standard Oil Co. v. Brodie, 239 S.W. 753 (Ark. 1922).
388. Pierce Oil Corp., 264 U.S. at 139. The Arkansas Supreme Court made an identical, express ruling in Brodie, 239 S.W. at 756.
389. Monamotor Oil Co., 292 U.S. at 93 (citing Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 217
U.S. 443, 454 (1910), and Jones, 205 N.W. 72); see also Pierce Oil Corp., 264 U.S. 137; Brodie, 239 U.S. 753.
390. See American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965).
391. 256 U.S. 642 (1921).
392. See id. at 643-44.
393. See id. That holding was principally based on a previous holding of the Court in
the same case. See Askren v. Continental Oil Co., 252 U.S. 444 (1920).
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sus post-interstate), but that enforcement could be separated, thus
saving the statute, by enjoining enforcement with respect to sales in
unbroken containers (that is, those made while the goods were still
in “interstate commerce”).394 Thus, the Court instructed the lower
court to issue a decree requiring Continental Oil “to render detailed
statements of all gasoline received, sold, or used by it, whether in interstate commerce or not, to the end that the State may the more
readily enforce said excise tax to the extent that it has lawful power
to enforce it as above stated.”395 There is nothing in the opinion that
indicates any state-required reporting or “accounting” had been an
issue. So far as can be ascertained from the opinion, the reporting requirement was based on the Court’s power to establish an enforceable decree, not on a conclusion that the state had the power to require such an accounting.
Thus, when sales taxes were being enacted, states had a readily
available example of a comparable tax (comparable in being of small
amount, with innumerable taxpayers), which had a tried and proven
collection scheme that could be easily adapted to the retail sale of
goods. The primary difference was that the sales tax was measured
by the retail sales price, so the collection duties had to be imposed on
the retailer where that price was first determined.
Similarly, the gasoline tax precedent was helpful to the Court
when the constitutionality of use taxes came before it. In Henneford
v. Silas Mason Co.,396 the Court cited, inter alia, a gas tax case for the
proposition that “[a] tax upon the privilege of use or storage when the
chattel [is] used or stored has ceased to be in transit is now an impost so common that its validity has been withdrawn from the arena
of debate.”397 The Court offered considerable discussion on the equality and fairness of the sales-and-use-tax combination and expressly
distinguished between the use tax (on property that has become part
of the mass in the state) and an indirect tax on a foreign sale: “But
the fact that the legislature has chosen to lay a tax upon the use of
chattels that have been bought does not make the tax upon the use a
tax upon the sale.”398

394. See 256 U.S. at 646. The theory of “interstate commerce” at that time relied on
drawing a bright line where particular items began and ended their interstate journey. See
id. at 647. States could regulate items (or with respect to items) before or after—but not
during—their interstate journey. See id. Thus the significance of sale from “broken” or “u nbroken” containers.
395. Bowman, 256 U.S. at 650.
396. 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
397. Id. at 583 (citing Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934)).
398. Id. at 587. Silas Mason emphasizes the precise incidence of sales and use taxes.
See 300 U.S. at 582; see also McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33,
49 (1940).
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That distinction has been consistently followed. 399 Imposing a tax
on a sale in another state is beyond the state’s power and would violate the Commerce Clause. 400 If imposing a tax on a transaction that
occurs in another state is beyond a state’s power, it is very difficult to
see how imposing any other obligation on that transaction is not subject to the same infirmity.
Two years after Silas Mason the Court relied even more heavily
on gasoline tax cases. In Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing Co. v. Gallagher,401 an Illinois corporation contended that it could not be required
to act as California’s use-tax collection agent.402 The bulk of the brief
opinion details the nature of Felt & Tarrant’s operations in California, that is, two exclusive general agents authorized to solicit sales,
employ subagents, rent property in the company’s name, and other
similar activities. 403 In addition to shipping ordered goods directly to
purchasers, the company (to save shipping costs) made bulk shipments to the agents, who then made the deliveries. 404 The Court disposed of the company’s arguments by referencing and quoting Silas
Mason (discussed immediately above) and two gasoline tax cases,
Monamotor Oil and Continental Oil.405 Specifically, in its reliance on
the gasoline tax cases, the Court quoted Monamotor’s conclusion that
a state could require a person to perform administrative tasks in
support of the state’s collection of a lawfully imposed tax and that requiring the distributor to act as the state’s collection agent was a
“common and entirely lawful arrangement.”406 In addition, the Court
stated: “Bowman v. Continental Oil Company recognized the right of
the state to require a distributor ‘to render detailed statements . . . .’”407 The Court’s reading of the Continental Oil opinion is
not consistent with the opinion taken as a whole. It is, at best, taken
out of context.408 Nevertheless, that statement in Monamotor has
been subsequently (and apparently without further investigation)

399. See, e.g., General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); Felt &
Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
400. See McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); see also Oklahoma Tax
Comm’n v. Jefferson, 514 U.S. 199 (1995) (holding that a retail sale of goods or services can
only be taxed in the state where the sale occurs).
401. 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
402. Id. at 64.
403. See id.
404. See id.
405. See id. at 66–68 (citing Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642
(1921)).
406. Id. at 68 (quoting Monamotor Oil, 292 U.S. at 93).
407. Id. at 67 (quoting Continental Oil, 256 U.S. at 650).
408. See supra text accompanying notes 391-395.
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cited in support of a conclusion that collection obligations can be imposed on out-of-state sellers. 409
When the first significant mail-order cases came before the Court
in 1941, the Court had considerable recent experience with gasoline
taxes for reference. In companion cases by Iowa against the mailorder pioneers (and giants) Sears, Roebuck & Co. 410 and Montgomery
Ward & Co.,411 the Court expressed concern for the “practical operation” rather than the “precise form of descriptive words” that might
be applied. 412 With that in mind, the Court noted that use taxes were
a constitutionally permissible means of preventing residents from
evading sales taxes, 413 and imposing a reporting burden on interstate
businesses was also permissible.414 Both Sears and Montgomery
Ward sold goods to Iowa residents from in-state retail stores and via
catalog.415 Sears’ approximately $10.1 million annual sales to Iowa
residents were almost evenly divided between in-store sales and
mail-order sales. 416 The Court emphasized the fact that the companies had registered as foreign corporations doing business in the
state and had substantial local presence: Sears had twelve retail
stores, 417 Montgomery Ward had twenty-nine plus several “order offices.”418 As unitary, in-state business operations, the Court held “departmentalization” did not immunize the companies from state regulation: 419 “these [mail-]orders are still a part of respondent’s Iowa
business. The fact that respondent could not be reached for the tax if
it were not qualified to do business in Iowa would merely be a result
of the “’impotence of state power.’”420 The Court’s holding that both
companies were required to collect, report, and remit use taxes on
mail-order sales to Iowa residents was clearly premised on the fact
that the companies were qualified to do business in that state and
had very substantial local business operations.

409. See, e.g., Heyman v. Mahin, 275 N.E.2d 421, 424 (Ill. 1971) (quoting Monamotor
Oil).
410. See Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
411. See Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941).
412. Sears, Roebuck, 312 U.S. at 363 (quoting Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n, 286 U.S.
276, 280 (1931)).
413. See id. (citing Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 581 (1937)).
414. See id. at 363–64 (citing Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62, 68
(1939); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 95 (1934)).
415. See Montgomery Ward, 312 U.S. at 374; Sears, Roebuck, 312 U.S. at 362.
416. See Sears, Roebuck, 312 U.S. at 362 n.3 (noting that Iowa sales in 1936 were
$5080 from stores and $5,900,000 from mail order, and in 1937 were $5,600,000 from
stores and $5,400,000 from mail order).
417. See id.
418. Montgomery Ward, 312 U.S. at 374.
419. Sears, Roebuck, 312 U.S. at 364-65 (portraying one of the many instances in which
the Court appears to be treating the collection agent as the taxpayer).
420. Id. at 364 (citing Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940)).
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Justice Roberts’ two-justice dissent emphasizes the functional
separation of the companies’ mail-order business and the “interstate
commerce” nature of mail-order sales. 421 Based on a then-old-style
formal distinction between interstate and intrastate business activities, the dissent argued that forcing the companies to comply with
use-tax collection rules was a direct burden on interstate commerce
and therefore unconstitutional. 422 “Iowa may not abuse its conceded
power to tax or regulate the respondent’s activities within the State
by attempting to compel compliance by the respondent with unconstitutional efforts to tax or burden its interstate commerce.”423 The
dissent was not impressed by Iowa’s argument that it should be able
to impose the use-tax collection rules against the companies because
the state “[could not] effectively reach its own citizens in order to enforce the use tax on them. This cannot, however, justify the state’s
attempt to save itself trouble by placing an unconstitutional burden
upon interstate commerce conducted by a citizen of another state.”424
Thus, a notable difference between the majority and dissent is
that the majority viewed the companies’ operations as unitary and
the dissent thought the two aspects of the business operations should
be considered separately. When treated as a unitary operation, it was
clear that the companies did business within the state and were subject to the state’s general regulatory jurisdiction. The fact that those
regulations included obligations relating to one part of its Iowa business operations rather than another was considered constitutionally
insignificant by the majority. 425 The opinions did agree, however, that
if the companies had limited their activities to mail-order sales, they
would not be subject to the state’s use-tax collection duties. 426
One interesting fact is that the state court had considered the applicability of use-tax collection duties to sales made to Iowa residents
by retail stores in adjacent states. 427 The Iowa Supreme Court had
held that Montgomery Ward was not required to undertake the “almost impossible task” of collecting use tax on those sales because
there was “no feasible way of knowing or ascertaining where the customer lives or where he is going to make use of the merchandise purchased.”428 That issue was not raised by the petition for certiorari and
was therefore not considered by the Supreme Court. 429
421. See 312 U.S. at 366-72 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
422. See id.
423. Id. at 369.
424. Id. at 371.
425. See id. at 364.
426. See id. at 362-63.
427. See Montgomery Ward, 312 U.S. at 374 n.3.
428. Id. (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Roddewig, 292 N.W. 142, 142-43 (Iowa
1940) (Hamilton, C.J., concurring)).
429. See Sears, Roebuck, 312 U.S. at 366 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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There does not appear to have ever been a thoughtful examination
of the imposition of use-tax collection duties on out-of-state sellers,
probably as a result of “sales-and-use-tax” being lumped together as
a conceptual unit. In 1944, the Supreme Court heard a set of three
“sales-and-use-tax” cases, McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co.,430 General
Trading Co. v. State Tax Commissioner, 431 and International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury. 432 Each case involved a tax that
the state wished to impose on a retail sale transaction involving the
interstate movement of goods. Dilworth involved Arkansas’ sales tax
and sales by Tennessee businesses to Arkansas purchasers, with the
goods delivered to the purchasers in Arkansas. 433 General Trading
involved Iowa’s use tax on sales by a Minnesota seller to Iowa purchasers, sent from Minnesota directly to the Iowa purchasers. 434 International Harvester involved Indiana’s “gross income” tax on sales
by local or out-of-state dealers where the out-of-state purchaser took
physical delivery in Indiana.435 In each case, the relevant state statute required the seller to remit the tax to the taxing state. 436 These
cases established the tradition of treating sales and use taxes based
on their precise combination of taxable event and incidence, without
much concern for economic impact, which was continued fifty years
later in Jefferson Lines.437
Dilworth held the Arkansas sales tax on Tennessee sales invalid
as an attempt “to project its powers beyond its boundaries and to tax
an interstate transaction.”438 General Trading, however, held the
Iowa use tax valid, even though the transactions were essentially
identical to the Dilworth transactions, because the Iowa tax was incident on an in-state use, not an out-of-state sale.439 In its conclusion,
the Court said, seemingly an afterthought: “To make the distributor
the tax collector for the State is a familiar and sanctioned device.” 440
430. 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
431. 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
432. 322 U.S. 340 (1944). Justice Rutledge filed a single opinion in the three cases, dissenting to Dilworth and International Harvester but concurring in General Trading. See
322 U.S. at 349 (Rutledge, J., concurring and dissenting). The principles enunciated in
Justice Rutledge’s opinion have since become central in cases involving state taxation of
interstate business. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298,
306 (1992) (“[h]eeding Justice Rutledge’s counsel”).
433. See Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 328.
434. See General Trading, 322 U.S. at 336.
435. See International Harvester, 322 U.S. at 341-42.
436. The Indiana gross income tax appears to have been just that, a tax on all gross income of state residents and nonresidents engaged in business in the state. See id. at 344
n.4. The Court did not make any distinction between this tax and the sales and use taxes
in the companion cases.
437. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 187 (1995).
438. Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330.
439. See General Trading, 322 U.S. at 338.
440. Id. at 338-39 (citing Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939);
Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1939)).
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Other than that statement, there is nothing in the opinion to suggest
that the taxpayer had argued that it could not be forced to collect the
tax. One might infer that the quoted sentence was added in response
to Justice Jackson’s dissent. That dissent was based on reasoning
that is as accurate and pertinent to today’s Internet-mediated sales
as it was in 1944:
The transaction of sale is not taxed [by Iowa’s use tax] and, being
clearly interstate commerce, is not taxable. So we are holding that
a state has power to make a tax collector of one whom it has no
power to tax. Certainly no state has a constitutional warrant for
making a tax collector of one as the price of the privilege of doing
interstate commerce. He does not get the right from the state, and
the state cannot qualify it. I can imagine no principle of states’
rights or state comity which can justify what is done here. Nor
does the practice seem conducive to good order in the federal system. The power of Iowa to enforce collection in other states is certainly very limited and the effort to do so on any wide scale is
unlikely either to be systematically pursued or successfully executed.441

But this decision, by which one may not ship goods from anywhere
in the United States to a purchaser in Iowa without becoming a nonresident tax collector, exceeds everything so far done by this Court.
In my opinion the statute is an effort to exert extraterritorial control
beyond which a state could exert if there were no Constitution at all.
I can think of nothing in or out of the Constitution that warrants this
effort to reach beyond the state’s own border to make out-of-state
merchants tax collectors because they engage in interstate commerce
with the State’s citizens. 442 As the dissent points out, the cases cited
by the majority do not involve out-of-state sellers, but instead defendants who were clearly doing business in, and making deliveries in,
the taxing state.443 While the extent to which a state might impose
regulations that burden interstate commerce may have expanded
since 1944 (or are subject to different logic), the fundamental basis of
state power has not changed.
If one examines the cases cited by the General Trading majority
in support of its off-handed holding, no case involving out-of-state
taxpayer/collectors is found.444 Subsequent cases citing Monamotor
441. 332 U.S. at 339-40 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
442. See id. at 339. Justice Roberts joined in the dissent. Justice Rutledge’s opinion
challenging the rationale applied in the three companion cases does not address the question raised by Justice Jackson.
443. See id.
444. See Monamotor Oil, 292 U.S. 86 (Iowa motor fuel tax, Iowa distributors); Pierce
Oil Corp. v. Hopkins, 264 U.S. 137 (1924) (Arkansas gasoline tax, Arkansas dealer); Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 443 (1910) (Kentucky bank shares tax, Kentucky
bank); Standard Oil Co. v. Brodie, 239 S.W. 753 (Ark. 1922) (Arkansas gasoline tax, Ar-
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Oil show a similar pattern. 445 The end result is that there does not
appear to have ever been a serious examination of the issue. Instead,
requiring any seller to collect sales and use taxes was just a common
and entirely lawful arrangement, which must a fortiorari be legal.
What the gasoline and sales and use tax cases do show, at least
through 1944, is that no collection duties were imposed on sellers
that did not have substantial, continuous, and systematic in-state
business activities. 446
Ten years after General Trading (in 1954) the Court, in Miller
Bros. v. Maryland,447 did recognize that the retail seller was not the
taxpayer. Maryland residents visited Miller Brothers’ Delaware retail store and purchased furniture. The store did not make telephone
or mail-order sales. Some of the purchases were delivered to the
buyer’s home by common carrier and some by the seller’s own trucks.
Maryland contended that it could require Miller Brothers to remit
use taxes on all sales to Maryland residents. 448 The Supreme Court
disagreed. Miller Bros. noted two factors that are still true, but frequently ignored in contemporary rhetoric: (1) the collection of use
taxes on inhabitants is an expensive administrative problem that
states can avoid by shifting the burden to out-of-state sellers; and (2)
the practical effect of transferring the collection burden to the seller
is that the out-of-state seller pays the sales tax on a sale that does
not occur within (is not taxable by) the taxing jurisdiction. 449 Even
though the Court noted that use tax questions were generally discussed as Commerce Clause questions, 450 its decision was based on
due process considerations. 451 The facts showed that Miller Brothers
was not “doing business” in Maryland. 452 Maryland residents had to
personally visit Miller Brothers’ Delaware store to make purchases. 453 The use tax Maryland was attempting to collect from Miller
Brothers (“Miller Bros.”) was not due (because the taxable event did

kansas dealer); Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 205 N.W. 72 (S.D. 1925) (South Dakota motor
fuel tax, South Dakota dealer).
445. See, e.g., National Geographic Soc’y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551
(1977); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
446. General Trading is not an exception to that statement because in that case the
Court accepted the Iowa court’s factual conclusion that the company was an in-state retailer “maintaining a place of business in” Iowa. General Trading, 322 U.S. at 337.
447. 347 U.S. 340 (1954). The majority opinion in Miller Bros., which held that the
state could not force the out-of-state seller to collect use taxes, see id. at 347, was written
by Justice Jackson, see id. at 341, but it did not specifically rely on Justice Jackson’s dissent in General Trading, see id. at 346.
448. See id. at 341.
449. See id. at 343-44.
450. See id. at 345 n.14.
451. See id. at 344-45.
452. See id. at 347.
453. See id. at 341.
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not happen) until after the transaction was complete. 454 As the Court
stated, “[That the Maryland] inhabitants incurred a liability for the
use tax when they used, stored or consumed the goods in Maryland,
no one doubts. But the burden of collecting or paying their tax cannot
be shifted to a foreign merchant in the absence of some jurisdictional
basis not present here.”455
The four-Justice dissent456 directly disagreed with the majority’s
conclusion that Miller Bros. had not “injected” itself into the Maryland market by advertising and deliveries 457 and contended that the
increased burden of collecting Maryland’s tax would, in these particular facts, be “a minimal burden.”458 The principal distinction between the majority’s and dissent’s position is that the dissent treated
the problem as one of specific jurisdiction, while the majority continued the what was then long-standing practice by questioning
whether the company was engaged in commercial activities in the
taxing state.459
Six years after Miller Bros., the Court again addressed a state’s
imposition of tax-collection duties on a nonresident seller. In Scripto,
Inc. v. Carson,460 Florida demanded that Scripto’s specialty trading
division remit Florida use tax on sales of promotional pens to Florida
businesses. 461 Scripto had no offices or other physical facilities in
Florida, but it received all orders in, and shipped its products from,
its Atlanta, Georgia, offices. 462 Scripto contended that there was not
sufficient nexus to allow Florida to enforce that demand.463 The Florida statute defined “dealer” for sales and use tax purposes to include
all sellers who solicited sales (through representatives, catalogs, or
other advertising) within the state, regardless of where the seller
was located. 464 Scripto did not have any employees or exclusive
agents in Florida, but it did have contracts with ten “advertising specialty brokers” who had worked continuously in Florida as independent contractors for a number of years. 465 These persons received catalogs and other materials from Scripto, solicited sales in Florida (sign-

454. See id. at 344.
455. Id. at 347.
456. Justices Black, Clark, and Warren joined an opinion authored by Douglas. 347
U.S. at 357 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
457. See id. at 358.
458. Id. at 357.
459. The dissent’s use of inapposite theory has flavored subsequent decisions which, in
turn, gives what slight support there is for some of the more extreme positions currently
being taken by state tax officials.
460. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
461. Id. at 207-08.
462. See id.
463. See id. at 208.
464. See id. at 208 n.1 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 212.06(2)(g)).
465. See id. at 209.
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ing contracts as “salesman”), and were paid commissions on sales. 466
Apparently these persons did not work exclusively for Scripto. 467 The
Court held that the distinction between “employee” and “independent
contractor” was not constitutionally significant with respect to
Scripto’s activities. 468 Recognizing that Miller Bros. required “some
definite link” between the state and the transaction it seeks to tax,
the Court stated:
We believe that such a nexus is present here. First, the tax is a
nondiscriminatory exaction levied for the use and enjoyment of
property which has been purchased by Florida residents and which
has actually entered into and become a part of the mass of property in that State. [The old “bright line” theory of “interstate commerce.”] The burden of the tax is placed on the ultimate purchaser
in Florida and it is he who enjoys the use of the property, regardless of its source. We note that the appellant [Scripto] is charged
with no tax—save when, as here, he fails or refuses to collect it
from the Florida customer.469

In context, it is apparent that the Court was considering the connection between the Florida tax and the Florida taxpayer; there was
sufficient nexus with respect to the tax itself. The Court’s discussion
of the extent of Scripto’s activities within Florida was principally in
that context, that is, was there any economically significant distinction between Scripto’s Florida activities and a resident retail seller’s
in-state activities? The difference between the taxable events that
trigger sales tax (retail transaction) and use tax (possession of property) was not discussed.
With respect to imposing collection duties on Scripto, the Court
stated: “As was pointed out in General Trading Co., this [requiring
the seller to collect taxes] is ‘a familiar and sanctioned device.’ Moreover, we note that Florida reimburses appellant for its service in this
regard.”470 The Court distinguished Miller Bros. on the basis that
Miller Bros. could not know which cash purchasers in its Delaware
store were Maryland residents and that it made only “occasional” deliveries to Maryland: “Marylanders went to Delaware to make purchases—Miller did not go to Maryland for sales.”471 The Court con-

466. See id.
467. See id. at 209-10.
468. See id. at 211 (“The formal shift in the contractual tagging of the salesman as ‘independent’ neither results in changing his local function or solicitation nor bears upon its
effectiveness in securing a substantial flow of goods into Florida.”).
469. Id. at 210-11.
470. Id. at 212 (quoting General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335, 338
(1944)).
471. Id. The implications of that statement seem slightly inconsistent with the Miller
Bros. facts. The stipulated facts in that case make it appear that the store delivered all or
most of the sold merchandise to the customer’s home, which required that store employees
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cluded that the minimum connections not present in Miller Bros.
were present with respect to Scripto.472 The Scripto opinion is not
particularly convincing.
The primary difference noted by the Court between Miller Bros.’
operations and Scripto’s was that Scripto made a specific effort to exploit the Florida market and, during the entire period in question,
Scripto had a group of representatives continuously active in the
state and generating significant revenues. 473 It is relatively clear that
the Scripto analysis was phrased in terms of judicial specific jurisdiction, as required for due process. 474 Scripto was later characterized in
Quill475 as being the furthest extension of the Commerce Clause
nexus to out-of-state sellers. 476
Perhaps the more interesting part of Scripto is the Court’s conclusion that General Trading Co. controls the decision.477 As discussed
earlier, General Trading was based on the factual conclusion that the
company was doing business in the taxing state. 478 Therefore, even
though much of the decision’s language can be read as applying judicial specific jurisdiction rules, the decision is based on the more exacting requirement that the company be engaged in significant, ongoing commercial activities in the state. 479
In 1967 (thirteen years after Scripto), the Court decided National
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue.480 National Bellas Hess,
Inc. (NBH, Inc.) was a national mail-order retailer, incorporated in
Delaware and headquartered in Missouri. 481 It had no physical proplearn the buyer’s residence address at the time of sale. See Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland,
347 U.S. 340, 341 n.2, 357 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
472. See Scripto, 362 U.S. at 213.
473. See id. at 212.
474. The Court mentioned Commerce Clause issues with respect to Florida’s exaction
of sales/use taxes on the products Scripto shipped into Florida. See id. at 210-211. It is
clear that the Court was applying the “old” rules about when goods in transit in interstate
commerce “come to rest” in a state sufficiently to allow state taxation of those goods, viz.
the Court stated: “[T]he mere fact that property is used for interstate commerce or has
come into an owner’s possession as a result of interstate commerce does not diminish the
protection which he may draw from a State to the upkeep of which he may be asked to bear
his fair share.” Id. at 212 (citing General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335,
338 (1944)). In that context, there was no need for the Court to consider the Commerce
Clause “nexus” requirements developed in later cases. Of course, the “n exus” between the
taxpayer-user and the state is not the real issue.
475. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
476. See id. at 306 (noting that the tax had been upheld even though all of the sales activity had been conducted by independent contractors).
477. See Scripto, 362 U.S. at 212.
478. See supra text accompanying note 439.
479. Scripto’s language (not its holding) continued the slide started in Miller Bros. toward using specific jurisdiction language when discussing a prescriptive jurisdiction problem.
480. 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overruled in part by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
481. See id. at 754-55.
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erty or agents in Illinois. 482 Its contact with Illinois was through catalogs and “flyers” mailed to Illinois consumers. 483 Illinois residents
mailed their orders to Missouri, and the ordered goods were sent
from there to the customer by mail or common carrier. 484 The Illinois
use-tax statute imposed tax collection duties on any “’[r]etailer maintaining a place of business [within] [Illinois],’” which phrase was defined to include retailers who solicited sales solely by catalogues or
other advertising, regardless of where the orders were accepted. 485
Based on this definition, Illinois contended that NBH, Inc., was required to collect use taxes from its Illinois customers, turn over the
proceeds to Illinois, keep records, give receipts, and the like, or be
subject to civil and criminal penalties. 486 One civil penalty was to
“submit” customers’ use-tax obligations, even though the customers
had not paid the tax to NBH, Inc., a customary result for sales and
use taxes. 487 NBH, Inc., contended that Illinois’ attempt to impose
these obligations violated due process and constituted an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. 488 The burden was clearly not
trivial. 489
The Court started by stating that the two constitutional limitations were closely related. For Commerce Clause purposes, the Court
said, the test was whether the tax was designed to make interstate
commerce bear a “fair share of the cost of the local government whose
protection it [interstate commerce] enjoys.”490 For the Due Process
Clause, the Court said, the “simple but controlling question is
whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return.”491
With specific reference to the burden of collecting use taxes, the
482. See id. at 754.
483. See id.
484. See id. at 754-55.
485. Id. at 755 (quoting the statute).
486. See id. at 755-56 (citing various statutes).
487. See id. at 757 n.9.
488. See id. at 756.
489. The Court described many requirements imposed by the statute beyond collecting
the tax:
National [NBH, Inc.] must give the Illinois purchaser ‘a receipt therefore in the
manner and form prescribed by the [Department of Revenue],’ if one is demanded. It must also ‘keep such records, receipts, invoices and other pertinent
books, documents, memoranda and papers as the [Department of Revenue]
shall require, in such form as the [Department of Revenue] shall require,’ and
must submit to such investigations, hearings, and examinations as are needed
by the appellee to administer and enforce the use tax law.
Id. at 755 (footnotes omitted).
490. Id. at 756 (quoting Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946), and citing Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 462 (1959); Central
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 663 (1948)).
491. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940), and citing
Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952); Ott v. Mississippi Val. Barge Line Co., 336
U.S. 169, 174 (1949)).
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Court stated that due process requires some “definite link, some
minimum connection” between the state and the person it seeks to
encumber.492 The Court noted that in decisions preceding Bellas Hess,
it had held that a state could impose the duty to collect use taxes on
out-of-state sellers when the out-of-state seller maintained in-state
retail stores, 493 when the sales were arranged by local in-state
agents, 494 and when the out-of-state seller had independentcontractor salesmen engaged in continuous solicitation in the taxing
state. 495 The Court expressly declined to “obliterate” the line it had
previously drawn between sellers who had an in-state operation and
those who only communicated with the state through mail or common carrier. 496 The Court summarized its reasons why the use-tax
collection burden was unconstitutional in this setting primarily in
Commerce Clause terms:
[I]t is difficult to conceive of commercial transactions more exclusively interstate in character than the mail order transactions here
involved. And if the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens
upon National [NBH, Inc.] were upheld, the resulting impediments
upon the free conduct of its interstate business would be neither
imaginary nor remote. For if Illinois can impose such burdens, so
can every other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality,
every school district, and every other political subdivision throughout the Nation with power to impose sales and use taxes. The
many variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in
administrative and record-keeping requirements could entangle
[NBH, Inc.’s] interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated
obligations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose
“a fair share of the cost of the local government.”497

Those considerations are the same ones Justice Jackson raised in his
dissent in General Trading, decided over twenty years earlier. 498 The
difference in result can be explained principally by the fact that the
Court in Bellas Hess did not accept, as fact, that NBH, Inc., was “doing business” in the state. If the long-distance interaction between
NBH, Inc., and Illinois residents had been sufficient to support Illinois’ position, it would have supported a similar conclusion concerning every other taxing jurisdiction where NBH, Inc., had customers.
492. Id. (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954), and citing
Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1960); American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S.
451, 458 (1965)).
493. See Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941); Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
494. See General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
495. See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
496. See National Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. at 758.
497. Id. at 759 (footnotes omitted).
498. See General Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 339 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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The practical burden that would thereby have been imposed on NBH,
Inc., (whose out-of-state shipments went across the nation) would
have been orders of magnitude greater than the practical burden imposed on General Trading (whose out-of-state shipments went to one
adjacent state). From this comparison, one might infer that decisions
concerning burdens on interstate commerce are to be judged more on
the particular litigant’s relative financial strength than on legal criteria.
After another ten years passed, the Court again addressed the
problem of imposing use-tax collection duties on an out-of-state seller
in National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization.499
In National Geographic, the state’s target was the National Geographic Society (the Society), which made mail-order sales of maps,
atlases, and other materials to California residents from its offices in
Washington, D.C., and Maryland.500 California contended that the
Society’s two in-state offices were sufficient to allow imposition of
California use-tax collection duties on the mail-order sales. 501 The Society disagreed, pointing out that the offices had no connection with
the mail-order sales, but only sold advertising in the Society’s magazine.502 The Society’s advertising sales offices had been operating in
the state for nearly twenty years before the case was heard by the
Supreme Court, during which time the staff had doubled (to eight
persons total) and advertising sales had aggregated about $1 million
annually.503 The Court held that the lack of a functional connection
between the in-state offices and the mail-order sales was not relevant, affirming the judgment of the California Supreme Court that
the imposition of collection duties was constitutional. 504 Significantly,
however, the Court expressly rejected the California Supreme
Court’s holding that when an out-of-state seller conducts a substantial mail-order business with a state’s residents, the “slightest presence” of that seller in that state, independent of the interstate mailorder business, was sufficient nexus to allow imposition of use-tax
collection duties. 505
In reaching its decision in National Geographic, the Court placed
on one side a group of cases which had held a sufficient nexus existed

499. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
500. See id. at 552.
501. See id. at 554.
502. See id. at 560. For a short period, the California offices did make some sales of
similar materials and collected California sales tax with respect to those sales. However,
both the California Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court found it unnecessary to
consider those activities in reaching a decision with respect to the mail-order sales. See id.
at 554 n.3.
503. See id. at 554 n.2.
504. See id. at 560.
505. Id. at 555-56.
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for imposing apportioned gross receipts taxes 506 or use-tax collection
duties, 507 when the target company had continuing, income-producing
activities in the state. On the other side the Court placed Miller Bros.
and Bellas Hess, in which the Court had held there was no basis for
imposing use-tax collection duties. With respect to the gross receipts
tax cases, the Court emphasized that it had approved the tax when it
was clear that the value taxed was related to the in-state activities;
that is, it was appropriately apportioned. 508 It then stated that a
state has an even stronger claim when it is “only” imposing the administrative duty of collecting taxes imposed on other persons because there is no possibility of double taxation (specifically referring
to sales and use taxes).509 With respect to the prior use-tax collection
cases (both those which had approved, and those which had disapproved, imposing the duty), the Court emphasized the state services
enjoyed by the company, as a whole, as a justification for imposing
the tax-collection duties. 510 It expressly rejected the theory that those
prior cases had been based on whether there was a functional connection between the seller’s in-state activities (which “benefited”
from state services) and the activities generating the sales on which
use taxes were to be collected. 511 The Court equated the state’s services to National Geographic’s in-state sales offices with the services
provided by the state to the retail outlets of Sears, Roebuck and
Montgomery Ward; the fact that the Sears and Ward’s retail outlets
had functionally participated in the respective mail-order businesses’
operations was held insignificant. 512
National Geographic was considered essentially simultaneously
with Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.513 As mentioned at the
opening of this section, Complete Auto articulated a four-part test for
determining if a state’s tax unduly burdens interstate commerce.
Given their propinquity, if the Court understood National Geographic as a Commerce Clause case, one would expect and application of the Complete Auto formula; however, one would be disap506. See id. at 556-58 (citing Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington Rev. Dep’t, 419
U.S. 560 (1975); General Trading Co. v. Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); Felt & Tarrant
Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939)).
507. See id. at 555-57 (citing Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960); Nelson v.
Montgomery Ward, 312 U.S. 373 (1941); Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359
(1941)).
508. See id. at 557-58.
509. See id. at 558. There was no mention of the fact that such an administrative burden had been considered very substantial, and legally significant, in Bellas Hess.
510. See id. at 558-62.
511. See id. at 560-61.
512. See id.
513. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). National Geographic was argued one month after Complete
Auto and the National Geographic decision was handed down one month after Complete
Auto’s. This suggests that when National Geographic was argued, the Complete Auto opinion was being written.
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pointed. Instead, the Court relies on the decisions discussed above
that focus on whether the company is actively involved in in-state
business, such as Continental Oil, Felt & Tarrant, General Trading,
Monamotor Oil, Sears, Roebuck, and Miller Bros., strongly suggesting a due process analysis. 514
Again unfortunately, though the Court was looking at whether
the Society was “doing business” in California, it used words and
phrases familiar to judicial specific jurisdiction cases. In its rather
confusing analysis, the Court did refer to both Complete Auto 515 and
Bellas Hess 516 but did not discuss the relationship, if any, between
the two.517 Trying to determine where, how, or if the Court used the
Complete Auto analysis in National Geographic is futile, because the
Court did not actually treat it as a tax case.
With this history, in 1991, the North Dakota Supreme Court considered State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp.,518 a case almost identical to Bellas Hess. Because the intervening twenty years had produced significant legal and technological changes, the North Dakota
court held that it was no longer appropriate to follow Bellas Hess. 519
514. The Court cited Complete Auto twice: the majority cited it once as an example of a
properly apportioned tax; Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in the result, once as an example of inconsistency in the Court’s tax rulings. See National Geographic, 430 U.S. at 559,
563 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result).
515. See id. at 558. The citation to Complete Auto was only that, a bare citation supporting the statement that “fairly apportioned” taxes had been sustained when they were
fairly related to state services to the out-of-state taxpayer. See id. The concurrence cited
Complete Auto as proof that the Court’s tax cases were “not fully consistent.” Id. at 563
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the result).
516. See id. at 559.
517. Ironically, in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, the Court used National Geographic’s reference to Bellas Hess to support its argument that Complete Auto
had not weakened Bellas Hess. 504 U.S. 298, 311–12 (1992).
518. 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991), rev’d, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
519. See id. at 213. In its opinion, the North Dakota mentioned the growth o f the mailorder business from a “relatively inconsequential market niche” to a retail “Goliath” with
$183.3 billion in 1989 sales. Id. at 208, 209. It also relied on the advances in computer
technology to conclude that compliance with the multitude of regulations imposed less of a
burden than in the early 1960s. See id. at 215.
It is interesting to note that the North Dakota Supreme Court did not mention either the
relative size of the mail order market (compared to the entire retail market which also increased during that period) or the increase in the number of both sales-taxing jurisdictions
and tax rates that occurred during the same period. That is consistent with state tax authorities’ tactics in the current debates, where they assert that very large dollar volumes of
sales are going untaxed, creating an impression that an extremely significant portion of retail sales are not taxed. When placed in the context of total retail sales, and retail sales tax
revenues, however, it is fairly obvious that even the exaggerated untaxed sales and alleged
tax “losses” are not all that significant. See ROBERT J. CLINE AND THOMAS S. NEUBIG,
ERNST & YOUNG LLP, THE SKY IS NOT FALLING: WHY STATE AND LOCAL REVENUES WERE
NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACTED BY THE INTERNET IN 1998, at ii (1999) [hereinafter THE SKY
IS NOT FALLING], http://www.ey.com/global/vault.nsf/US/Sky_is_not_falling/$file/Sky.pdf
(visited Mar. 31, 2001). The Ernst & Young study estimated sales tax “losses” at $170 million, less than one tenth of one percent of total sales and use tax revenues, and this in a
year that produced a $36 billion surplus in state budgets. See id. If state budget figures are
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The North Dakota use-tax definition of “retailer” included all persons
who engaged in “regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer
market” in the state. 520 Related regulations defined “regular or systematic” as three or more advertisements within a twelve-month period. 521 North Dakota filed an action in state court to compel Quill to
pay use taxes, plus penalties and interest, on all sales after July 1,
1987.522
Quill sells office equipment and supplies through catalogs, fliers,
advertisements, and telephone calls. 523 While it has physical facilities
in only three states, it makes sales throughout the United States. 524
It is a “typical,” but comparatively large, retail mail-order seller. 525
The Supreme Court noted that Quill’s annual national sales (for an
unidentified year) were over $200 million, with “almost” $1 million in
sales to about 3000 North Dakota customers. 526 Though Quill was
stated to be the sixth largest “vendor of office supplies” in the state,
it had no physical facilities or agents in North Dakota, and it delivered all of the merchandise via U.S. mail or common carrier from
out-of-state locations. 527 Naturally, Quill took the position that North
Dakota had no power to compel it to collect or pay use taxes. 528
Obviously, Quill is factually indistinguishable from Bellas Hess.
The North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged the similarity, but
decided that Bellas Hess was no longer good law. 529 That conclusion
was based on the interim evolution in both due process theory and
business methods and technology.530 With respect to due process, the
North Dakota court noted the changes in theory discussed earlier. 531
The post-Bellas Hess cases approve judicial specific jurisdiction over
persons whose activities are directed toward the state, even if that
person is never physically present in the state. 532 Thus, the Court
concluded, North Dakota courts could exercise jurisdiction over Quill,
rounded to tenths of billions (e.g., $17.2 billion), which is not uncommon, it is unlikely that
any state’s budget figures would be changed if all use taxes were actually collected.
520. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1992) (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01(6) (Supp. 1991)).
521. Id. at 303 (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 81-04.1-01-03.1 (1988)).
522. See id. at 303.
523. See id. at 302.
524. See id.
525. See id.
526. Id. at 302.
527. Id. Quill did retain title to some software a few North Dakota customers used to
make orders, but that was so de minimis no one considered it a real basis for jurisdiction.
See id. at 315 n.8.
528. See id. at 303.
529. See State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 213 (N.D. 1991), rev’d ,
504 U.S. 298 (1992).
530. See id.
531. See supra Part III.B.
532. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
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at least with respect to goods sold to North Dakota customers. Therefore, the Due Process Clause also did not protect Quill from use-tax
collection duties. 533 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, noting that Quill
had “purposefully directed” its commercial activities at North Dakota
residents sufficiently to satisfy due process requirements. 534
Relevant to the Commerce Clause issue, which it did not clearly
separate from due process, the North Dakota court described two
types of changes to support its decision to disregard Bellas Hess. The
first change was the line of cases after Bellas Hess that rejected a
formalistic approach to state taxation of interstate commerce in favor
of a more flexible approach based on the practical effect of the tax,
that is, Complete Auto and its progeny. The North Dakota court
stated that since Bellas Hess was based on a formalistic “physical
presence” test, it had been discredited by subsequent decisions. 535
Further, the court noted, the state of North Dakota provided services
and benefits that allowed Quill to sell its goods in the state, including
but not limited to disposal of “24 tons” of catalogs and flyers, thereby
justifying the imposition of the tax-collection obligations. 536
The second change noted by the North Dakota court related to the
burden imposed on interstate commerce by use-tax collection duties.
Bellas Hess relied in part on the number and diversity of sales taxes
in the United States and the consequent compliance burden on mailorder businesses. 537 The North Dakota court noted that the mailorder business, at least as a whole, had become big business, implying that it had resources not available twenty-five years earlier.538 It
also noted advances in computer technology, which went from effectively nonexistent in the 1960s to pervasive in the 1990s. According
to the court, these two factors combined to substantially lessen the
533. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.
534. See id. at 306-08. Neither court addressed the distinction between “special” and
“general” judicial jurisdiction. Both referred to judicial specific jurisdiction cases.
535. State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 214 (N.D. 1991), rev’d, 504
U.S. 298 (1992).
536. Id. at 218-19. Here, like the Supreme Court in National Geographic, the North
Dakota court failed to note that under Complete Auto, the necessary relationship is between the taxes paid to, and the services rendered to the taxpayer by, the state. There is
no obvious connection between the services provided by the state and a requirement that
the theoretical recipient of the services in turn perform services for the state. One might be
excused for thinking that the alleged state services were provided to the use-tax payers
(state residents), with the quid pro quo being the taxes collected rather than the collection
services.
537. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967),
overruled in part by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
538. See id. at 208-09. Perhaps it was hoping that the current Supreme Court would
vote with the Bellas Hess dissent, which made the same argument as the North Dakota
court, but over 20 years earlier. Instead, the Bellas Hess dissent undermines the North
Dakota court’s “changed circumstances” argument. See National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at
765 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of “vastly underestimat[ing] the skill of contemporary man and his machines”).
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burden of complying with multiple sales tax regimes. 539 While the
Supreme Court indirectly acknowledged these environmental
changes, it disagreed with the North Dakota court’s conclusion. 540
Thus, when Quill came to the Supreme Court, the Court had to
address Bellas Hess and the evolution of Due Process and Commerce
Clause doctrine in the intervening years. The Supreme Court’s first
step was to revitalize the separation of Due Process and Commerce
Clause issues. 541 The two clauses, it said, were analytically distinct:
While a lack of due process, the Court said, necessitates a conclusion
that the tax is an undue burden, even if there is sufficient contact for
due process purposes, the tax may still impose an undue burden for
Commerce Clause purposes. 542 Therefore, the Court said, the two issues should be analyzed separately.
The Court acknowledged that there had been an evolution in the
application of the Commerce Clause to taxation after Bellas Hess. 543
In particular, the Court noted that Complete Auto had established a
more flexible, four-part test to determine if a tax is an undue burden
on interstate commerce. 544 But the Court said Bellas Hess, and therefore Quill, concerned only the first of those four factors, that is,
whether the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing state. 545 The Court stated that the North Dakota
court had treated the “minimum contacts” requirement of due process theory (judicial specific jurisdiction) as equivalent to the “substantial nexus” requirement of Commerce Clause theory 546 (which,
one might have said before Quill, was not a surprising thing for the
North Dakota court to do). Due process concerns relate to the connection between the state and the person over which it wishes to exercise jurisdiction, emphasizing “notice” and “fair warning” are key fac-

539. See id. at 215. The North Dakota court did not cite any authority for the proposition that what constitutes an unconstitutional burden when imposed on a poor man may
be constitutionally imposed on a rich man.
540. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 316 (1992).
541. See id. at 305-06.
542. See id. (quoting International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S.
340, 353 (1944) (Rutledge, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)). This clear reference
to Justice Rutledge’s opinion is significant because, as discussed below, it was his dissents
that first enunciated the theoretical basis for the more flexible approach to taxation of interstate activities.
543. See id. at 309-10.
544. See id. at 311.
545. See id.
546. See id. The Court dismissed the North Dakota court’s conclusion that Bellas Hess
was outmoded by referring to post-Complete Auto cases that relied on Bellas Hess, specifically: Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 263 (1989) (a decision particularly significant for
taxing Internet-related activities); D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 33 (1988);
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); and National Geographic Soc’y v. California Bd. of
Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 559 (1977).
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tors. 547 In contrast, the Court stated, Commerce Clause nexus requirements “are informed not so much by concerns about fairness for
the individual defendant as by structural concerns about the effects
of state regulation on the national economy.”548
The Court noted that none of the cases relied on by the North Dakota court involved persons with no physical presence in the state. 549
Further, the Court stated that while more recent theory favors a
flexible, case-by-case approach, it does not categorically reject a
“bright-line” rule under appropriate circumstances. 550 Instead of being “’a trap for the unwary,’” the Court characterized the Bellas Hess
rule as furthering the ends of the Commerce Clause by delineating a
“discrete realm” of interstate commerce that is free from use taxation.551 The Court admitted that if Bellas Hess had not existed, it
might have reached a different decision, justifying the continued validity of Bellas Hess more on stare decisis than Commerce Clause
theory.552 The bright-line test, the Court said, created a clear, firmly
established boundary in an area of the law it characterized as a
“’quagmire’” with much room for controversy, confusion, and litigation.553 In addition, consistent with the theory underlying stare decisis,554 the Court noted that for twenty-five years there had been
substantial reliance on the settled rule and that the dramatic growth
of the mail-order business may have been due in part to the existence
of that rule.555 Finally, the Court noted that clearly dividing due
547. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
548. Id. Despite the Court’s statement, however, it could be argued that Complete
Auto’s factors two and three directly address those structural concerns, and therefore, addressing them in the nexus (factor one) context is redundant.
549. See id. at 314.
550. See id.
551. Id. at 314-15. The quoted phrase should be taken in context, that is, state imposition of use -tax collection duties on out-of-state mail-order retailers.
552. Id. at 317-18.
553. See id. at 315. That statement could be a harbinger of other bright-line rules and
a swing back toward the “formalistic” approach to state taxation of interstate commerce. At
the least, it could be used to justify bright-line rules concerning Internet-mediated activities, with respect to which there are so many impenetrable swamps of legal theory and political rhetoric that they will be finally overcome only by rising above the swamp or draining it.
554. Three Justices who joined in part of the majority opinion specifically addressed
stare decisis. They asserted that the inquiry into the reasons underlying Bellas Hess was
unnecessary. See id. at 319-21 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined Justice Scalia. See id. These three believed that the
Court should have merely reversed the North Dakota Supreme Court with a bare citation
to Bellas Hess. Justice White’s solo dissent challenged the majority opinion almost across
the board, specifically challenging the separation of Due Process and Commerce Clause
nexus requirements, the validity of the majority’s position that interim decisions had continued Bellas Hess’s vitality, and the strength of the stare decisis argument. See id. at 32234 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
555. See id. at 316. Later, the Court states, “[T]he Bellas Hess rule has engendered
substantial reliance and has become part of the basic framework of a sizeable industry.” Id.
at 317. That essentially turns the North Dakota court’s position on its head; the expansion
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process issues and Commerce Clause issues makes it clear that Congress can adopt appropriate rules using its Commerce Clause power
without running afoul of the Constitution’s due process limitations. 556
Quill establishes a protective harbor for a limited category of outof-state sellers (those “’whose only connection with customers in the
[taxing] state is by common carrier or the United States mail’”), 557
but it does not precisely address related problems. As the Court
noted, Quill did have title to some computer programs (and disks?)
physically present in North Dakota.558 However, that was insufficient
to create a “substantial nexus” because the Court had earlier (in National Geographic) expressly rejected a “’slight presence’” as sufficient for Commerce Clause purposes. 559 Thus, the distinction between
“slight presence” and “substantial nexus” remained unanswered.
Only mail-order sellers with no in-state physical presence are within
the safe harbor; all others are apparently subject to some undefined
“more flexible” analysis under which a “substantial nexus” is enough,
but something more than the “slightest presence” is required.
Quill completed the slide toward applying judicial specific jurisdiction terms to regulatory issues. Perhaps more significantly, it did
not rely on, or even mention, the line of tax collection-duty cases discussed earlier and relied on in Bellas Hess. Of equal significance is
that the Court throughout its opinion referred to Quill as the taxpayer. To say that Quill increased the depth and width of the statetax quagmire is a gross understatement.
Two related issues have been addressed following Quill: (1) what
relationship between in-state persons and the out-of-state seller is
sufficient to attribute an in-state presence to the seller (2) what takes
in-state activities or things beyond “slightest presence” into “substantial nexus” territory. The cases in which these issues have been
addressed reveal the depth of state tax officials’ desire to squeeze
Quill into a safe harbor for nothing larger than a one-person inflatable raft.
There are two areas in which the relationship to in-state persons
have been addressed. The first concerns related corporations. In SFA
Folio Collections, Inc. v. Tracy,560 the Ohio Supreme Court held that
of the mail-order business becomes a justification for continuing the Bellas Hess rule,
rather than an argument for abandoning it.
556. See id. at 318-19. Since Quill, Congress has taken up the Internet taxation issues
with an eye toward creating a national solution. See infra discussion Part V. That effort
should have been made less tentative by Quill, but due process questions remain relevant.
557. Id. at 315 n.8 (quoting Bellas Hess).
558. See id. at 315 n.8.
559. See id.
560. 652 N.E.2d 693 (Ohio 1995). SFA Folio is almost identical to Bloomingdale’s by
Mail, Ltd. v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Revenue, 567 A.2d 773 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), which
found that the presence of a sister corporation did not establish nexus with an out-of-state
mail order seller, despite their coordinated marketing themes.
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an in-state retailer’s presence did not establish Commerce Clause
nexus over its sister corporation, a mail-order-selling corporation
with no in-state property or agents. 561 The Ohio Tax Commissioner
argued that SFA Folio and Saks-Ohio were parts of a unitary retail
merchandising operation and that, therefore, SFA Folio was required
to collect use tax on mail-order sales to Ohio residents. 562 There was
apparently some evidence that Saks-Ohio stores, as a matter of independent policy, accepted “returns” of SFA Folio merchandise and distributed about 200 SFA catalogs per issue. 563 The Ohio court held
that SFA Folio and Saks-Ohio were separate legal entities under
Ohio corporation law and could not be treated otherwise for its tax
laws. 564 The court noted that Saks-Ohio’s return policy and its catalog
distribution might have created sufficient nexus for due process concerns, but they were insufficient to satisfy Commerce Clause substantial nexus requirements. 565
A second relationship area addressed since Quill relates to contacts between the out-of-state seller and less-than-professional state
residents. A group of school “book club” cases (some of which predate
Quill) involves two companies, Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc., and Troll
Book Clubs, Inc. 566 The companies’ operations are essentially identical. Packets containing book descriptions and order forms are sent to
elementary school teachers. 567 The teachers may, or may not, make
that information available to their students. 568 The students purchase books and give their payments to the teacher. 569 The teacher
sends a consolidated order to the “book club” with payment. 570 The
561. See SFA Folio, 652 N.E.2d at 697.
562. See id. at 695-96.
563. See id. at 697.
564. See id. at 696-97.
565. See id. at 697. The court expressly rejected a “unitary business” argument to establish Commerce Clause nexus. See id. at 698. That theory, the court said, was a due
process theory applied to a taxpayer with a proven in-state nexus to determine what po rtion of that taxpayer’s total income was taxable in the state. See id. (citing Allied-Signal
Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 778 (1992)). The SFA Folio situation is clearly
distinguishable from Reader’s Digest Ass’n v. Mahin, 255 N.E.2d 458 (Ill. 1970), upholding
the imposition of a use-tax collection burden on a parent company where the in-state employees of a subsidiary solicited orders, on a contract basis, for the parent company’s products. See id. at 459.
566. Pledger v. Troll Book Clubs, Inc., 871 S.W.2d 389 (Ark. 1994) (post-Quill); Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 255 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Ct. App. 1989) (preQuill); Appeal of Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc., 920 P.2d 947 (Kan. 1996) (post-Quill); Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 567 N.W.2d 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)
(post-Quill). The description of facts in the text is accurate for both Troll Books and Scholastic Books and is distilled from all four of the cited cases.
567. See Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
568. See id. at 78-80 (indicating that the response rate to Scholastic’s mailings was
14.6%, which may be better than the average mail-order catalog but does seem to indicate
that the teachers were not under any compulsion to obtain orders from their students).
569. See id. at 78.
570. See id.
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“book club” fills the orders by sending the books to the teacher, who
distributes them to the students. 571 Teachers who submit orders receive “bonuses” that allow them to purchase books, or other items,
which they can use however they choose.572 The cases arose in states
where the selling company had no in-state physical presence (property, employees, or professional agents) and all contacts with the
state were through mail or common carrier. Perhaps it is not surprising that the results were mixed—two courts held that sufficient
nexus existed to impose use-tax collection duties, and two courts held
that no such nexus existed.
In Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization573
(decided before Quill), the California Court of Appeal held that the
company was required to collect and pay use taxes on books sold to
California residents. 574 The primary issue, the court felt, was whether
the teachers were the company’s agents. 575 Based on the facts, the
court found that the teachers were the company’s agents, but it is not
clear if that conclusion is based on a pre-sale implied contract or
post-sale ratification.576 The court then analogized the situation to
the facts in Scripto and held that the teachers were not legally distinguishable from the professional salespersons in Scripto.577 The
court did not separately analyze the Due Process and Commerce
Clause nexus issues. The decision appears to consider only due process issues.
In the second case, Pledger v. Troll Book Clubs, Inc.578 (decided after Quill), the Arkansas Supreme Court also concentrated on the
agency question.579 The court noted that an agency relationship necessarily includes some degree of control by the principal. 580 The fact
that over eighty percent of the teachers receiving the company’s
mailings did nothing, the court said, proved that no agency relationship existed.581 The Arkansas court distinguished the prior California
decision on two grounds: the California case was decided before Quill
and thus did not consider the physical presence aspect dispositive,
and Arkansas law did not allow “the relationship of agency to be im-

571. See id. at 79.
572. See id.
573. Id.
574. Id. at 81.
575. See id.
576. The court said that once the teachers started to act, they were acting under the
company’s authority and that an agency relationship can be implied based on conduct and
circumstances, as well as by ratification. See id. at 79-81.
577. See id. at 81.
578. 871 S.W.2d 389 (Ark. 1994).
579. Id. at 392.
580. See id.
581. See id.
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plied retroactively by ratification.”582 Because the teachers were not
the seller’s agents, the Arkansas court held that Quill required a
holding that use-tax collection duties could not be imposed on the
out-of-state seller.583
Subsequently, the Kansas Supreme Court held the teachers were
the company’s agents, 584 and the Michigan Court of Appeals held that
they were not. 585 In all the cases, only the Michigan court expressly
and directly addressed Quill’s Commerce Clause nexus requirements. The Michigan court held that the teachers were not the company’s agents, and that Quill’s actual-in-state-presence requirement
was not satisfied. 586 It did not hold that if the teachers were agents,
the company would be required to collect and remit use taxes.
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court examined another common sales technique involving nonprofessionals in House of Lloyd v.
Pennsylvania.587 The out-of-state company established a marketing
“hierarchy of district managers, supervisors, demonstrators, and
hostesses.”588 Except for the hostesses, who sponsored small “parties”
in their homes, the persons signed contracts with House of Lloyd and
receive sample kits that contained products, apparently with a value
between $150 and $300.589 House of Lloyd contended it was not required to pay use taxes on the sample kits and various “prizes” and
“gifts.” House of Lloyd was apparently successful in its recruiting
program, because the court noted that it had over 50,000 persons
“dedicated to promoting and selling [its] products, to recruiting and
training salespeople, and to securing a substantial flow of goods into
the Commonwealth.”590
582. Id.
583. See id.
584. The Kansas court initially indicated that it was “easy” under Kansas law to imply
agency, then went on to prove that. The court concluded that “[b]y Scholastic’s accepting
orders and payments and shipping merchandise to teachers for distribution to the student
purchasers, the Kansas teachers are the implied agents of Scholastic.” Appeal of Scholastic
Book Clubs, Inc., 920 P.2d 947, 956 (Kan. 1996).
585. The Michigan court said the teachers were more like parents who ordered books
for their children from a mail-order catalog, and no one would contend the parents were
the mail-order seller’s agents. See Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Department of Treasury,
567 N.W.2d 692, 696 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
586. See id. at 695-96. A directive from Michigan’s Treasury Department, Use Tax
Nexus Standards, Mich. Rev. Admin. Bull. 1999-1 (Mich. Dep’t of Treas., May 12, 1999),
Westlaw, MI TAX RAB 1999-1, discussed infra at Part III.D.2.b., could easily be read as
inconsistent with this decision. Under the directive, almost anyone who does anything in
the state that benefits an out-of-state seller creates a “sufficient” Commerce Clause nexus.
See id. (“Jurisdictional Standard” discussion in part entitled “Law and Analysis”).
587. 694 A.2d 375 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).
588. Id. at 376.
589. See id.
590. Id. at 376-77; see also John Swenson Granite, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 685 A.2d
425, 429 (Me. 1996) (holding Quill’s Commerce Clause nexus requirements were satisfied
when a company, in four and one-half years, sold $4 million in products from New Hampshire into Maine, carried 89% of the deliveries in its own trucks, and kept its vice-president
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This case reveals a marketing strategy that clearly lies outside
the Quill safe harbor, even if it includes no in-state offices or physical
facilities. The number of in-state persons who promoted House of
Lloyd’s products places its marketing scheme in an entirely different
universe than mail-order and school-book-club marketing.591 The
“home party” marketing scheme purposefully establishes a long
term, continuous, in-state team of marketers. Mail-order sellers only
send out catalogs (or now, create Internet Web sites). It should also
be noted that House of Lloyd did not concern collection of use taxes
owed by Lloyd’s customers. 592 The use-tax obligation was triggered by
Lloyd’s use (through its in-state agents) of personal property in the
state for promotional purposes; property to which Lloyd retained title
and control. 593 The taxable event occurred while Lloyd owned and
used the property, and therefore, Lloyd was the taxpayer, not merely
an involuntary tax collector. 594
The issue of what direct action takes an out-of-state seller into
“substantial nexus” territory has also been addressed, but perhaps
less rationally. In Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of New York,595
the New York Court of Appeals held that Quill does not require the
physical presence to be substantial, but only that it be “more than a
‘slightest presence.’”596 The New York court examined the physical
activities of two companies within New York. 597 It concluded that
those activities were more than a minimum and therefore the state
could properly impose the burden of collecting state sales taxes. 598
With respect to one taxpayer, Orvis Company, Inc., the New York
court inferred that there may have been an average of four visits per
year to “as many as 19 wholesale customers.”599 Thus:
and a Maine-resident employee present in the state promoting new and repeat business).
But see Laptops Etc. Corp. v. District of Columbia (In re Laptops Etc. Corp.), 164 B.R. 506
(Bankr. Md. 1993) (noting that a substantial portion of sales from a Virginia retail store
were made to Washington, D.C., residents, but the minimal personal presence of employees in Washington, D.C., for business purposes was insufficient to establish a sufficient
Commerce Clause nexus).
591. Cf. Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1991) (same corporation
found to be “doing business” in Texas for corporate franchise tax purposes, on similar
facts).
592. See House of Lloyd, 694 A.2d at 377-78.
593. See id.
594. See id.
595. 654 N.E.2d 954 (N.Y. 1995).
596. Id. at 961.
597. See id.
598. See id.
599. Id. at 962. In reaching that conclusion, the court approved the Tax Tribunal’s, and
the administrative law judge’s, decision to disregard testimonial affidavits (allowed by the
tribunal’s rules) in favor of broad inferences from a letter from Orvis’ treasurer. That letter
was in response to a preliminary inquiry by an informal New York sales tax auditor and
was treated as an “admission against interest.” The court, after acknowledging that the
Tribunal’s rules expressly allowed submission of affidavits in lieu of live testimony, com-
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[T]he foregoing evidence supported a reasonable inference by the
Tax Appeals Tribunal that Orvis’ substantial wholesale business
in this State was generally accomplished by means of its sales personnel’s direct solicitation of retailers through visits to their stores
in New York, subject only to approval of all orders in Vermont.600

To reach its decision, the New York court cumulated all of the assumed activities of the wholesale division during the three-year audit
period and concluded that those cumulated activities provided sufficient nexus to require the operationally distinct mail-order division
to collect use taxes from the beginning of the audit period.601 The
court stated, “This sales activity in New York would presumptively
suffice as a nexus to impose a use-tax collection responsibility.”602
The other taxpayer in the Orvis case, Vermont Information Processing, Inc. (VIP), sold computer software and hardware to New York
beverage distributors. 603 The products were delivered to New York by
common carrier or mail. However, over the three-year audit period,
VIP employees went to New York on forty-one occasions to deal with
“the more intractable problems” with its products. 604 Here, too, the
court stated, as a factual matter, that it could be “reasonably infer[red]” that VIP’s sale contracts obligated VIP to make charge-free
visits to customers within sixty days of a sale.605 The court found that
the employees’ in-state presence “enhanced sales and significantly
contributed to VIP’s ability to establish and maintain a market . . . in
New York.”606 Again, the court held the taxpayer responsible for New
York use-tax collection from the beginning of the audit period. 607

mented, “The fact is, on the crucial issue in this litigation, Orvis declined to expose its witnesses to cross-examination by producing them at the hearing . . . .” Id. at 961. Thus,
rather than 12 visits in three years, as indicated by the evidence, the court based its conclusion on an inference that there may have been an average of four visits per year to “as
many as 19 wholesale customers.” Id. at 962.
Orvis’ affidavits indicated that its wholesale sales persons visited New York customers
for the purpose of discussing shipping problems and to check displays. Even the letter on
which the Tax Tribunal relied indicated that the persons making the in-state visits had no
authority to take orders. See id. at 961.
600. Id. at 961. It is interesting to note that, just prior to the quoted statement, the
court mentioned that the state auditor had found wholesale sales to “from 9 to 16” New
York customers, but concluded (based on the “incredible” affidavits) that the sales persons
had visited up to 19 customers. Id. Perhaps there was a misprint in the opinion. While one
might expect such obvious antitaxpayer bias from a Tax Tribunal hearing officer, it is not
the type of objective analysis one would expect from the highest court of a state.
601. See id.
602. Id. (emphasis added).
603. See id. at 955.
604. Id. at 962. VIP did not advertise in New York or do any direct mail solicitation.
See id. at 966 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
605. Id. at 962.
606. Id.
607. See id.
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The New York court’s legal analysis is on a level with its factual
legerdemain. The decision spends a number of pages reviewing the
“evolution” of U.S. Supreme Court “doctrine” concerning state taxation of interstate commerce. 608 In support of its conclusion that after
Bellas Hess it is easy (“not unduly exacting”) to find the required
physical presence, the court relied on two cases, Standard Pressed
Steel Co. v. Washington609 and Goldberg v. Sweet.610 The court found
solace in Standard Pressed Steel because, in that case, the taxpayer’s
in-state presence consisted of one engineer who worked out of his
home and consulted with the taxpayer’s single in-state customer. 611
What the court did not note was that dealing with the customer, Boeing Aircraft Co., was a full-time job performed wholly within the
state over a number of years and that the business and occupation
tax involved was only on the in-state sales directly related to the engineer’s services. 612 The New York court also failed to mention that a
group of company engineers visited Boeing for about three days every
six weeks.
The court’s reference to Goldberg is even more curious. That case
involved Illinois’ excise tax on interstate telephone calls. 613 The New
York court characterized the decision as basing its findings of a sufficient nexus on the fact that the tax was on calls terminating or originating in Illinois and billed to an Illinois address. 614 Immediately after that conclusion, the New York court correctly noted that neither
the parties nor the U.S. Supreme Court questioned Illinois’ nexus to
tax.615 The intended implication was that such a small thread (one
end of a telephone call and a billing address) provided nexus. Such a
reading of Goldberg is unwarranted. Neither the parties nor the
courts questioned nexus between the state and taxpayers in that case
because it was beyond question.616 A cursory examination of Goldberg
608. See id. at 955-60.
609. 419 U.S. 560 (1975).
610. 488 U.S. 252 (1989).
611. See Orvis Co., 654 N.E.2d at 957.
612. See Standard Pressed Steel, 419 U.S. at 561-62.
613. See Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 254.
614. See Orvis Co., 654 N.E.2d at 957. The page cited by the New York court discusses
apportionment, not nexus. See Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 263.
615. See Orvis Co., 654 N.E.2d at 957; cf. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 260.
616. The tax in Goldberg was only imposed on telephone calls that originated or ended
in the state and were billed to in-state addresses. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262. The nexus between the event and the tax is obvious, the same that exists when sales tax is imposed on
an in-state sale. The plaintiffs in Goldberg brought a class-action suit on behalf of all Illinois persons who paid telephone bills. See id. at 257. The defendants, aside from the Director of Illinois’s Department of Revenue, were all telephone companies (like GTE) on whom
the collection obligation was imposed and who contracted with those bill-payers for long
distance services. See id. The relevant nexus was not a mere telephone call and billing address, it was the provision of long distance telephone services to thousands of state residents. Undoubtedly those service providers also had offices and employees within the
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shows that the only question was whether the tax was properly apportioned; to the extent that the relied-on portion of Goldberg mentioned nexus, the discussion was speculation about whether other
states might have nexus to impose a similar tax. 617
While the New York court did include abbreviated descriptions of
prior U.S. Supreme Court sales and use tax cases, 618 it consistently
stressed the number of taxpayer agents that had contact within the
taxing state, not the quality or nature of the in-state business activities carried on by those agents. 619 By reducing the apparent requirements to a minimum-numbers game,620 the New York court was able
to say that the numbers justified imposition of use-tax collection duties under its assumed facts concerning Orvis and VIP.
Ultimately, the New York court treats Quill as establishing a
positive bright-line test, that is, that any taxpayer who has more instate physical contact than Quill, regardless how fleeting, automatically satisfies Commerce Clause nexus requirements. 621 The court
concluded that “contemporary Commerce Clause analysis” does not
require that the vendor’s in-state physical presence be substantia l.
“Rather, it must be demonstrably more than a ‘slightest presence.’” 622
To make that determination, the court relied on numbers, not substance, which is not approved by Quill or any other Supreme Court
decision. Saying that the New York court “missed the boat” in Orvis
would be inaccurate—“missed the harbor” would be more precise.
One important issue that the court did not discuss in Orvis is
when nexus was established. Whether there was sufficient nexus at
the beginning of the audit period was never addressed. Since the
duty to collect cannot arise until nexus exists, the court failed to address a crucial question. Instead, it imposed the duty from the beginning of the audit period, apparently assuming that the taxpayers had
carried on similar in-state activities for some unstated time before
the audit period. When the nexus is based on an accumulation of
temporary visits, there must be some consideration of how many and
what type of visits are sufficient; otherwise there is no real accumulation and one temporary visit is sufficient (which is clearly not supported by any Supreme Court decision). Without evidence concerning

state, but that is not mentioned in the decision because nexus was not even a potential issue. See id. at 257, 260.
617. See id. at 261-63.
618. See Orvis Co., 654 N.E.2d at 960.
619. See id.
620. See id.
621. See id. at 960-61. The court asserted that treating Quill otherwise (i.e., as only
creating a safe harbor for mail-order sellers, which is what Quill actually does) would totally undermine the Supreme Court’s primary justification for its holding. See id.
622. Id. at 960-61.
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pre-audit-period activities (none were mentioned), a more clear example of an ex post facto duty would be difficult to find.
Decisions like Orvis put out-of-state vendors in a very precarious
position. If out-of-state vendors do not, from the very beginning, collect use tax from all purchasers, there may come a time when a court
renders a judgment requiring payment of the taxes they “should
have” collected, plus penalties and interest. Out of self-preservation,
vendors may start collecting taxes even if it is obvious that no Commerce Clause nexus exists. One supposes state tax collectors would
applaud the result, that is, the collection and remission of use taxes
by persons who could not constitutionally be required to do so, the
ends justifying the means. Some state tax collectors have not been
content with sitting back and waiting for court decisions to frighten
vendors into volunteering collection services. Businesses that take
state tax administrators’ pronouncements seriously will be forced to
collect sales tax or use tax on all sales.
b. State Tax Regulators.—Perhaps due to prior losses, 623 a Michigan Department of Treasury directive reduces minimum Commerce
Clause nexus to the point of nonexistence. Revenue Administrative
Bulletin 1999-1624 (“RAB 1999-1”) asserts that if one person indirectly
associated with an out-of-state seller is in the state for any part of
one day, sufficient nexus exists for imposing use-tax collection duties
on that seller for the next year.625 For “administrative convenience,”
the Department declared that it would only engage in enforcement
efforts if someone were in the state on two or more days during any
twelve-month period. 626 RAB 1999-1 states that there is sufficient
Commerce Clause nexus for Michigan to impose use-tax collection obligations on a seller whenever the seller has an employee or any
other type of associate “regularly and systematically present in
623. See Magnetek Controls, Inc. v. Michigan, 562 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
In Magnetek, the Michigan Department of Treasury argued that regular trips to other
states by marketing personnel, plus having independent contractor representatives in
those states, was not sufficient to allow those states to impose taxes, thus the taxpayer
owed more to Michigan. See id. at 221. The court relied heavily on Orvis to rule against the
Department. See id. at 223-24 (citing Orvis Co., 654 N.E.2d at 954). Perhaps that loss
prompted an internal review at the Department. See id. at 223. On the other hand, perhaps the Department merely takes inconsistent positions, one for use taxes and the opposite for “single business tax” solely due to the revenue effect. See id. at 223-24; see also
Gear Research v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, Nos. 227850, 239890, 1997 WL 672609
(Mich. Tax Tribunal July 15, 1997) (arguing that Quill requires some continuous physical
presence (office, factory, store, etc.) before recognizing jurisdiction to tax).
624. Use Tax Nexus Standards, Mich. Rev. Admin. Bull. 1999-1 (Mich. Dep’t of Treas.,
May 12, 1999), Westlaw, MI TAX RAB 1999-1.
625. See id. (“Jurisdictional Standard” discussion in part entitled “Law and Analysis”).
626. Id. Sellers should be wary, however, because the RAB’s preamble states that it
can be modified at any time. See id. Conclusion II of the RAB states that the directive (and
any amendments, no doubt) will be applied retroactively to “all open years and for cases
still open and on direct review.” Id.
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Michigan conducting activities to establish or maintain the market
for the out-of-state seller.”627 To that point, the position is not
particularly remarkable. The language following that general
statement, however, totally eviscerates the “regularly and
systematically” language and stretches “establish or maintain” far
beyond common understanding.628 The directive includes in the list of
acts that “establish or maintain the market” anything that might
result in direct or indirect contact with actual or potential customers.
The list includes everything from soliciting sales to conducting
training for potential customers, to dealing with deadbeat
629
customers.
The Multistate
Tax Commission (MTC) 630 created a “Public Participation Working Group” to draft guidelines on the constitutional
nexus necessary for imposing use-tax collection burdens. 631 The result, which appears to be complete deadlock, might have been used to
predict the climate in Congress’ Advisory Commission on Electronic
Commerce. 632 In January 1998, the MTC released a draft set of
“guidelines” (MTC State Draft) written by the state tax administra-

627. Id. (paragraph I(6) of “Conclusions”). It might reasonably be inferred that the
“market” being established or maintained is in Michigan, though that is not required by
the language used.
628. See id.
629. See id. (paragraph I(6)(a) of “Conclusions”). The relevant portion states:
(a) Activities that establish or maintain the market for the out-of-state seller
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Soliciting sales;
(2) Making repairs or providing maintenance or se rvice to property sold or to
be sold;
(3) Collecting current or delinquent accounts, through assignment or otherwise, related to sales of tangible personal property or services;
(4) Delivering property sold to customers;
(5) Installing or supervising installation at or after shipment or delivery;
(6) Conducting training for employees, agents, representatives, independent
contractors, brokers or others acting on the out-of-state seller’s behalf, or for
customers or potential custo mers;
(7) Providing customers any kind of technical assistance or service including,
but not limited to, engineering assistance, design service, quality control, product inspections, or similar services;
(8) Investigating, handling, or otherwise assisting in resolving customer complaints;
(9) Providing consulting services; or
(10)Soliciting, negotiating, or entering into franchising, licensing, or similar
agreements.
Id. (emphasis added).
630. The Multistate Tax Commission is an organization created by interstate compact
with a significant number of state-members. Its purpose is to promote uniformity in the
administration of state taxes. See Multistate Tax Commission Home Page, at
http://www.mtc.gov (visited Mar. 31, 2000).
631. See Public Participation Working Group Materials (updated Apr. 24, 1998), at
http://www.mtc.gov/PPWGs/ppwglist.html.
632. See discussion infra p. 739.
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tor portion of the group.633 The MTC State Draft’s authors would be
obvious even if they were not expressly identified. The proposal consists of a number of “guideline” statements, most followed by a number of examples. The following are among the things that the draft
identifies as creating “Commerce Clause nexus:” 1) an employee who
“telecommute[s]” to work (with permission for an indefinite period)
establishes the out-of-state employer’s physical presence in the employee’s home state; 634 2) owning real property in the state, as an investment and totally unrelated to business activities, establishes
nexus in the state where the property is located; 635 3) storing some of
a business’ financial records at its auditor’s office establishes the
business’ nexus with the state where the auditor’s office is located; 636
4) delivering sold goods to another state by contract carrier, rather
than common carrier, establishes nexus where the delivery is
made;637 5) the existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship automatically creates nexus for the other relationship member(s) in every
state where one member has a physical presence, if there is even the
slightest association between the two business activities; 638 and 6) a
business that “resells” telephone services using a prepaid phone card
that is usable in other states due to arrangements made with service
providers has nexus wherever a phone card purchaser actually uses
the card.639 The examples here could be extended to include the ma633. MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, CONSTITUTIONAL NEXUS G UIDELINE FOR
APPLICATION OF A STATE ’S SALES AND USE TAX TO AN O UT- OF-STATE BUSINESS (State Participant Revised Participation Working Group Draft, Jan. 1998) [hereinafter MTC STATE
DRAFT], http://www.mtc.gov/PPWGs/nexus/nexus24.pdf (visited Mar. 31, 2001). For a more
extensive review of the MTC and its multi-year campaign against nexus requirements, see
generally John C. Blase & John W. Westmorland, Quill Has Been Plucked! MTC States Are
Slowly Eroding the Substantial Nexus Standard, 73 N.D. L. REV . 685 (1997) (discussing
the March, 1997, draft).
634. MTC STATE DRAFT, supra note 633, para. II.C.1., at 7 (Example 6).
635. See id. para. II.C.2, at 7 (Example 2). One wonders if being a 1% member of an
LLC that has 1% of its capital invested in property in a state would also satisfy the nexus
requirements. Based on the general tenor of the draft, it is clear that state tax administrators answer “yes.” See id. para. II.C.3, at 9 (Example 4).
636. See id. para. II.C.3, at 9 (Example 5).
637. See id. para. II.C.5, at 10 (Example 2). Why the state collectors feel there is any
meaningful distinction between contract carriers and common carriers, under Quill or any
other authority, is not stated. This example is, however, not atypical of the extent to which
some state advocates willingly don intellectual blinders in their attempt to nullify Supreme
Court decisions.
638. See id. para. II.C.5, at 9-11 (various examples). These examples are rather obviously contrary to state court decisions on the topic. See, e.g., SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v.
Bannon, 385 A.2d 666 (Conn. 1991); Bloomingdale’s by Mail v. Commonwealth, 591 A.2d
1047 (Pa. 1991). The only possible justification for taking these positions is that the decisions were not made by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, the decisions were based on
fundamental principles of corporation law, which is essentially identical in all states, particularly with regard to the notion that corporations have separate legal existence regardless of the owners’ identities.
639. MTC STATE DRAFT, supra note 633, para. II.C.6, at 11 (Example 1). This example
obviously totally ignores World-Wide Volkswagen. See generally World-Wide Volkswagen
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jority of the examples used in the draft, many of which are equally
absurd.
Of particular interest are two statements in the draft. Paragraph
II.C.4 is “reserved for a possible discussion of physical presence
based upon an out-of-state business’ relationship to intangible property in the taxing state.”640 This statement is made more than once.641
Apparently the logical impossibility of using intangible things to establish physical presence was not noticed, or was not considered
relevant, by the drafters. Perhaps they also consider virtual reality
real. The potential threat to use Web site locations as a basis for
nexus is obvious. The second interesting statement makes that potential even more obvious: Under paragraph II.C.6, Example 2 is “reserved for a possible illustration of physical presence based upon the
ownership, lease, use or maintenance of an establishment in the taxing State that facilitates the conduct of a business through computerbased telecommunications.”642
An “industry response” was prepared, providing individual comments on each paragraph and example in the “state participant revised” draft. 643 The comments took issue with almost every “guideline” and example. One frequent comment was: “This example is of
limited use because the conclusion reached is devoid of underlying
analysis.”644 Most of the shortcomings of the state participant draft
come under fire, frequently with citations to relevant court decisions. 645
The industry response is not, however, totally meritorious. In
more than one place, the industry response takes the position that
Quill does not create a “safe harbor” but, instead, the Court intended
to establish a “bright line” test that is independent of the situs of the
sale or subsequent use. 646 The comments do not say how one distinguishes between a “bright line test” and a “safe harbor” or how the
seller’s or buyer’s physical location is irrelevant under Quill.
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). However, a state tax official might argue that
World-Wide Volkswagen deals with due process and, therefore, does not prevent finding
Commerce Clause nexus.
640. MTC STATE DRAFT, supra note 633, para. II.C.4, at 9.
641. See id. para. II.C.7, at 12. Paragraph II.C.7 implies that nexus will exist even if
the relationship is indirect through a representative of the taxpayer who has some relationship with in -state intangible property.
642. Id. para. II.C.6, at 12 (Example 2).
643. See Industry Response to State Participant Revised Public Participation Working
Group Draft of the Constitutional Nexus Guidelines (presented at full Public Participation
Working Group meeting of Mar. 27, 1998) [hereinafter Industry Response],
http://www.mtc.gov/PPWGs/Nexus/nexus25.PDF.
644. Id. passim.
645. See, e.g., id. at 12 (Industry Response to para. II.C.5 (Example 5)) (citing Bloomindales by Mail v. Commonwealth, 591 A.2d at 1047 (Pa. 1991); SFA Folio Collections, Inc.
v. Bannon, 585 A.2d 666 (Conn. 1991)).
646. E.g., id. at 5 (Industry Response to para. II.B.3).
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One who reviews the MTC State draft and the Industry Response
will find little hope for compromise. The draft does not appear to be
an effort to reach workable or objective guidelines; instead it is a
rather obvious effort to restrict the holding in Quill to the narrowest
possible scope and to expand what is sufficient to Commerce Clause
nexus to “relationships” so attenuated that the term loses all meaning. Many of the “guidelines” and examples describe situations which
go beyond even the most liberal interpretations of due process limitations on judicial specific jurisdiction.
3. Politics As Usual
After Quill there has been significant political controversy concerning taxes and the Internet. While the issues are not limited to
mail-order sales matters, those have featured prominently in the
publicity. Congress placed a moratorium on new state Internetfocused taxes and appointed an Advisory Commission on Electronic
Commerce to study the issues and report back to Congress. 647 The
Commision’s activities have been characterized by dissenseion and
political posturing rather than consensus making. Congress mandated that Commission membership be divided among state officials,
federal officials, and industry representatives. Naturally, the Commissioners’ opinions are equally divided, and there seems to have
been more hardening of positions than movement toward compromise. The Commission did not produce any softening of attitudes or
positions. A simple majority voted in favor of an industry-proposed
recommendation, but a two-thirds majority is required to make the
recommendations official. 648 Perhaps the only result of the Commission process was to demonstrate that (1) a rational compromise between the directly affected parties is impossible, and (2) the expenditure of many tax dollars could prove, beyond doubt, what was only
patently obvious before the process began. From any point of view
that is even marginally objective, there can be no workable solution
to taxing Internet-mediated sales (that is, requiring Internet sellers
to collect state use taxes) unless something is done to simplify that
task. Most of the more viable proposals submitted to the Commission
do something along those lines.

647. See Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. XI, 112 Stat. 2681, 271921 (1998).
648. See John Schwartz, Internet Tax Commission Ends Meeting in Deadlock, WASH.
POST, Mar. 22, 2000, at E1 [hereinafter Schwartz, Internet Tax ]; John Schwartz, Web Tax
Panel Falls Short of Goal: After 18 Months, Commission Gives Issue Back, WASH. POST,
Mar. 31, 2000, at E3.

740

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:649

One such proposal was submitted by the National Governors Association, “Streamlining State Sales Tax System.”649 As envisioned by
the proposal, the Association has created the Streamlined Sales Tax
Project, 650 a pilot program by a few states that (a) makes uniform
definitions, classifications, and administrative procedures, (b) limits
the number of tax rates, and tax rate changes, within any state, and
(c) establishes a “Certified Service Provider” system for collecting and
paying use taxes.651 The “Certified Service Provider” would act as a
collection and distribution point, and sellers who choose to participate would be able to limit their potential liability by complying with
the procedures. 652 The system would be voluntary, both for states and
for sellers, and does not require federal legislation. It specifically
says that there would be no change in current nexus rules, which
may be a rather empty statement because opinions about what those
rules are remain divergent, to say the least.
Another proposal, submitted by the “Business Caucus,” has many
of the same objectives, but it proposes federal legislation establishing
the revised system. 653 Among the prominent features of the envisioned federal legislation are (1) encouraging states to cooperate in
creating a uniform state law that would fix uniform rates, limit rate
changes, and provide uniform definitions, audits, and other standards; (2) establishing a detailed rule on when nexus exists for state
taxation of business activities and use-tax collection duties; and (3)
continuing or enacting federal moratoria on state tax changes pending completion of the new rules. 654 One very interesting, and contro649. See Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce, Document Library, at
http://www.ecommercecommission.org/library.htm (visited Mar. 31, 2001).
650. See Streamlined Sales Tax System for the 21st Century, at http://www.geocities.
com/streamlined2000/Proposal.asp (visited Mar. 31, 2001).
651. See Streamlined Sales Tax Project, Executive Summary 2 (Mar. 1, 2001),
http://208.237.129.206/sline/EXECSUM.pdf (visited Mar. 31, 2001).
652. See Streamlined Sales Tax Project, Pilot 2 (Mar. 8, 2001), http://208.237.129.206/
sline/pilotprojectoverview.pdf (visited Mar. 31, 2001); see also UNIFORM SALES AND USE
TAX ADMINISTRATION ACT § 9, at 5 (Streamlined Sales Tax Project, as amended Jan. 24,
2001). A similar “trusted third party” arrangement is one of the options being considered in
Europe to address similar VAT-tax collection problems. See Working Party No. 1, European Comm’n, Harmonisation of Turnover Taxes 7 (June 8, 1999) (working paper) [hereinafter EC Working Paper], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/
publications/working_doc/taxation/ecommerceEN.pdf (visited Mar. 31, 2001).
653. See ACEC Business Caucus, A Proposal for Internet Tax Reform and Reduction,
http://www.ecommercecommission.org/document/202BusinessCaususProposal.doc (last visited Nov. 6, 2000). The Business Caucus includes Charles Schwab Corp., America Online,
Inc., MCI WorldCom Inc., AT&T Corp., Time Warner Inc., and Gateway Inc. See Curt
Anderson, Associated Press, Internet Tax Ban Extension Urged (Feb. 9, 2000),
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/htx/nm/20000209/bs/tax_internet_3.html (visited Feb. 13,
2000); Reuters, New Internet Sales Tax Ideas Offered (Feb. 9, 2000), http://dailynews.
yahoo.com/htx/nm/20000209/bs/tax_internet_1. html (visited Feb. 13, 2000).
654. This proposal envisions a significant federal involvement and implementing legislation, both of which may be necessary. It is unrealistic to expect 50 states and all their
subdivisions to agree to any single operational method or to voluntarily limit their own
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versial part of this proposal would suspend state sales taxes on
things like books, records, and videos, which are capable of digital
distribution via the Internet. That certainly meets the rhetorical call
for equal taxation of electronic and “traditional” sales (the mythical
“level playing field”), but not quite in the manner state tax authorities have in mind. This proposal received the endorsement of a majority of the Commission, but not the “supermajority” required to
make the result “official.”655
E. Legislative or “Prescriptive” Jurisdiction
Prescriptive (that is, legislative or regulatory) jurisdiction is both
similar to and different from judicial jurisdiction. Both refer to limitations of legal authority; any attempt to act beyond those limits has
no legal status. A judgment entered against a person over whom the
court has no personal jurisdiction is of no greater legal significance
than regulations adopted by the Ku Klux Klan to control mango harvesting in Central Mongolia, and vice versa. The same is true for
laws adopted by a state legislature that control, in effect or intentionally, activities of nonresidents beyond state borders. The principles of prescriptive jurisdiction are the “subject matter jurisdiction”
rules for the legislative and executive branches of government. Of
course, any attempt by the judicial branch to enforce void enactments
is equally void.
The basic principles behind prescriptive jurisdiction are those of
international law discussed in the introduction. They are a direct result of the absolute internal sovereignty of nations and States; the
acts of one government cannot have legal force within the territorial
jurisdiction of another government. 656 No other result is possible
unless the concept of sovereignty itself is changed or eliminated.
In the U.S. federal system, legal issues concerning federal prescriptive (subject matter) jurisdiction are common. Legal issues concerning state prescriptive jurisdiction are much less common. State
legislators and executives are aware of their government’s geographic boundaries. However, there are situations in which otherwise valid state enactments are invalid because of their impact on
persons and events outside those boundaries. Given the habit of relating restrictions on government actions to provisions in the Constitution, most state prescriptive jurisdiction issues are treated as Due
Process or Commerce Clause issues.

power to impose taxes. Of course, based on the political rhetoric to date, it will probably
not be much easier for Congress to find a majority to support any single plan.
655. See Schwartz, Internet Tax, supra note 648.
656. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714, 722 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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One case that discussed prescriptive jurisdiction principles is
Pennoyer v. Neff, 657 the foundational case on state jurisdiction over
nonresidents. Though its express decision has been substantially
eroded by time, technology, and theory, the principles it enunciated
are as valid today as they were a century ago. The Court there enunciated “principles of public law” that apply to the States because of
their fundamental independence:
One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its
territory. . . . The other principle . . . follows from the one mentioned; that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and
authority over persons or property without its territory. The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it
is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of
one State have no operation outside of its territory . . . and that no
tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions.
“Any exertion of authority of this sort beyond this limit,” says
Story, “is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or
property in any other tribunals.”658

Developments concerning judicial personal jurisdiction during the
twentieth century appear to have significantly eroded Pennoyer’s
strict territorial limitations on judicial jurisdiction,659 but those developments have not changed or expanded the fundamental principles on which Pennoyer was based. At most, the more recent cases
have expanded what can be recognized as consent to jurisdiction 660
and what constitutes “acting in a state” for judicial jurisdiction purposes. 661
More modern decisions rarely resort to these fundamental principles. Instead, reference is made to the Due Process Clause 662 or the
Commerce Clause. 663 Decisions such as International Shoe and
World-Wide Volkswagen hold that due process principles preclude
the exercise of state judicial jurisdiction over persons or entities that
have insufficient connection with the forum’s territorial jurisdiction.664 The “principles” are those enunciated in Pennoyer.

657. Id.
658. Id. at 722-23 (citations omitted). For application of the same principles in a state
tax setting, see St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423 (1870).
659. See, e.g., Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186.
660. See id. at 201-05.
661. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
662. See id.
663. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).
664. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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With respect to legislative action and Commerce Clause principles, the connection between modern cases and those fundamental
principles is less direct and sometimes obscured because many
Commerce Clause cases are founded on other principles, such as discrimination. However, the connection remains. One of the purposes
for delegating to Congress power to regulate commerce among the
states was to eliminate the discriminatory and protectionist laws enacted by the states while the Articles of Confederation were in effect. 665 The “dormant Commerce Clause” corollary to the delegation
precludes states from actions that discriminate against, or unduly
burden, interstate commerce.
One manner in which a State might discriminate against interstate commerce is by adopting rules that have the effect of regulating
actions beyond the state’s borders. For example, Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seeling, Inc.,666 involved New York milk marketing regulations. To
prevent the price-support provisions from being rendered ineffective
by out-of-state competition, the regulations prohibited milk dealers
from selling milk purchased out of state unless the price paid to the
out-of-state producer was at least equal to in-state minimum
prices. 667 Invalidating that rule, the Court stated:
New York has no power to project its legislation into Vermont by
regulating the price to be paid in that state for milk acquired
there. So much is not disputed. New York is equally without power
to prohibit the introduction within her territory of milk of wholesome quality acquired in Vermont, whether at high prices or low
ones. . . .
Such a power, if exerted, would set a barrier to traffic between
one state and another as effective as if customs duties, equal to the
price differential, had been laid on the thing transported.668

The Court held that New York’s rules were invalid under the Commerce Clause. 669 It could have just as easily held the rules nullities as
being beyond the state’s prescriptive jurisdiction.
A similar result was reached in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,670 concerning an Illinois statute regulating tender offers for corporate shares.
The scope of the act was such that it would require compliance even
though there were no Illinois residents that might have been affected. The Court concluded:

665. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5
Otto) 714, 720, 722–23 (1877); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
666. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
667. See id. at 519 n.1 (quoting the regulation).
668. Id. at 521.
669. See id. at 522.
670. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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[T]he Illinois statute is a direct restraint on interstate commerce
and . . . has a sweeping extraterritorial effect. Furthermore, if Illinois may impose such regulations, so may other States; and interstate commerce in securities transactions . . . would be thoroughly
stifled. . . . The Commerce Clause also precludes application of a
state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the
State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within
the State. . . . “[A]ny attempt ‘directly’ to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property would offend sister States and
exceed the inherent limits of the State’s power.”671

In other cases, a number of state statutes intended to control instate prices of alcoholic beverages (to obtain the best prices for residents) have been struck down on Commerce Clause grounds because
their practical effect was to control the prices at which distributors
could sell their products in other states. 672 The Court summarized the
interaction of the Commerce Clause and state regulations with extraterritorial effect:
First, the “Commerce Clause .. . precludes the application of a
state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the
State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within
the State” . . . . Second, a statute that directly controls commerce
occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State’s authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature. .. . Third, the practical effect of the
statute must be evaluated not only by considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also by considering how the challenged statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes
of other States and what effect would arise if not one, but many or
every, State adopted similar legislation. Generally speaking, the
Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent legislation arising
from the projection of one state regulatory regime into the jurisdiction [territory] of another State. . . . [N]o state may force an out-ofstate merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in another.673

Thus, the Court uses Commerce Clause language to enforce the limiting rules inherent in state sovereignty, that is, prescriptive jurisdiction.
In cases presenting extraterritorial application of state tax rules,
the Court has tended to use either the Due Process Clause or the
Commerce Clause without following any particular pattern about
671. Id. at 642-43 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1877)) (citations omitted).
672. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
673. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336-37 (citations omitted).
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when which is used. The earlier gasoline tax and sales tax cases, during the period when there was a bright line between interstate commerce and local commerce, frequently referred to the Commerce
Clause because the parties usually contended that the tax was being
imposed on interstate commerce. 674 The bright line theory precisely
limited state prescriptive jurisdiction to “local” commerce. For example, the Silas Mason decision applied that bright line theory and held
that the state use tax at issue was not invalid under the Commerce
Clause, because (among other things) the tax could not become payable until after the related goods had completed their interstate
journey; in other words, the tax was on in-state use of property. 675
The company argued that despite the formal incidence, the use tax
was really a sales tax on the out-of-state sale, but the Court was not
swayed.676 The 1941 mail-order cases, Sears, Roebuck 677 and Montgomery Ward,678 applied the newer, more flexible approach to interstate commerce, but nevertheless sustained the imposition of tax collection duties by reference to cases applying the bright line theory.
When the three companion sales and use tax cases679 were heard
in 1944, the Court continued to apply the bright-line theory, invalidating the Arkansas sales tax because it was being applied to an “interstate sale,” but approving the Iowa use tax because the tax did not
apply until the property had come to rest in the state and was being
enjoyed by the consumer.680 Justice Jackson’s General Trading dissent, however, directly addressed the underlying problem of prescriptive jurisdiction, arguing that the state did not have the power to impose collection duties extraterritorially, because that would be beyond the State’s fundamental powers even if there were not relevant
constitutional restrictions. 681
When the Court made the effort in Quill to separate Due Process
and Commerce Clause issues, the opinion was unenlightening. It applies gloss rather than principles and ignores Justice Frankfurter’s
admonition quoted earlier. In the due process portion of Quill, the
674. See, e.g., Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934); Pierce Oil Corp. v.
Hopkins, 264 U.S. 137 (1924); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921); Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 205 N.W. 72 (S.D. 1925).
675. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582-86 (1937).
676. See id. at 587-88. In Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939), the
company argued that the California use-tax collection duties violated both due process and
Commerce Clause rules, see id. at 66, and it lost both arguments, see id. at 68. The Court
relied on cases applying the bright line rule. See id. at 66.
677. Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
678. Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941).
679. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); General Trading Co. v. State
Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 (1944).
680. Compare Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330-32 (rejecting Arkansas sales tax), with General Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 338 (upholding Iowa use tax).
681. General Trading, 322 U.S. at 339-40 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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majority opinion implicitly assumes that the state has legislative jurisdiction to regulate and addresses judicial specific jurisdiction gloss
instead of the true issue. In the Commerce Clause portion, the majority opinion totally misses fundamentals, sliding around in Commerce
Clause gloss before ultimately falling back on stare decisis.
The Court might have reached the same conclusion by simply referring to prescriptive jurisdiction limitations. State prescriptive jurisdiction does not extend to persons not doing business in the state.
However, federal prescriptive jurisdiction is not affected by state
boundaries. If the opinion had been written in prescriptive jurisdiction terms, it would not have invited the tax officials’ manipulative
interpretations discussed earlier. In Quill, prescriptive jurisdiction
receives only a brief mention. In his three-Justice concurring opinion,
Justice Scalia stated:
I agree . . . that abandonment of Bellas Hess’ due process holding is
compelled by reasoning “[c]omparable” to that contained in our
post-1967 cases dealing with state jurisdiction to adjudicate. I do
not understand this to mean that the due process standards for adjudicative jurisdiction and those for legislative (or prescriptive)
jurisdiction are necessarily identical.682

The limitations of prescriptive jurisdiction are more frequently
discussed in the Commerce Clause context. If a state regulation has
an impact on persons and events not associated with the state, it is
invalid.683 In Healy v. Beer Institute, the Court said:
[A] statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the
enacting State’s authority and is invalid regardless of whether the
statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended . . . . The critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control
conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.684

One of the more complete and well-reasoned decisions concerning
state’s attempts at regulating Internet-mediated activities is American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki.685 That case involved New York’s
criminalization of child pornography. Despite the statute’s laudable
intentions, after carefully exploring the nature of the Internet and its
various components, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York concluded that the statute was invalid under the Commerce Clause because it reached far beyond the state’s boundaries
682. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 319-20 (1992) (citations omitted) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
683. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Healy v. Beer Inst.,
491 U.S. 324 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573 (1986).
684. 491 U.S. at 336.
685. 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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and it was impossible to limit the effects to conduct within New
York.686 Of particular interest in the current context is the district
court’s observation that Internet users are indifferent to the geographic location of the Web sites they visit and Web site owners have
no control over the location from which their site is accessed. 687
To apply prescriptive jurisdiction principles requires specificity
concerning what the state is attempting to do and its effects outside
the state’s boundaries. Sales-and-use-tax schemes as a whole are not
at issue. Neither is the state’s authority to impose separate sales and
use taxes on in-state activities. The only question is whether the
state can impose use-tax collection duties on persons outside the
state, relating to a transaction completed outside the state, simply
because the related item eventually came into the state for initial use
by a consumer.
A state can regulate activities, property, and events actually
within the state. 688 The out-of-state seller does not act within the

686. See id. at 169, 177.
687. See id. at 170-171. The district court said: “An internet user who posts a Web page
cannot prevent New Yorkers or Oklahomans or Iowans from accessing that page and will
not even know from what state visitors to that site hail.” Id. at 171.
688. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 (1986). Section 402 lists
the circumstances in which a government can establish a binding rule:
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;
(b)
the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c)
conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial
effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well
as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state
interests.
Id. § 402. Section 403(1) states that even if a nation-state might otherwise validly exercise
prescriptive jurisdiction under § 402, it cannot exercise that jurisdiction with respect to
nonresidents if that would be unreasonable. Section 403(2) provides:
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a)
the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, that is,,
the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b)
the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is
designed to protect;
(c)
the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
(d)
the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation;
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state, the transaction is completed outside the state, and the events
that trigger the tax take place after the out-of-state seller’s participation ends. 689 Treating the sale transaction as a discrete event, completed solely in the state where the sale occurs, is mandated by the
way the concept of a “sale” has been consistently and continuously
treated for sales tax purposes. Jefferson Lines is a good example. 690
In that case, the Court reviewed the meaning of “sale” in the sales
tax context. In that context the Court said:
A sale of goods is most readily viewed as a discrete event facilitated by the laws and amenities of the place of sale, and the transaction itself does not readily reveal the extent to which completed
or anticipated interstate activity affects the value on which a
buyer is taxed. We have . . . held [sales] taxes properly measurable
by the gross charge for the purchase, regardless of any activity
outside the taxing jurisdiction that might have preceded the sale
or might occur in the future. Such has been the rule even when the
parties . . . specifically contemplated interstate movement of the
goods either immediately before, or after, the transfer of ownership.691

To say that the state where sold goods are delivered has jurisdiction to regulate or tax an out-of-state sale based on the transaction is
contrary to Jefferson Lines and the cases it cites and would effectively destroy whatever level of functionality the sales-and-use-tax
combination has. Jefferson Lines held that the sales tax did not have
to be apportioned because of this characteristic of a “sale.”692 If the
definition of “sale” is stretched to include all events up to the item
coming to rest in the state where it will be used, both sales and use
taxes will have to be apportioned to satisfy Complete Auto’s “fair apportionment” requirement. Thus, the question reverts back to what
the out-of-state seller did within the state. Judicial specific jurisdiction rules are inappropriate. For those rules to apply, there must be
some in-state event, resulting from the defendant’s voluntary act
(e)
the importance of the regulation to the inte rnational political, legal, or
economic system;
(f)
the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
(g)
the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity; and
(h)
the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. § 403(2).
689. In D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988), the Court said that the
old bright line rule between interstate movement and local situs was no longer relevant for
Commerce Clause purposes. However, it is relevant to use taxes because that point is employed in use taxes to determine when a tax be comes due, which D.H. Holmes admits. In
that case, there was no real question about nexus between the taxpayer and the state.
690. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995).
691. Id. at 186-87 (citations omitted).
692. Id.
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that was in some way directed toward the state. 693 Prescriptive jurisdiction rules, at least in the case of an out-of-state seller, require
some connection with the state that is not dependent on the in-state
event before the state can regulate the seller.
In some Internet-mediated sales, the seller may know the buyer’s
geographic location and may even know there is a high probability
that the sold item will be used there. But in many or most cases, the
seller will not need or have reliable information, but still risks a tax
auditor’s later, different conclusion. In economic and Internetoperational terms, there is little to distinguish between states’ usetax collection statutes and the anti-pornography law discussed in
Pataki: the state is attempting to regulate activities and persons outside its borders. There is one significant difference, however. New
York’s law was intended to alleviate a significant social problem that
could not be adequately addressed in a different manner. In contrast,
use-tax collection statutes are intended to alleviate some of the administrative burden of state tax departments that have a clear, and
constitutionally unquestionable, method of adequately addressing by
other means. In Commerce Clause “undue burdens” situations, the
degree of permissible burden depends, in part, on the benefit to be
gained.694 If an anti-child pornography statute “can’t get no sympathy,” use-tax collection statutes should not get more.
Limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction, whether treated as a due
process issue or a Commerce Clause issue, do not preclude regulating
or taxing activities or events that have a significant connection with
the enacting agency’s territory. The type of connection might vary,
but one aspect is clear in all of the authorities: the regulated party
must intentionally act with intent to have an effect in the enacting
agency’s territory. What is equally clear is that use-tax collection
statutes and state tax authorities’ assertions cast the net much
wider. Even if tax authorities rarely take legal action to enforce their
assertions, the threat and burden still exist. 695

693. See supra Part III.B.
694. See Maine v. Taylor 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Line, Inc.,
359 U.S. 520, 526 (1959).
695. The Pataki case recognizes the burden imposed by the existence of a statute. A
number of witnesses testified that they felt compelled to restrict their otherwise legal actions because of the possibility of being prosecuted under the New York statute. See
American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 174–75 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The district
court found the resulting “chilling” effect to be significant. Id. at 180.
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IV. DISCUSSION—A PATH T HROUGH THIS WEB ?
A. Context—Reality Check
The preceding materials demonstrate that what one might have
predicted to be a simple problem has been transformed into something rather complex. Changes in economic patterns, legal theory
thought patterns, political rhetoric, tax policy, and many other things
(not to mention somewhat ad hoc court decisions) appear to have
conspired. The result is not unlike the Internet—no central core, but
a number of areas of concentration with many independent interconnections. Removing one connection is little loss to the structure as a
whole, just as it adds little. But perhaps appearance is not all reality;
a little perspective might help.
Always seeking easy means of extracting funds, states (like other
governments throughout history) tax retail sales, which produces a
relatively constant, not-too-painful-to-taxpayers source of state revenue.696 Paying a few cents each time a purchase is made is less traumatic than paying a much larger amount less often. Nothing is taken
directly and obviously from the taxpayer’s paycheck, no complex
forms need to be laboriously completed and filed, and very few taxpayers would make the significant effort required to determine just
how much sales tax she or he actually paid in a year. Sales taxes are
relatively simple to administer: The retailers collect the tax, sending
in the money frequently. Retailers also routinely keep accounting records so auditing is not a significant problem; if the retailer has not
collected enough in tax, it is forced to pay the uncollected amount
from its own funds. The retailer has, therefore, a strong incentive to
collect the tax—it must either pay with others’ money or pay with its
own.
A complication arose when some tax official noticed, or speculated,
that consumers were (or might be) able to buy in an adjacent state
with a lower (or no) sales tax, thereby obtaining the goods without
enriching the state where they lived.697 That was represented as “unfair” to residents who could not (or did not) make out-of-state pur696. If one were cynical, one might speculate that there is less political risk in voting to
raise a sales tax by one tenth of a percent than to vote to increase income tax rates. It may
also be politically expedient to dedicate any specific sales tax increase to a particular
budget category with a clear public benefit (e.g., mass transit, school construction) which,
incidentally of course, allows general revenue funds to be allocated to budget categories
with less precise parameters.
697. With the adoption of local option and special district sales tax add-ons, the consumer’s ability and incentive to adjust shopping patterns increased—it is usually not as far
to the county or city line as to the state line. It would be interesting to see a study designed
to determine if a new sales tax changed gross retail sales in border areas. If there is such a
study it would provide a foundation for contemplating the impact of imposing tax collection
duties on Internet sellers—a better foundation, certainly, than the highly speculative predictions featured in the political rhetoric.
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chases; actually, it is probably more accurate to say that it was perceived as unfair to the state budget. The “solution” was to impose an
equal tax on state-resident consumers who purchased things for instate use without paying the state’s sales tax.698 Perhaps the credit
for out-of-state sales taxes paid was added to preserve the appearance of fairness. That solution created more problems.
Once a tax is imposed, it should be collected. It would be highly
unrealistic to expect individuals to stop by the tax office to pay a few
cents each time they purchased something in another state. Auditing
all of the individuals in a state to determine if they owed use taxes
would, obviously, be a losing proposition. The “solution” to the usetax collection problem was obvious—apply the same tax collection
duties on all retail sellers as the sales tax imposes on in-state retailers. For the most part, state tax authorities recognized the futility of
trying to vigorously enforce use taxes, and not very much potential
revenue went unpaid, because businesses paid the tax on their consumption, only individuals did not get taxed on their consumption.
As the number of states with sales taxes increased, this uncollected
revenue became even smaller because of the credit for out-of-state
taxes paid. Reasonably, there was not much interest in trying to collect use taxes on purchase by individual consumers. 699 But, at some
point, tax authorities became aware of a possible way to collect some
of those unpaid taxes.
Some creative marketing person had the idea of using the U.S.
mail to sell things to persons who were not able to visit the seller’s
store, and mail-order catalogs were born (actually before states had
sales taxes). At least for some rural states, the goods shipped into the
state by mail-order sellers became a measurable portion of consumer
purchases. 700 Obviously, large mail-order sellers were a much more
lucrative target than local farmers, who were hard-pressed anyway,
or the hardware store in the town just across the state line. Sales
698. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583-86 (1937). One can only
speculate about the thinking that went into initial use tax enactments. At least in retrospect, it seems that the originators could not have been so naive as to think that individual
consumers would ever voluntarily pay, or be forced to pay, use taxes. However, commercial
operations purchasing large and/or valuable items could reasonably be expected to pay the
tax. This is particularly true in states that impose a personal property tax or an income
tax, which includes all, or almost all, states. A personal property tax audit (or income tax
audit) could easily include a use -tax audit by merely requiring the owner supply a pu rchase invoice for all property purchases or expenses. If those were the originators’
thoughts, the taxes that current state officials complain about “losing” have never been collected (and therefore cannot be “lo st”) and were never seriously intended to be collected.
699. State sales or use taxes are regularly enforced against individual consumers with
respect to motor vehicles and the like. State vehicle registration rules typically require
proof of sales taxes paid. Without proof of prior payment, the sales or use tax must be collected before the vehicle will be registered.
700. See Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 362 n.3 (1941) (noting that
Iowa mail-order sales exceeded in-store sales some years).
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volume, and records of where goods were sent, made mail-order sellers a feasible target for use-tax collection efforts. Thus states were
willing to incur the costs necessary to take their efforts to, and
through, the courts.
Taking on the biggest mail-order sellers, the states lost in 1941
because of some pesky legal theories concerning much less important
things— jurisdiction, due process, and the Commerce Clause. 701 From
that time forward, states have been trying to find routes around, or
shrink the scope of, those restrictions. Changes in due process theory
probably encouraged tax officials. After more than forty-five years of
effort, it looked like they had finally succeeded when the North Dakota Supreme Court held that out-of-state Quill was required to remit use taxes on its mail-order sales shipped to North Dakota addresses. 702 But, hopes were dashed when the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the North Dakota court made a mistake. 703 On the positive
side (for the tax collectors), the Court said that due process did not
preclude enforcement against Quill, but the states lost because the
dormant Commerce Clause still precludes forcing mail-order sellers
to collect use taxes. 704
Despite how it may sound at times, all the noise is about a small
segment of taxable retail sales:
SALE TYPE

SALES OR
USE TAX
PAID?*

Individual, in person, home state

Always

Individual, in person, not home state

Always

Commercial consumers

Always

Individual by phone, etc., in-state seller

Always

Individual by phone, etc., out-of-state seller

Sometimes

*Assumes that all states have sales tax
Personal experience demonstrates how small the uncollected part is.

701. See Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941); Sears, 312 U.S. at
359.
702. State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991), rev’d, 504 U.S.
298 (1992).
703. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1992).
704. See id.
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B. Post-Quill State Administrative Activities
Like most court decisions, Quill does not achieve total clarity on
all points. However, it does support some relatively certain conclusions. The first is that something more is required to satisfy “Commerce Clause tax nexus” than is required to satisfy due process
nexus.705 If that were not true, separate analysis would be unnecessary. The first question is whether due process requirements are satisfied. If they are not, there is no need to inquire into Commerce
Clause questions. However, if due process nexus is established, then
there is the additional question of whether Commerce Clause nexus
is established. State response to Quill (no doubt exacerbated by exuberant predictions of e-commerce growth) was to take the assault on
constitutional restrictions to a new level. The Michigan Department
of Treasury’s efforts, discussed in Part III.D.2 above, are not atypical. 706
The “Law and Analysis” section of RAB 1999-1707 consistently interprets Quill in surprising ways. For example, it states, “The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that mailing catalogs into the state constitutes economic presence.”708 The referenced portion of Quill indicates
that due process nexus exists when “a mail-order house .. . is engaged in continuous and widespread solicitation of business within a
State,” even if that solicitation is accomplished by a “deluge of catalogs rather than a phalanx of drummers.”709 The distance between
the Court’s actual language (“deluge of catalogs”) and the Department’s interpretation (simply “mailing”) is amazing. The Court’s
nexus discussion relates to the quality and nature of contact: the
point was merely that mailing can be qualitatively sufficient contact—assuming it is also sufficiently extensive. RAB 1999-1’s language suggests that nexus is satisfied by any quantity greater than
one, without regard to quality or nature.
An even more obvious misconstruction is supplied with respect to
Quill’s “bright-line.” RAB 1999-1 states, “Under the bright-line standard of Quill any physical presence in the state[,] such as an employee present for one day[,] constitutes substantial nexus.”710 There
705. Id. at 313 n.7. The Court noted: “Although such comments [as in Trinova Corp. v.
Michigan, 498 U.S. 358, 373 (1991)] might suggest that every tax that passes contemporary Commerce Clause analysis is also valid under the Due Process Clause, it does not follow that the converse is as well true: A tax may be consistent with due process and yet unduly burden interstate commerce.” Id.
706. See Use Tax Nexus Standards, Mich. Rev. Admin. Bull. 1999-1 (Mich. Dep’t of
Treas., May 12, 1999), Westlaw, MI TAX RAB 1999-1.
707. Id.
708. Id.
709. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308. Using Quill’s due process discussion to justify a Commerce
Clause position is clearly contrary to Quill.
710. Mich. Rev. Admin. Bull. 1999-1.
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is no citation supporting that statement. If nothing else, its accuracy
is belied by the fact that in Quill, there was property of the seller
within the state, which is some physical presence, but which the
Court held was insufficient to establish nexus.
Similarly, RAB 1999-1 states that Quill overruled Miller Bros. v.
Maryland711 to the extent that Miller Bros. held that the in-state
presence of an out-of-state seller’s trucks was insufficient to create
commerce clause nexus. 712 It then goes on to state that “Miller Bros.
is no longer good law.”713 Neither of those statements is correct. In its
specific discussion of due process nexus (not Commerce Clause
nexus), the Quill decision starts with a quotation from Miller Bros., 714
hardly what one would expect for a decision “overruled” in the quoting decision. The Quill decision does partially overrule some prior
due process nexus decisions: “Thus, to the extent that our decisions
have indicated that the Due Process Clause requires physical presence in a State for the imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those holdings . . . .”715 Since in Miller Bros. the out-of-state
seller did have some physical presence in the state, and the Court
held that there was still not sufficient Commerce Clause nexus, RAB
1999-1 misstates both Miller Bros. and Quill’s effect on it. It similarly mischaracterizes other Supreme Court decisions in its efforts to
justify its conclusions. 716
Quill does not say that due process nexus requirements need not
be met if Commerce Clause nexus requirements are met. It is reasonable to infer from RAB. 1999-1 that the Michigan Department of
Treasury thinks otherwise. One can easily propose any number of
scenarios that would satisfy RAB 1999-1’s Commerce Clause nexus
conditions but would not come close to satisfying due process requirements. 717 Just one example should suffice:
711. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
712. Mich. Rev. Admin. Bull. 1999-1 (sixth unnumbered paragraph of the “Jurisdictional Standard” discussion).
713. Id.
714. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 306 (“The Due Process Clause ‘requires some definite link,
some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property, or transaction it
seeks to tax’ . . . .” (citations omitted)).
715. Id. at 308.
716. For example, RAB 1999-1, in unnumbered paragraph 8 of the section entitled
“Law and Analysis,” discusses Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960), which Quill
characterized as the “furthest extension of that power” to impose use tax collection duties.”
Quill, 504 U.S. at 306. Scripto involved the multi-year, continuous, in-state activities of a
number of nonexclusive sales representatives. See Scripto, 362 U.S. at 207. RAB 1999-1
characterizes the Scripto salespersons as “part-time,” periodic, and cyclical, which is facially inaccurate. The difference between 10 sales persons who are continuously active in a
state over a number of years (Scripto) is orders of magnitude different from one, indirect
associate handling a minor matter within the state on two minor occasions within any 12month period. See RAB 1999-1.
717. Such a question could arise only because of the obvious misinterpretation of Quill.
Since, per Quill, Commerce Clause nexus requirement are more demanding than due proc-
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Alfa Corp. sold (across the counter in its single Ohio retail store) a
$100 cell phone to Jethro, an individual living at the time of sale in
Ohio. (The store collected and submitted Ohio sales tax). Jethro
moves to Michigan, closing the Ohio bank account on which the
payment check was drawn. Jethro’s check is returned unpaid. Alfa
Corp. eventually assigns the check to Weedunum Collection
Agency. Weedunum’s account manager travels round-trip between
Cleveland and Kansas City on personal business, both directions
changing airplanes at Detroit [Michigan] Metro Airport. Both
times in Detroit Metro, while waiting for her flights, the account
manager telephones Jethro and leaves a message on his answering
machine, threatening legal action in Ohio if the check is not made
good.

According to RAB 1999-1, Alfa Corp. would be required to register as
a use-tax-collecting retailer and collect and submit use taxes on all
sales to Michigan residents for twelve months, starting on the day of
the second telephone call. It should be obvious that the collection
agent’s two unsuccessful telephone calls are not sufficient contact for
due process purposes. (Or what Quill actually holds for that matter.)
Despite its extreme position, the Michigan Department of Treasury is not the most radical state tax advocate. The state participants
in the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) nexus guideline project
probably lead the pack when it comes to stretching legal logic.718 The
MTC is an organization of state tax officials from the majority of U.S.
States. Its purpose is to promote uniformity in state taxation. 719 That
does not prevent it from being an advocatory body.
Quill’s “bright-line” test is negative, not positive as wished by
state tax authorities and Orvis. The Supreme Court did not say “sufficient Commerce Clause nexus is established by any physical contact
with a state, direct or indirect, between property or associates of an
out-of-state seller unless the contact is solely and exclusively via mail
and common carrier.” The Court did say that regardless of the extent
to which an out-of-state seller has directed its activities toward a
state, there is not sufficient Commerce Clause nexus if that seller’s
only physical contacts with the state’s use-tax payers are via mail or
common carrier. Quill only creates a safe harbor for some mail-order

ess nexus requirements, if the former is satisfied, the latter would also be satisfied. The
fact that RAB 1999-1 finds Commerce Clause nexus in situations that would not satisfy
due process requirements proves its misinterpretation.
718. See supra text accompanying notes 630-646. The draft even goes beyond the line
in some instances, probably on the rationale that the court decisions which the proposals
ignore are only state court decisions that are not mandatory precedent for all states. See,
e.g., SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon, 585 A.2d 666 (Conn. 1991).
719. See Multistate Tax Commission Home Page, at http://www.mts.org.
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vendors. It adds very little, if anything, to understanding which other
vendors may or may not have Commerce Clause nexus.720
C. Post-Quill Politics
Quill probably would have been only one more in a series of minor
state losses if the Internet had not sprung into existence about the
same time. Tax officials correctly noted that there is no legally significant difference between an out-of-state seller who receives an order by old-fashioned mail and one who receives an order by e-mail or
webpage form. Responding to that, and to hype about the expansion
and power of commerce via the Internet, state tax officials turned to
propaganda and politics. (The Supreme Court provided advance encouragement in Quill.) Use-tax collection moved from a nagging
problem, albeit minor and obscure, to a near-center-stage political
performance cum brouhaha.721
Both in general and before Congress and its Electronic Commerce
Advisory Commission, state and local government officials have
loudly and repeatedly contended that any restriction on states’ ability to collect use taxes on Internet-mediated sales will have a disastrous impact. 722 If one mistakes the rhetoric for fact, one would believe that the federal government will soon totally control state
budgets, and in a few years the states will be bankrupt, many of
their schools and other educational programs closed, public transportation crippled, and other basic services stopped or severely restricted. Not only that, but most physical-reality-based retail businesses would be bankrupt—“brick and mortar” “home town” business
will be a thing of the past. In their enthusiasm, state officials seem to
have forgotten that the “home town business” they imply will disappear has already mostly disappeared; they have become Wal-Marts,
720. This safe harbor aspect has been recognized by at least one state court. In Florida
Dep’t of Revenue v. Share Int’l, Inc., 667 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), aff’d, 676 So. 2d
1362 (Fla. 1996) (adopting appellate court opinion), the state contended that Quill established a bright-line which, when crossed, automatically established Commerce Clause
nexus. The court rejected that argument:
If the “bright line” is crossed and the out-of-state vendor no longer falls within
the safe harbor, it must then be determined whether the vendor’s activities
within the state establish a substantial nexus with the taxing state such that
imposing the duty to collect and remit . . . does not violate the Commerce
Clause.
Id. at 230. The court held that sponsoring a yearly three-day seminar, for persons from all
over the United States at which products were sold, did not establish sufficient presence to
allow imposition of tax collection duties with respect to orders delivered by mail and common carrier. Id.
721. One might be tempted to call it a “debate,” but that word implies some degree of
reason is utilized, which seems to be a rare occurrence.
722. Rather than include extensive notes concerning the rhetoric, which would be marginally appropriate for an academic discussion, samples and comments (with citations) are
included in Appendix B.
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K-Marts, and shopping malls full of franchise stores, all of which are
busy creating and promoting their own Internet Web sites (and collecting sales taxes). If one recalls that states can and do collect sales
taxes from mail-order sales made by companies that have stores or
distribution facilities in the buyers’ state, it is easy to see why states
use the “Main Street Business” “spin.” It evokes the image of small
rural towns with historical brick-front buildings with stores that
have been operated by generations of the town’s outstanding citizens.
In addition, those officials conveniently overlook the fact that with an
Internet Web site, a small “home town” business can compete on almost even terms with international marketers, unless tax collection
costs increase Web site costs beyond the smaller businesses’ budgets.
A significant portion of the “factual” basis for the hype and doomsaying comes from predictions about the growth of the Internet and
Internet-mediated sales. Since the Internet is a new thing, both unpredicted and unpredictable, those “facts” must be carefully examined, particularly because a superficial examination shows most of
them to be based on assumptions (some stated) and equally speculative predictions of others. Many of the relied-upon predicted “facts”
are published by persons or groups having a financial interest in the
directions predicted. 723
Perhaps the most disturbing thing is that state officials seem to
believe their own rhetoric, or are intentionally misleading by omission, or both. The rhetoric constantly and vociferously decries “lost”
tax revenues, claiming amounts that are unimaginably huge for the
average person, that is, tens or hundreds of billions of dollars. They
always omit at least two very important facts.
The first is that the tax revenues “lost” have never before been collected, despite the fact that they have been, are, and will remain legally due and collectable from state residents. There is a significant
difference between losing something and not gaining something one
never had before. The states’ claims are not different from those of a
person who never studied for the bar exam and then complains that
he “lost” $5 million because he failed the exam.
The second omission is that the “spin” never provides any context
for the stated amounts. Despite the apparently huge amounts involved, the proportion of sales and use tax revenues potentially uncollected is minuscule. One report filed with the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce points out that the Internet-mediated
sales (and thus potential tax revenues) are 0.2% to 0.3% of total
business-to-consumer sales. 724
723. See Appendix B.
724. AARON LUKAS , CATO INST., TAX BYTES : A PRIMER ON THE TAXATION OF
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE n.17 (draft version), http://www.ecommercecommission.org/
library.htm.

758

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:649

Concerning mail-order retailers and use taxes, there is a strain of
argument, sporadic but persistent, with an alluring “logic” that could
be very dangerous. The argument is, in one disguise or another, that
a particular target is so economically successful that imposing a tax
collection duty on it would not be a significant burden. It has superficial appeal because the question, after all, is whether the state action
places an “undue burden” on interstate commerce. The word “burden” invites matching load against ability. What may be a great burden for the average ten-year-old would be nothing for the average
twenty-five-year-old body builder. That argument is inherent in the
National Bellas Hess dissent, which starts by noting that the seller
was a “large retail establishment” with $60 million in net sales in
1961 and over $2 million in Illinois sales during a fifteen-month period. 725 The dollar volume of business that will be exempted by the
National Bellas Hess decision runs through the dissent.
A similar strain runs through the North Dakota Supreme Court’s
initial decision in Quill.726 It emphasizes not only Quill’s success, but
also the success of the mail-order business in general. Success may
be somewhat relevant for due process considerations, as evidence of
the defendant’s purposeful direction of activities toward a state.
However, the interstate business’ financial standing is not generally
relevant to Commerce Clause issues. The Court’s Commerce Clause
decisions require a comparison between the financial or other burden
placed on interstate commerce, as compared to the burden on intrastate commerce. Economic strength is not a factor on either side.
If economic success were a factor in Commerce Clause analysis,
what measure should be used? Gross income? Net income (before or
after taxes)? Total assets? Return on investment? Ratio of gross sales
to net income? Would the cost of compliance (however estimated) be
compared to income (however calculated) and a percentage fixed at
which a burden becomes “undue”? The difficulties that would be created by such an approach are obvious.
However, that is indirectly what the North Dakota court did in
Quill. Had the North Dakota court’s decision been affirmed, it may
not have been a substantial blow to Quill’s financial strength. But
that minor legal theory known as “precedent” would take over and an
untold number of other companies might have been dealt disabling
financial blows. The Internet is touted as a means through which one
can go into a global business with very little capital—where the little
guy can compete on even terms with the big guy. That would no
longer be true if every Internet Web site seller had to be prepared to
725. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 760-61
(1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
726. State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991), rev’d, 504 U.S.
298 (1992).
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collect taxes for every consumption-taxing jurisdiction or face financial disaster when it became successful enough for some tax auditor
to take notice, and a court, à la Orvis, to impose ex post facto collection obligations.
In the political debate, some proposals have been made (supported
by some state officials) that actually address the problem. A significant factor in Supreme Court decisions concerning use-tax collection,
especially National Bellas Hess and Quill, is the heavy burden on interstate businesses, as compared to the burden on in-state businesses, if they were required to collect use taxes on all sales. The
burden comes solely from the astonishing complexity, number, and
variety of state sales and use tax laws. 727 It is not rational to expect a
retailer with less than $100s of millions in sales to be able to afford
the personnel and computing power necessary to keep up with the
thousands of tax rates, rules, and reports that nationwide collection
duties would presently require.
It has been proposed that states embark on simplification, restricting the number of sales tax rates per state and the number of
rate and rule changes per year, and establishing a national collection
service that will calculate and remit taxes to states. 728 Such proposals
have been attacked by other state officials, 729 some asserting that
uniformity would somehow impinge on state sovereignty, which,
ironically, is the cause of the jurisdictional restrictions against which
they are struggling.
Of course, the Supreme Court has not done much to resolve issues
relating to state use taxes. Changes in the application of due process
and dormant Commerce Clause theories over the past sixty years
have, in general, made application more uncertain raher than less.
D. State Jurisdiction and Extraterritorial Acts
In due process cases, 730 the Court has recognized that technological, political, and social changes since the Constitution was written
(or even during the past century) require some flexibility in interpreting the Constitution. It may seem illogical to apply rigid, geographically prescribed limits on state jurisdiction at a time when
persons travel across and throughout the nation in a matter of hours
and routinely take actions (via electronics or otherwise) that have
727. See generally II HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 56. In Missouri alone,
there was, in 1994, over 1000 sales-taxing jurisdictions, each of which could have a unique
tax rate. See Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 644 (1994).
728. ACEC Business Caucus, A Proposal for Internet Tax Reform and Reduction, at
http://www.ecommercecommission.org/library.htm; National Governors Ass’n, Streamlined
Sales Tax System for the 21st Century, at http://www.ecommercecommission.org/proposal.
htm.
729. See Appendix B.
730. See supra Part III.
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some connection with a remote state or country. However, the federal
system embodied in the Constitution and the theory behind that (not
to mention international law principles) require that political
boundaries be recognized. Contemporary theories of government prevent states from exercising governmental powers beyond their
boundaries, notwithstanding wishes of government officials.
That is not detrimental to a state’s individual interests. Territorial limits on a state’s ability to impose its will equally protect all
states from actions of other states. The reciprocity that makes the international system work also operates on the interstate level. The issues in Quill, and the current political posturing, involve much more
than a minute portion of state tax revenues. They involve the fundamental rules that circumscribe the exercise of all government powers, not just the power to tax.
Because fundamental principles are involved, it is mandatory that
the questions be precisely focused. Thus, getting past the rhetoric requires clarity concerning what the discussion really is, and is not,
about:
It is not about:
A. State sales taxes.
B. If, when, or from whom, use taxes are due and payable.

It is about:
A. State officials’ attempt to shift the burden of use-tax collection from their own shoulders to the shoulders of out-of-state sellers, from whom no tax is due.
B. Long-standing constitutional limitations (1) on government
efforts to impose burdens on (take property from) persons beyond
the government’s geographic boundaries, and (2) on state government actions that unreasonably impinge on the national economy.

The fact that the Supreme Court has not consistently or clearly
articulated the jurisdictional theory to be applied has led directly to
the current political row. The clear trend over the past half-century
has been toward further attenuating the connection required to satisfy due process requirements in judicial specific jurisdiction cases.
Court opinions do not clearly discourage applying the same rules in
tax cases. The Quill majority opinion does just that, though it is not
obvious that was an intentional choice. 731 On their surface, use-tax

731. Quill also consistently identifies Quill as the taxpayer, which it is not. Quill Corp.
v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, passim (1992). If the Court’s usage indicates a conscious decision to look at some “economic reality,” rather than continuing the
formality applied to sales and use taxes from the beginning, it should say so. Silas Mason
expressly declined to treat the use tax as a sales tax on an out-of-state seller. Henneford v.
Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937). If the Court has changed its point of view, Silas Mason should be overruled, or at least disavowed.
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collection actions appear to present specific judicial jurisdiction problems, that is, whether a sufficient connection between the defendant
and the subject matter of the legal action exists, or more specifically,
whether the defendant is connected with the nonpayment of tax. But
if one looks beyond surface appearances and casual language, the actual issue is whether the state has prescriptive jurisdiction, which is
a very different problem. As the connection required for judicial jurisdiction becomes even more attenuated, the need to clearly distinguish prescriptive jurisdiction rules becomes more important.
One reason that Internet-mediated activities excite controversy is
because they can be made to appear to justify stretching the already
tenuous judicial specific jurisdiction limitations. In large part, the attempted justification is based on a misconception (purposeful or not)
of who does what in Cyberspace. As described in Part II, a Web site
is, in and of itself, passive. The Web site program remains dormant
until it is contacted from the outside. 732 On external request, the Web
site program sends information to the inquirer. That is true whether
the Web site is or is not “interactive.” At this point, the geographic
location of the inquirer is totally irrelevant. Decisions such as Inset
Systems place the situation entirely on its head, effectively concluding that a Web site program somehow ventures out uninvited and
forces itself onto the computer screen of Internet users. 733 Persons
who actually do that are called “spammers,” “hackers,” or “crackers,”
not Web site programs. Programs that do that are called “viruses.”
Connecting a computer containing Web site programs to the communication system merely makes it possible for others to contact the
site, if they find the address, very much like having one’s telephone
number listed. The browser initiating contact with a Web site is no
more intruded upon by the Web site than someone voluntarily opening a telephone “Yellow Pages” book.
Until a browser provides it, a Web site has no information about
where the browser might be geographically. If that information is not
necessary to the Web site’s function, such as when selling and
downloading digital products, there is no business reason why that
information should be obtained or retained.734 It is likely that Internet digital-products sellers in the future will have even less opportunity to obtain information about the purchaser’s location. “E-cash” is
as untraceable as cash, and there is a growing sentiment favoring
732. An interesting philosophical question might be posed: Does a Web site inhabit Cyberspace, or exist anywhere, when it is not communicating with an external terminal? Of
course that attributes a personality, or entity-ness, to a computer program, which is not
justified given the present state of the art.
733. Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
734. Even when a credit card is used to pay, the seller may not obtain or retain
information about the purchaser. See E-Data Corp. v. Micropatent Corp., 989 F. Supp. 173
(D. Conn. 1997).
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browsers’ privacy and actively opposing the collection and retention
of information by Web site operators. 735 A product recently introduced
by a Canadian company guarantees browsers’ anonymity, so a Web
site seller cannot know who the browser is or where she is physically
located. 736
Many of the cases which have held that the Web site owner purposefully directed its acts toward the forum state are correct, if the
question is judicial specific jurisdiction. When anyone sends information (through the Internet or otherwise) to a person or company
whose physical location is known, the act is intended to have some
result at the destination. It cannot, however, be concluded that due
process requirements are therefore automatically satisfied for usetax collection purposes. When a browser purchases tangible products
that must be physically delivered, the Web site seller is acting in the
same manner as any other seller who receives orders from distant
purchasers. This returns one to the problems discussed above, that
is, that the use-tax collection rules are retroactive and assume the
seller has information it cannot obtain with certainty. An Internet
buyer, should he so desire, is equally or more capable of concealing
his identity and purposes than a person making an in-person purchase.
In contemporary political/legal thought, a fundamental principle
of personal jurisdiction is the subject’s ability to know when he or she
may be within the reach of a government’s authority. That is the reason behind the “purposefully directed toward” language in the due
process cases. Having notice of the rules, allows avoidance of particular jurisdictions. Even though geographical political boundaries may
be easily crossed, they still give notice of which government presides
over the geographic area. Because physical boundaries do not exist in
Cyberspace, that notice is lacking. Without other objective and reliable boundaries, a Cyberspace user is unable to purposefully put
himself within, or purposefully avoid, any particular jurisdiction.

735. On e-cash, see, for example, eCash Technologies, Inc., eCash Global Software Solutions, at http://digicash.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2001); Editorial , E-Cash 2.0, THE
ECONOMIST , Feb. 17, 2000, http://www.economist.com/editorial/freeforall/current/fn7284.
html (last visited Feb. 18, 2000); Mondex International, Ltd., All About Mondex, at
http://www.mondex.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2001). On privacy, see, for example, Mike
Brunker, Privacy Tools Usher in an Era of Net Anonymity, MSNBC, Dec. 14, 1999, at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/345954.asp; Americans for Computer Privacy, at http://www.
computerprivacy.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2000) (discussing encryption and federal legislation); Electronic Privacy Information Center, at http://www.epic.org/privacy (last visited
Feb. 4, 2000); Zero-Knowledge Systems [Home Page], at http://zeroknowledge.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2000). Regulators, at least in Europe, are concerned about the tracing problems
posed by e-cash. See EC Working Paper, supra note 652, at 9; UK’S TAXATION AGENDA, supra note 40, at pt. 4
736. See Zero-Knowledge Systems [Home Page], at http://zeroknowledge.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2000).
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This holds equally true for passive Web sites. When a Web site responds to a request and transmits information to an Internet address, the Web site owner is unaware of the destination. Therefore,
the Web site owner is not consenting to the jurisdiction of the address owner’s physical political government any more than a person
who is kidnapped, blindfolded, and carried across political boundaries. The basis upon which “implied consent” to jurisdiction is
founded does not exist in Cyberspace.
The lack of actual or implied consent is not the only problem. Most
discussions overlook a jurisdictionally significant factor: what is legally involved when states try to impose use-tax collection duties on
out-of-state sellers. Those discussions (including court decisions) appear to proceed on the assumption that a use tax is imposed on the
seller. Some sales taxes are technically imposed on the seller. 737 In
contrast, all use taxes are imposed on the buyer, the terminology in
Quill notwithstanding.738 On the out-of-state seller, some states impose the burden of collecting the use tax the consumer might have to
pay to some state. If the seller fails to collect a tax that later actually
becomes due from the purchaser, the penalty is paying the amount it
should have collected. 739 Mistakenly treating a use-tax case as one to
collect a tax due from the defendant might be understandable, but it
is the product of, and results in, imprecise analysis. The object of a
“use tax” action against an out-of-state seller is to exact a penalty for
737. A thorough review of state sales taxes is provided in HELLERSTEIN &
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 56, at tbl. 12.1. That source indicates that in 18 states the seller
is the sales-tax payer. The name used for a tax may be “retailers’ occupation tax” or “gross
receipts tax” or “gross sales tax,” but functionally they are identical: The seller separately
states, and collects from the purchaser, an amount equal to a percentage of the purchase
price. It is common (regardless of name or technical incidence of the tax) to refer to them
all as “sales taxes” and to admit the practical reality, which is that the consumer is aware
that she or he is paying a specific amount to the government, that is not part of the item’s
purchase price. For reasons mentioned earlier, seller-incident sales taxes are coupled with
a “use tax” just like the purchaser-incident sales taxes. See id.
738. The use tax can only be imposed on the consumer and still be logical. The taxable
event is the “use” of goods that somehow escaped being subject to a sales tax when purchased (mail- or Internet-order purchase is not the sole possibility). If a use tax could be
imposed on a transaction at the time of sale, it would be a sales tax. Only after a purchase
transaction can it be determined that no sales tax has been paid to the possessor’s state.
By definition, the seller has no connection with the sold item’s use. This distinct characte ristic of use taxes was recognized in Miller Bros. Corp. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 343-44
(1954), when sales taxation was relatively new. However, during the ensuing 45 years,
“sales and use taxes” have so frequently been identified as a unit that their fundamental
differences have largely disappeared from consciousness. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex
rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), consistently refers to the out-of-state seller as the “taxpayer.”
739. It would seem that the seller would have a legal right to go back to the purchaser
and collect the tax. It is unlikely that a seller would take that action in an average retail
sale, however, since the cost of collecting would be greater than the tax collected. The outof-state seller would not have the legal abilities of a state in collecting minor amounts of
taxes from state residents of other states.
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failing to comply with the state’s regulations. If the tax was not collected, which is usually the case, the defendant-seller’s bank balance
is decreased based on the extent to which he failed to comply, plus
penalties and other costs. But regardless of loose language, the legal
issue is what the law required (or can require) the seller to do, not
how much tax he owes.
Collecting sales taxes on in-state sales is a burden on the seller,
but one to which sellers are generally resigned, one that clearly can
be imposed under the state’s general regulatory powers, and one that
is relatively simple—one tax rate, one set of rules, one submission
form. Collecting use taxes on sales to residents of other states is a
different problem. 740 Use taxes are payable by a state’s residents but
are difficult and costly for the state to collect. Through the use taxcollection rules, what states are trying to do is transfer the burden to
the out-of-state sellers, because it is not cost-effective for the state to
do its own collection work.741
The cost-transferring rules are an attempt to exercise the state’s
general regulatory power over persons beyond the state’s boundaries.
In the due process context, such an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction is indefensible. The decisions “expanding” the scope of state
court judicial jurisdiction concern particular defendants in particular
fact situations where the litigation specifically relates to the defendants’ particular actions in or directed toward the states involved. 742
Those decisions make a clear distinction between “specific” judicial
jurisdiction and “general” judicial jurisdiction.743 “Specific” jurisdiction looks to the particular defendant’s acts and whether the alleged
cause of action arises out of those acts. To base the state’s authority
740. The most complicated task for in-state retailers is determining which items are
taxable and which are not, which often cannot be determined logically. Use -tax collectors
have the same problem, but it is complicated when states each have different rules. Any
one state’s taxable -vs.-nontaxable rules do not frequently change and, as the North Dakota
court discussed, computerization has eased that problem. “UPC” codes and laser scanners
have eliminated the need for individual judgment, and that technology is essentially universal in retail stores. Significantly, UPC codes and code readers have multiple functions
that benefit the retailer’s general operations, justifying the cost. But the additional computer hardware and software needed to collect use taxes would be expensive, and the only
benefit would accrue to the tax collection agencies, which would bear none of the costs.
741. In Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 343, the Court recognized this: “The collection of the
use tax from inhabitants is a difficult administrative problem, and if out-of-state vendors
can be compelled to collect it and remit it to the taxing state, it simplifies administration
[for the state tax authorities].” Id. at 343.
Many states allow use -tax collectors a “discount” as compensation for the administrative
burden. But those same states allow an identical discount to sales-tax collectors (i.e., instate retailers who collect only for one state). See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra
note 56. Moreover, it is unlikely that the discounts cover the actual collection costs, particularly when any “shortage” in collection effectively reduces the discount dollar-fordollar.
742. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
743. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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to collect a use tax, as a tax, on specific judicial jurisdiction, the question must be, “Is the use tax due because of the seller’s acts?” The answer to that is, “No, the use tax is imposed on in-state use by someone other than the seller.” A state legal action to make the out-ofstate seller collect use taxes is not based on the sale contract but on
the state’s general law applicable to residents.
That is more like the province of “general” judicial jurisdiction. If
one tries to apply general judicial jurisdiction rules to use-tax collection actions against nonresidents, the question is whether the actions
of the defendant have been such that it has become, effectively, a
resident of the state.744 Are the defendant’s activities within the state
sufficiently “continuous and systematic” to constitutionally justify
the state’s imposition of its general regulatory authority over that defendant?745 If the answer in a mail- or Internet-order situation is
“yes,” then there is no limit on the extent to which state regulations
can be enforced against a person with less contact with the state
than is required for special judicial jurisdiction. That the scope of
general jurisdiction would become broader than the scope of “specific”
jurisdiction is contrary to logic and Supreme Court decisions. 746
If use-tax collection actions are treated as merely questions of judicial special jurisdiction problems, there must be a case-by-case
analysis to determine the quality and nature of the defendant’s acts
directed toward the forum. The Internet-related due process cases
discussed earlier show significant disagreement about what is sufficient. Based on the better-reasoned cases, there should be a showing
that the defendant at least had the opportunity to choose not to engage in transactions with persons from the forum state. The best
analyses, like the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama in Butler v. Beer Across America, 747 treat a Web site as a
relatively trivial factor and, instead, look at the actual commercial
transactions connected with the state. There can be no reason-based
assumption that merely connecting to the Internet, without active efforts to avoid a particular forum, is a positive choice to interact with
that forum.
It is somewhat more logical to treat use-tax collection actions as
judicial general jurisdiction questions. There is no legal connection
between the in-state taxable event and the out-of-state seller. The
seller does not cause the consumer to use any item at a particular lo744. See Millennium Enter., Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D.
Ore. 1999).
745. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16 (quoting Perkins v. Banguet Consolidated Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)). In Perkins, the defendant company’s president had been carrying
on all possible corporate functions from within the state of Ohio during the time that its
physical facilities, in the Philippine Islands, were in the hands of hostile Japanese forces.
746. See Millennium, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907.
747. 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2000).
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cation. Connecting the out-of-state seller to the independent in-state
use is contrary to World-Wide Volkswagen.748 However, if the seller
has a systematic, continuing association with the state, to the extent
that the in-state activities are functionally equivalent to a resident’s,
then it is not unreasonable to subject that person or entity to all the
state’s laws. Imposing a legal duty on a resident is not a violation of
due process, even if the duty relates to out-of-state activities. As discussed earlier, there are no cases that have found a defendant subject to judicial general jurisdiction based solely on Internet-mediated
events. That does not mean it is impossible. The state-related actions
of Internet-based companies like Amazon.com are only slightly different (that is, mode of physical delivery) from their reality-based instate competitors.
Even if a particular out-of-state mail-order seller is held subject to
state judicial jurisdiction, the second question (Commerce Clause)
remains. Does this exercise of jurisdiction discriminate against, or
impose an undue burden on, interstate commerce? Examined in the
light of Commerce Clause regulatory cases, the answer should be
“yes” to both: Use-tax collection regulations, by definition, discriminate against interstate commerce because they are imposed on outof-state vendors. Based on cases such as Maine v. Taylor,749 the state
would have to show that there is no other way in which it could collect the use taxes due from its own citizens, something that a state
could not do. Decisions such as Raymond Motor Transport, Inc. v.
Rice750 teach that in such situations, the proper inquiry is the potential for multiple states to impose related, but different, regulations
and the burden that would impose on interstate commerce, as compared to the burden on intrastate commerce. Rather obviously, the
burden of complying with the thousands of differing state and local
collection regulations is substantially greater than complying with
one state’s sales tax regulations. If use-tax collection cases are
treated as business-regulation enforcement actions, which they are,
and then tested against Commerce Clause rules about state regulation (not taxation) of commercial activities, the collection regulations
are not enforceable.
However, when the issues are clearly posed, it becomes obvious
that this is not merely a Commerce Clause problem. In most, if not
all, Commerce Clause cases, the state clearly has territorial jurisdiction over the defendant or its acts, for example, the defendant’s
748. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
749. 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (sustaining discriminatory regulation only because there was
no other means of protecting a very important state interest).
750. 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (holding regulation on length of trucks on state highways invalid because the state could not demonstrate a state benefit that outweighed the substantial burden such regulations would place on interstate commerce).
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trucks drove through the state, 751 its trains traversed the state, 752 it
brought fish into the state, 753 it imported alcoholic beverages754 or
waste 755 into the state, or it otherwise engaged in some overt act
within the state. The question in those cases is thus, “Given the
state’s jurisdiction in the matter, can it nevertheless not enforce its
regulation because of the burden on, or discrimination against, interstate commerce?” In the use-tax collection situation, the question is
whether the state has the power to impose the regulation in the first
instance. That brings into question the scope of legislative, or prescriptive, jurisdiction, which is a due process issue, not a Commerce
Clause issue.
A state does not have the power to regulate or tax nonresidents
with respect to events that are completed outside the state’s geographic boundaries. 756 Thus, states cannot tax, or otherwise regulate,
sales transactions completed in other states or countries, regardless
of who the parties are.757 That is why use taxes were enacted. A usetax obligation is triggered by a consumer’s use of property in the
state, regardless of the user’s residence or citizenship, and regardless
of where or how the property was acquired. Attempting to impose tax
collection duties on nonresident sellers runs squarely into the Due
Process Clause; nonresidents are not subject to state prescriptive jurisdiction without some connection to the state. The loosening of due
process requirements, according to Quill, eliminates the due process
barrier when the nonresident seller enters into a contract to sell
something to, or deliver something to, a state resident. 758 In due
process terms, that allows the state to exercise specific judicial jurisdiction with respect to that contract or delivery, or its subject matter.
However, the more difficult question remains, when a state imposes

751. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
752. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
753. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
754. See Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
755. See Oregon Waste Management Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511
U.S. 93 (1994).
756. See supra Part III.E. States can tax a resident’s income earned outside the state,
but that jurisdiction is based on the taxpayer’s continuing association with the state, not
on the acts that earned the income.
757. See supra Part III.E. In theory, a state could enact a consumption tax that requires residents to pay a tax whenever and wherever they spend money, which could be
justified on the same basis as taxing residents whenever and wherever the residents earn
income. An all-encompassing consumption tax on residents, however, would create the
same administrative problems encountered concerning use taxes.
Actions based on product liability rules, commenced against an out-of-state seller, do not
violate this rule if some of the resulting damages were incurred in the forum state and the
defendant-seller had reason to believe that the product might be in that state. See WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
758. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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use-tax collection duties, what type of jurisdiction is it attempting to
exercise?
It is respectfully suggested that judicial jurisdiction rules do not
apply. “Specific” judicial jurisdiction theory allows a state’s courts to
enter a judgment against a nonresident concerning injuries suffered
in that state due to that nonresident’s actions. The legal rules applied
are those of the forum. Thus, in a specific-jurisdiction-type case, the
court is applying local law to a local event that is connected to an external event. Due process requires a direct connection between the
nonresident and the local event. That a nonresident is involved does
not change the state’s ability to enforce its laws with respect to the
in-state event. While the obligation to pay a use tax is internal to the
taxing state, imposing tax collection obligations on nonresident sellers is not. This was recognized in Miller Bros.759
If judicial jurisdiction rules are applied in the use-tax collection
situation, the result is always retroactive and constitutionally unfair.
Liability is imposed on a nonresident because of subsequent actions
taken in another state by an unrelated person, which actions the
nonresident could not control nor reliably predict. Regardless of a
sale’s circumstances, the seller can never be certain that a particular
item will become subject to any particular state’s use tax. Sending an
item to a state does not guarantee that the item will be taxably used
there unless the state’s use tax is so broad as to impose a tax whenever an item physically appears in the state, however briefly, for
whatever purpose.760 The seller would be responsible for collecting (or
failing to collect) the use tax of whatever state in which the ultimate
consumer first uses the item. Sellers would frequently be correct if
they guessed that the first use would be in the state to which an item
is being shipped. 761 But the fact that a seller may guess correctly does
not grant jurisdiction.

759. See Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
760. It should be obvious that a use tax so broad would run afoul of the Commerce
Clause because it would impose a tax both on instrumentalities of interstate commerce and
things moving in interstate commerce, which has been known to violate Commerce Clause
restrictions for over 100 years.
761. A court might conclude that a seller could reasonably foresee use in the purchaser’s state of residence. But what is reasonably foreseeable if the purchaser directs delivery to someone in a different state? Or to herself at an address different from her
claimed residence address? What if the purchaser lives in New Jersey, has his credit card
bills sent to New York, and directs the item shipped to himself at a Post Office box in Mo ntana? Foreseeability alone is insufficient to support specific judicial jurisdiction. See WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 287. Logically, foreseeability also should be insufficient to
support prescriptive jurisdiction. Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Quill says the two
are similar, not the same. See 504 U.S. at 299. Prescriptive jurisdiction usually requires
more definite connections, not more tenuous ones. Would a seller be safe if she obtained an
affidavit from every purchaser concerning the state in which the item(s) will be used? Or
that the purchaser will pay the use tax? Probably not.
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A use-tax collection duty is inherently retroactive (also known as,
ex post facto). No use-tax obligation arises until the property is first
used by a consumer. Based on current understandings of temporal
physics, no tax is due until after the sale is consummated and the
item has been taken from the seller’s control. 762
Regardless of verbiage and lofty theory, legislation imposing usetax duties on nonresident sellers should be legally treated as what it
is in reality and economic effect, the retroactive imposition of sales
tax on out-of-state sales by a nonresident seller, which violates both
the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause. To date the Supreme Court has not seen fit to look behind the labels, so sellers and
tax officials are left with trying to make sense of the decisions.
E. Reconciling the Unreconcilable
If there is any way to reconcile Supreme Court decisions concerning use-tax collection duties and out-of-state sellers, it is that the
seller is, at least for those limited fact situations, a “constructive”
resident. In fact, that is about the only way the Court’s decision in
National Geographic763 makes sense. That case cannot be explained
under judicial specific jurisdiction rules because the taxpayer’s instate presence was not related to either the out-of-state sale or the
in-state use. If the National Geographic Society is treated as a resident, the tax collection duties can be imposed because it is a resident,
and the state, therefore, had prescriptive jurisdiction. Similarly, the
analysis in Scripto emphasizes the congruence between the in-state
activities attributed to the defendant and the activities of a state
resident. 764 The Court treated Scripto Corporation in the same manner it would treat a resident who just happened to have its distribution warehouse in another state. The same logic can be applied, admittedly less comfortably, to Quill. There, the Court held that judicial specific-jurisdiction-type due process requirements were met, but
that something more is needed to satisfy Commerce Clause requirements. The things mentioned that might satisfy the “something
more” were things typical of a state resident, that is, some type of
significant, long-term physical presence. If Quill had been a constructive North Dakota resident, there would have been no constitutional
limitation on imposing use-tax collection duties, regardless of the
number of other states in which it might do business, which is
probably why the Court ultimately relied on stare decisis.

762. That might be partially ameliorated by giving the purchaser the right to a refund.
But that would not help the cash flow of the seller who guessed wrong, or the customerrelations of the seller who insists on collecting use taxes that never become payable.
763. See National Geographic Soc’y v. California, 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
764. See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
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Even though the term was mentioned only in Quill, and there
only briefly in a concurring opinion, in tax cases the Court has frequently indulged in considerations more appropriate to prescriptive
jurisdiction than to general or specific judicial jurisdiction. If it were
directly presented with the question, it is not likely that the Court
would say that rules governing general jurisdiction, à la Helicopteros,765 would have to be satisfied to legislatively create a constructive resident for use-tax collection duties.
Even if due process requirements can be satisfied under a constructive resident theory, that does not automatically eliminate
Commerce Clause requirements, as was made clear by Quill.766 The
temptation to equate the nexus requirement in Complete Auto with
judicial specific jurisdiction (due process) nexus is understandable
because they are usually satisfied by similar actions—and the Court
has rarely made the distinction.767 But outside the tax context, it is
fairly obvious that regulations which are otherwise clearly within a
state’s jurisdiction sometimes cannot be applied, even to persons
with unquestioned contact with the state, because of the undue burden that enforcement would impose on interstate commerce. The cost
of complying with the complicated and inconsistent use-tax regulations of different states and localities is no less burdensome than the
cost of complying with less complicated but inconsistent truck-length
regulations of different states. 768 Imposing additional costs on out-ofstate sellers is not conceptually different from imposing additional
costs on out-of-state waste producers. 769
The states’ rhetoric in the current political controversy about how
any federal involvement in any resolution violates principles of federalism and infringes on state’s rights is ludicrous. They are fighting
a battle that was decisively lost long ago. The last time the federal
government was precluded from acting in a way that might have a
negative effect on state revenues was the day before the Constitution

765. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
766. 504 U.S. at 301-02.
767. If the tax question involves a tax on an out-of-state person, the question of prescriptive jurisdiction and judicial specific jurisdiction are effectively combined. If a state
has prescriptive jurisdiction to tax a particular event, judicial specific jurisdiction is esse ntially automatic because of the connection between the taxpayer and the taxable event.
That is why the habit of saying “sales and use taxes” (implying unity) is unfortunate; imprecise language can lead to imprecise analysis.
The Quill majority opinion fell into that trap. See 504 U.S. at 317. It clearly states that
what North Dakota statute requires is that the out-of-state seller collect and remit use
taxes imposed on North Dakota consumers. See id. at 302. Despite that, the opinion’s language addresses the issue as if Quill is the taxpayer, making no distinction between the
case before it and the prior cases actually involving a tax on the defendant. See id. passim.
768. See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
769. See Oregon Waste Management Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511
U.S. 93 (1994).
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was ratified. Any lingering doubts were well laid to rest when the
Commerce Clause “affectation doctrine” was adopted. 770
What additional connection is needed so that the imposition of
use-tax collection duties on out-of-state sellers like Quill or Amazon.com does not violate Commerce Clause restrictions? To say that
the Supreme Court has given little guidance is an understatement of
immense proportions. The Court expressly rejected California’s
“more than the slightest presence” formulation in National Geographic,771 but it did not offer any other formulation. Neither Quill
nor any other Supreme Court decision has quantified what is
enough. While failing to offer a precise quantification is no doubt
consistent with the case-by-case approach used for Due Process and
Commerce Clause issues, it provides little solace to taxpayers, involuntary tax collectors, or tax authorities. The lack of guidance merely
enables states to take positions that are, from a common sense point
of view, outrageous; the lack of clear and precise legal rules means
that, from a legal-formalist point of view, they cannot be found to violate any specific rule.
V. SUMMATION—THIS DOESN’T LOOK L IKE A KANSAS WEB
The variety, background, history, and politics of the issues currently associated with state use taxes is intriguing and sometimes
astonishing. Whether one starts with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia,
or Gibbons v. Ogden772 in 1824, or the Babbidge Difference Engine in
1833, or the 1908 Sears, Roebuck catalog, or William Gibson’s 1984
Neuromancer, one inevitably has to go back and pick up other strings
from other beginnings. The web of history is more complicated than
the World Wide Web, and its interconnections are often less obvious.
The legal portions of that history web may not have as much variety
as the technological, or be quite so contrived as the political, but it is
not so continuous or easily followed. One tracing the development of
legal rules about constitutional restraints frequently becomes disoriented by the multiple, and often unstated, interconnections between
cases. The courts cannot be faulted if they sometimes appear to have
strayed or failed to leave a clear route to follow; courts are made up
of people, who are influenced by their times. Judges and lawyers constantly study history (otherwise known as precedent) to find support
for desired results. But how a court’s decision is written depends as
much on the parties’ pleadings and contentions as it does on the
weight of precedent. A court must decide the controversy before it

770. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 (1995); McLain v. Real Estate
Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
771. National Geographic Soc’y V. California, 430 U.S. 551, (1977).
772. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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(including its social and economic context), not a clean hypothetical
situation created to demonstrate hypothetical solutions. Legal theory
development does not follow a logical or preplanned route, but jumps
from one “real-world” problem to the next.
Supreme Court decisions concerning states’ power over persons
and events that have connections beyond state boundaries do not
provide a clear, steady progression. They have also been significantly
influenced by judicial interpretation of the Commerce Clause, particularly the watershed reevaluation in the 1930s. Cases presenting
issues relating to state taxation of interstate commerce have come
before the courts less frequently or consistently than other issues.
Perhaps because of that, there appears to be a delay or hesitation in
applying more recent theory to developing issues. Finding principled
bases for predicting future results is rather difficult. The language of
a particular decision, when compared to the language of other decisions, often provides generous room for interpretation and disagreement. That is certainly true with respect to state use taxes and electronic commerce. Therefore, going back to the most basic foundations
of government authority is not only justified, it is probably required.
One foundational principle supporting the U.S. Constitution is
that no government has power beyond the permission granted by the
persons to be governed. Having specific geographic boundaries is a
characteristic common to governments. Beyond its geographic
boundaries, a government’s pronouncements may be interesting information, but they are not rules that anyone must heed. In United
States legal theory, boundaries on governmental action (geographic
and others) are gathered under the term “jurisdiction.” While there
are different types and classifications of jurisdiction, the underlying
principle is constant: A government trying to act beyond its legal authority is, and should be, as effective as a shark trying to fly to the
Moon. Thus, when any question is presented concerning what a government can or should do, the first question must always be: “What
are the boundaries of the government’s permission in this type of
situation?”
The basic question in this discussion is the scope of state governments’ ability to require out-of-state sellers to act as those governments’ involuntary tax collection agents. The answer is that there is
presently no certain answer. The ultimate answer will depend, in
significant part, on how the problem is ultimately framed, that is, as
a question of personal jurisdiction, or as a Commerce Clause question, or as a question of government jurisdiction.
If the question is addressed principally in due process (personal
jurisdiction) terms, geographic borders will largely be ignored and
the only questions will be fact questions. The preceding discussion
concerning judicial specific jurisdiction demonstrates that jurisdic-
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tional limitations are based on the particular defendant’s acts in relation to the forum. But those limitations are few and the courts are
far from agreement on the minimum acts necessary to subject a person to a distant government. Some cases indicate that merely connecting a Web site to the Internet is sufficient to support geographic
jurisdiction in any forum reached by the Internet. Other cases indicate that a person may have to take undefined affirmative steps to
avoid particular geographic jurisdictions. Still others hold that the
person must knowingly take some act with the intent of causing
some result in a particular geographic location. What any specific
court might decide in any specific case is, of course, inherently unpredictable.
Thus, a prudent businessperson would act in a manner calculated
to satisfy the most restrictive potential rule. If that prudent businessperson takes into account both court decisions and state tax administrators’ published positions, he or she has three possible options: The first is to attempt to collect sales or use taxes on all sales
to persons in the United States. At the present time, that would
likely be an extremely costly, if not impossible, task. The second possible option is not to make sales to persons in the United States. That
is obviously not a very good business decision if the person wishes to
stay in business; a very substantial majority of potential Internet
customers are in the United States.
The third possible option is not selling from a location within the
United States; even if it is decided that states can enforce their usetax collection rules throughout the United States, they will still be
limited to the United States. There are places in the world that do
not have consumption or transaction taxes and welcome business enterprises, especially “clean” ones like electronic sales. All things considered, it would seem that the most prudent business decision would
be to move business operations out of the United States. For state
tax collectors that is akin to killing the goose that laid the golden
egg.773 It is, however, the most rational response to the positions
those administrators are currently taking.
If it is decided that this is a Commerce Clause issue, as Quill appears to say, the resolution will depend on what Congress decides to
do, if anything. The present state of affairs is less than satisfactory
for all interest groups. If Congress does not act, the obscure and malleable definition of Commerce Clause “nexus” invites actions by state
tax administrators similar to those discussed earlier, that is, taking
773. Not only would they “lose” previously uncollected use taxes, they would lose taxes
that have actually been previously collected, like income, property, and sales taxes. Also,
those losses would be multiplied by the cascading effect of persons changing their business
location to avoid taxation. Those potential losses are much greater than the potential usetax collections that might be gained.
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all possible logical steps, and even a few illogical ones, to compress
the scope of the Quill holding and to minimize what is required to establish nexus. That would have the same result as treating the question as a personal jurisdiction one; the most logical response of prudent businesspersons would be to move their Web sites out of the
country. If Congress does act, it will also have to address the nexus
question or the result will be the same. The current proposals for
creating uniform state sales and use-tax rules with centralized administration may substantially alleviate some of the problems associated with minimal nexus requirements, but it seems highly
unlikely that states will voluntarily limit their taxing powers and
nearly as unlikely that Congress will impose such a solution.
If it is decided that this is a problem of fundamental state power,
that is, a prescriptive jurisdiction issue, the results will probably be
better, but what that might be remains uncertain. One thing, however, seems fairly certain: The scope of a state’s prescriptive jurisdiction is not so broad as that of a state court’s specific jurisdiction. The
most consistent reading of Supreme Court cases is that prescriptive
jurisdiction requires that the potential subject be acting in much the
same manner as a resident, that there be a measurable, continuing
business presence in the state. As electronic commerce grows and becomes more versatile, it is possible that the Supreme Court would
narrow or eliminate a tangible physical presence requirement. But it
seems very unlikely that the Court would eliminate the requirement
for systematic and continuing participation in a particular geographic market.
Of the three potential answers, the one least likely to encourage
persons to move their electronic commerce sites out of the United
States is prescriptive jurisdiction. If for no other reason, that is because other countries in the world will most likely adopt similar
rules. Prescriptive jurisdiction rules are not unique to the United
States and have been tested in many controversies over the years.
Thus a person would find it difficult to escape the reach of such rules,
in or out of the United States.
Additional Considerations
There is no doubt that the issue(s) related to state taxation of
Internet-mediated transactions will be resolved. There is, however,
substantial uncertainty about how and when. It is rather naive to believe that the resolution will be wholly rational—politics is involved,
which automatically eliminates complete rationality. Power is also
involved, which means many persons and groups will be more intent
on preserving and expanding their power than on reaching a rational
solution. When power and wealth are at stake, long-term and universal interests are ignored for short-term and personal interests. That
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much is clear in the political rhetoric surrounding State taxation of
Internet-mediated sales. State tax officials are intent on not surrendering any power they think they now have, and on expanding that
power as far (geographically, politically, and legally) as they possibly
can; reasonable interpretation of court decisions and business operations is not nearly so important.
One thing that many of the players in the current drama seem not
to understand is that the “playing field” to which they are so fond of
referring is not just their own city, county, state, or nation—it is the
entire world. It is incredible that those persons are not aware of their
setting. They speak of the “global information infrastructure” and
“Cyberspace” and Internet, but they ignore the reality behind those
labels. It is possible for a city or county government to decide what
rules it will adopt, but enforcing those rules will be impossible unless
they are consistent with the relevant state rules. Similarly, state
governments can decide what rules to adopt (via court or legislation),
but enforcing those rules will be impossible unless they are consistent with national rules. Similarly again, the national government
can decide what rules to adopt, which will also prove ineffective
unless they are consistent with international law. Only one example
should suffice. The European Union is considering legislation that
would require the collection of VAT taxes on electronic sales to EU
persons. 774 VAT taxes in the EU vary from 12% to more than 20%,
substantially more than state sales taxes. If the United States decides that states can enforce their sales and use-tax rules against
out-of-state sellers, it will not be in a position to say that EU-member
countries have no authority to enforce their VAT taxes on similar
transactions. Of course, other countries in other parts of the world
can and will follow suit. It is said that within the United States there
are over 7000 jurisdictions that impose some type of consumption
tax. How many thousands more will be added when an Internet
seller must account to the entire world?
The playing field is also not limited to tax regulations. If a government has the legal power to impose its tax collection regulations
on out-of-area persons, it can also impose other types of regulations,
for example, language used (such as French in France-sited Web
sites), content (such as doctrinally acceptable publications in Iranaccessible Web sites, or politically acceptable statements in PRCaccessible Web sites), aesthetics (such as no nudes in Cleveland774. See Edmund L. Andrews, Europe Plans to Collect Tax on Some Internet Transactions, N.Y. TIMES , Mar. 2, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, NYT File; EC Working Paper, supra note 652, at 7 (discussing many of the same problems: difficulty in determining purchaser’s location, inconsistent rules, enforcement limitations, taxpayer deception, e-cash,
etc.); THE UK’S TAXATION AGENDA, supra note 40 (mirroring the European Commission’s
opinion).
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accessible Web sites), pornography (as defined wherever, in sites accessible from wherever), permissible products (such as no birthcontrol devices on Vatican-accessible Web sites), and so on. The same
governmental power lies behind all adopted regulations. Until they
wake up to practical reality, government officials struggling to assert
and expand their power are bound to fail, ultimately if not immediately.
The practical reality is that businesses selling goods or services
will stay in operation only so long as they are making a profit. Businesses will, to the extent possible, establish themselves in locations
that enhance their profit potential, which usually includes lower
taxes and fewer regulations. Internet-based businesses do require
some physical space in some real-world location. But those requirements are minimal, an office or two. If the business does not hire a
computer-operating company to “host” its Web site, then it will also
need a room big enough to hold the necessary computers (which are
getting smaller daily), and a high-quality connection to the electronic-communications network. Almost everyone, and certainly
every government tax official, has heard of international “tax havens.” It takes no imagination whatever to envision international
“Internet havens.”775 There are many places in the world that are capable of, and would substantially benefit from, becoming an Internet
haven. Perhaps states will gain the power to force out-of-state sellers
to collect use taxes, but it may well be a hollow victory when the discover they find their own businesses moving to more receptive locations. In exchange for a few more dollars in use-tax revenue, they
stand to lose many more dollars in income tax revenues, and sales
tax revenues, and technological development, and other areas as
well.
State and local officials, and federal officials as well, who are not
willing to consider the larger context will soon find that they have
lost much more than a minuscule percentage of potential use tax
revenues. Rational, functional regulation of Internet-mediated transactions and events can only be done on a global basis.

775. See Andrea Wilson, E-Commerce Goes to Bermuda, E- COMMERCE TIMES , Feb. 8,
2000, available at http://www.sidsnet.org/archives/other-discussion/9905/0002.html (Ms.
Wilson is co-founder and Senior V.P. of First Atlantic Commerce, Ltd., which provides se rvices to companies interested in a Bermuda address).
It takes only slightly more imagination to envision an Internet haven that does not require a physical location within any country. A not-so-large ship with generators and satellite dishes could satisfy the physical requirements. The inherent space limitations and living conditions may limit the number of operations that would go to that extent to avoid
regulation, but the possibility remains.
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APPENDIX A: INFORMAL DEFINITIONS OF INTERNET-RELATED WORDS
AND WORD USAGES
ACCESS: (used as a verb) The act of connecting one’s computer to the
Web as a whole or to individual Web sites.
BROWSER: (a) A computer user employing a “browser” program to
explore and/or manipulate information available through the
Web; (b) A computer program for use in individual computers
that enables the user to access the Web and Web sites.
DOMAIN NAME: A form of Web address that is commonly used to access a Web site. The Web includes a directory that matches domain names with technical addresses. A browser (person and
program) generally uses the domain name, but the GII uses the
IP address. A company’s or individual’s domain name frequently
includes the site owner’s name or some variation on it. The assignment and ownership of domain names have created a number of controversies, all of which are beyond the scope of this article.
DOWNLOAD: The act or operation of copying a computer program
from one computer to another via the GII. The actor requests or
directs that digital information be transmitted from the remote
computer to the actor’s computer. The program at the source
computer is not altered or removed. The copy at the receiving
computer may be stored temporarily or permanently.
“Download” is generally used to indicate a purposeful copying intended to allow the downloader to use the program in the future.
Any information that can be converted to digital format can be
transmitted through the GII and Internet via downloading or
uploading.
GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE or GII: The electronic
communications system (telephone wires, optical cables, switching systems, and so on), including both the tangible (“hardware)
and the intangible (“software”) components that enable electronic communication throughout, and beyond, the Earth.
HOST or SERVER: A computer which contains a Web-site program or
related information. A browser-program enables the browserperson to view the information contained in the host-contained
Web site. Depending on the programming of the Web-site program, a browser may be able to upload or download information,
from e-mail to complete, digitalized movies and sophisticated
programs.
HTML: The common computer programming language or protocol
that enables different computers at different locations to communicate with each other. The development of HTML (“hypertext mark-up language”) is what made the World Wide Web possible and popular.
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HYPERTEXT: A part of a Web site (text or graphic) containing concealed programming code that, when triggered, causes the local
computer to display a different part of the current Web page or
directs the remote computer to download a different Web page,
which the local computer then displays.
INFORMATION PACKET or PACKET: Units of information packaged by
the Internet protocol for transmission. The Internet protocol divides each communication into a number of small parts, each
with instructions concerning where the information is being
sent. The packets are re-assembled into a complete communication by the destination computer. Each packet may journey by a
different route, and the packets comprising a given communication may arrive in a different sequence than that in which they
were sent.
INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER or ISP: A computer owner and/or operator that mediates access to the Web. An individual browser
first connects to an ISP, which in turn connects the browser
through the communications system with the Web. The browsing
individual’s computer becomes part of the Web, but without a
Website program and address, that computer cannot be contacted by other browsers.
IP ADDRESS: The technical address of a Web site: a series of numbers and periods, much like a telephone number, but more
elaborate. The Web includes a directory that matches domain
names with IP addresses. The GII employs IP addresses in essentially the same manner it employs telephone numbers, that
is, to establish a connection between communicating locations.
ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDER or OSP: A company which has computers connected to the GII that contain information developed
by that company and available to subscribers. These companies
started before the Web and browser-programs developed, but
they have since been absorbed into the Web. The most wellknown OSPs are Prodigy? and AOL? .
ROUTER: A computer that is part of the GII and mediates the physical route that a given communication takes from one location to
another; one of the “traffic signals” and flow controllers of the
GII, and therefore the Web. The router functions independently
of the browser, who is indifferent to the number or location of
routers, except to the extent that the location or number might
slow or delay communications.
SURFER or SURFING: A popular term for what a browser-person is,
or is doing, while using the Web. It sometimes implies that the
activity is somewhat random, with the browser following one
link to another with no specific goal in mind.
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UPLOAD: The act or operation of copying a computer program from
one computer to another via the GII, and the functional opposite
of download. To upload, the actor requests or directs that digital
information be transmitted from the actor’s computer to a remote computer.
VISIT: To contact, as a browser, a remote server-computer and directs that computer to download Web-site information. This term
causes conceptual confusion because the “visiting” browserperson does not “go” anywhere. In fact, the opposite occurs; the
information from the server comes to the browser’s computer. It
is possible for a person to manipulate (change) the information
on a remote computer, but this is usually not done via the World
Wide Web.
WEB, THE (a/k/a WORLD WIDE WEB): That portion of the communications infrastructure, plus the computers attached to it, that
uses a standard programming language/protocol that can be
manipulated by a browser program. It is not a location or system
separate from other communications systems. The information
contained in computers connected to the Web is the apparent
substance of the Web. It utilizes the GII, but the latter name has
not gained popular use. Most persons would not think there is
any difference between the Web and the GII.
WEB PAGE: A portion of a Web site that is transmitted as a unit but
may fill more than one computer screen; Web site programs normally transmit one page at a time. A Web site may contain more
than one page; multiple pages are connected by hyperlinks that
allow a browser to “move” from one page to another, or to different locations on a single page. The page that is communicated
first when a browser reaches a particular address is normally
called that site’s “home page.”
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APPENDIX B: RHETORIC F LOURISHES
The political/lobbying/sound-bite campaign mentioned in the main
text often seems to be coming from a reality as separate as Cyberspace or Carlos Castaneda’s. It is, however, a product of that popular
pastime called “spin doctoring,” which is a euphemism for consciously
calculated misinformation by omission, implication, innuendo, misdirection, and (frequently) distortion. This sort of manipulation is fashionable and is apparently considered ethical except when a U.S.
President makes statements about personal affairs. The examples
included here are not meant to be exhaustive, but they are representative.
National League of Cities
The National League of Cities (NLC) says it represents over
18,000 cities and towns of all sizes and its mission is to promote cities as “centers of opportunity, leadership, and governance.” In August 1999, the NLC published a booklet it called High Stakes in Cyberspace: Ensuring Tax Fairness in the Electronic Marketplace.776 The
booklet was apparently distributed to “local leaders” nationwide.
Among other things, a chart says that (as of that date) municipal
sales tax revenues “sacrificed from non-taxation of Internet purchases” would be about $500 million by the end of 1999, $1000 million by 2002, and $1226 million by 2003.777 The chart does not say if
those figures are cumulative or annual; one suspects the former
though the latter is implied. The projection data is from Forrester
Research (see below). The entire booklet is a well-“spun” incitement
to advocacy, but an advocacy camouflaged to appear spontaneous and
“grass roots.” Interesting things include:
(1) It says that consumers “were expected” (apparently by Forrester) to spend $13 billion in 1998.778 The booklet was published in
1999, after real figures were available, but the actual numbers are
not mentioned. The U.S. Commerce Department reported in March
2000 that consumers spent $5.3 billion via Internet in the Christmasshopping quarter of 1999, about 0.64% of total consumer spending in
the period.779 Conventional wisdom is that significantly more than
half of consumers’ discretionary spending is done in the Christmasshopping quarter.

776. http://www.nlc.org/ecomm.pdf (visited and downloaded Feb. 5, 2000).
777. Id. at 1.
778. Id. at 11.
779. See Doug Brown, States Discuss the Internet Tax Pact, INTER@CTIVE WEEK, Mar.
8, 2000, http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/stories/news/0,4164,2457905,00.html (visited Mar.
16, 1000.
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(2) It also says business-to-business commerce is projected to
grow to $1.3 trillion by 2003.780 It does not say that almost all of
those sales are not subject to sales or use taxes.
(3) Based on predictions by Jupiter Communications (in the
same business as Forrester), it says “mouse clickers” will eclipse
catalog buyers “within a decade.”781 It does not mention that the
switch will have no effect on use-taxes collections since states also
cannot force catalog sellers to collect use taxes.
(4) Its “sector by sector” business-to-business sales forecast
(source: Forrester) projects the greatest ratio of Internet sales to total
sales will be in computers and electronics (only some of those might
be taxable); the other high-range categories are not taxed or covered
by other means (for example, vehicle sales), the lower range categories are ones that may include a larger portion of taxable sales. 782 Despite the huge total Internet-mediated sales predicted, the bottom
line indicates that only 9.4% of total sales will be Internet-mediated.
The total taxable sales would be an even lower percentage.
(5) The final pages are “sample Op-Ed” articles to which recipients are invited to add their personal “by line” and submit to local
news papers. 783
(6) In numerous places throughout the booklet, the NLC takes
the position that only Congress can solve the problems and thus
urges recipients to contact federal officials. Other groups, including
the National Governors Association, on the other hand, are contending that congressional involvement in the solution would be a violation of the Constitution and States’ rights and undermine the federal
character of the nation.
National Governors Association
The National Governors Association (NGA), in a publication generally supporting simplification of the state-sales-tax quagmire,
states:
Myth: States’ ability to fund essential public services like education,
law enforcement, and transportation infrastructure will not be affected by creating a tax loophole for electronic commerce.
FACT: More than 40% of state revenues come from sales taxes.
States and local governments could lose more than $10 billion per
year by 2003 in uncollected sales tax revenues on Internet and
mail-order sales. Not only that, but more than 40% of state spending goes towards education, law enforcement, and transportation.
If this problem is not addressed, America would have 200,000
780.
781.
782.
783.

See id.
Id.
See id. at 12.
See id. at 13-16.
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fewer teachers and police officers educating out children and keeping our communities safe.784

One rather obvious comment: No one is proposing a “tax loophole”
for electronic commerce. The taxpayers who are not paying the tax
are the governors’ voting constituents, not the nonvoting out-of-state
sellers. Yet somehow, a constitutional limitation on state action has
apparently become a tax loophole. There is no indication who made
the $10 billion-per-year loss prediction.
Interestingly, a few lines before the above quotation, the publication praised the governors (themselves) for cutting state taxes by
over $20 billion in the preceding five years. A little math shows the
governors could have lessened their politically motivated tax cuts by
one-half and completely eliminated the projected “shortfall.” One
might ask who received the benefit of the tax cuts, and not be surprised if the beneficiaries were a more select group than the group
that is not paying the use taxes they owe.
Forrester Research and Other Prognosticators
State rhetoric generally uses specific figures, asserting that large
volumes of sales will be made via Internet (not “might” be or are
“predicted” to be). Most of those figures come from predictions made
by Forrester Research, whose name makes it sound like a scientific,
objective organization, and which makes an effort to appear that
way. In addition to publishing its prognostications, Forrester Research is in the business of assisting companies in opening and operating Internet-mediated businesses. Its Web site states, among other
things: “Whether you’re developing your ebusiness strategy or reassessing your corporate web site, Forrester’s Advisory Services can
offer you guidance.”785 High-numbers predictions about how many
businesses, and how much business, will be generated via the Internet enhance Forrester’s business opportunities; one should expect
that Forrester’s predictions will be the highest that it can “justify,”
however thinly. Perhaps state officials have not questioned the numbers, because high numbers make the states’ position appear to have
a rational basis. It should be no surprise that Forrester has joined
the fray on the side of the states, even if at the same time it is somewhat tarnishing its assumed image of objective research.786 Forrester’s February 2000 release saying that online sales should be taxed
784. NATIONAL G OVERNORS ASS ’N, SALES TAXES AND THE INTERNET—MYTHS AND
FACTS (1999), http://www.nga.org/Internet/Facts.asp (downloaded Dec. 5, 1999).
785. http://www.forrester.com/ER/Products/Advisory/0,1525,1,FF.html (visited Apr. 10,
2000). It is unlikely that the guidance is gratis.
786. See Chet Dembeck, Forrester: Online Sales Should and Will Be Taxed, ECOMMERCE TIMES , Feb. 17, 2000, http://www.ecommercetimes.com/news/articles2000/
000217-6.shtml (downloaded Feb. 18, 2000).
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claimed $535 million in sales tax was “lost” in 1999, which exceeds
its mid-1998 projections of about $200 million by year-end 1999.787
One article resulting from Forrester’s announcement notes: “Though
it usually bills itself as an unbiased third-party research firm . . . .”
Forrester publicly supports imposing sales (and maybe use) taxes on
Internet-mediated sales. Forrester is quoted as saying: “New technology will enable companies to easily collect taxes across multiple
locations.”788 Of course, those businesses will need advice and assistance to implement those programs as part of their then-morecomplicated Web sites, as will the “trusted third parties” who would
be intermediaries in the NGA’s proposal. 789
The second “research” source cited by State and local tax officials
is Jupiter Communications, which bills itself as “the worldwide authority on Internet commerce,” which “provides its business-tobusiness and business-to-customer clients with comprehensive views
of industry trends, accurate forecasts and today’s best practices, all
backed by proprietary data.”790 As more and more businesses become
interested in Internet-based operations, and as the potential benefits
and costs of those operations increase, Jupiter will have a larger potential client base.
On the other hand, studies sponsored by opposing factions, such
as those published by Ernst & Young,791 tend to predict lower growth,
particularly in the field of commerce that would produce use-tax
revenues. The variance between predictions makes all of them suspect. The author has been unable to make any detailed comparison of
the bases used by the predictors, because while Ernst & Young’s free
publications clearly state their bases and assumptions, the Forrester
studies are priced far beyond the author’s budget.
The importance of having some information on the assumptions
and details of these predictions is underscored by a report issued by
the U.S. Commerce Department. 792 Appendix Five to that report discusses e-commerce sales of retail goods, the principal target of use
tax collectors. In the endnotes is a table showing various organiza-

787. See Mary Hillebrand, Report: $525M in E-tail Sales Tax Not Collected in 1999, ECOMMERCE TIMES, Feb. 25, 2000, http:www.ecommercetimes.com/news/articles2000/
00022-5.shtml (downloaded Feb. 27, 2000).
788. Id.
789. See NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASS ’N, STREAMLINED SALES TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (1999), http://www.nga.org/ Internet/Proposal.asp (downloaded Dec. 4, 1999).
790. Jupiter Communications, Analysis, Insight, Success, http://jup.com/company/ company_profile.jsp (visited Apr. 10, 2000).
791. Robert J. Cline & Thomas S. Neubig, Ernst & Young, The Sky Is Not Falling: Why
State and Local Revenues Were Not Impacted by the Internet in 1998 (Jun. 1999), available
at http://www.ey.com (downloaded Sept. 21, 1999).
792. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE , SECRETARIAT ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE , THE
EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY (1999), http://www.ecommerce.gov (downloaded Sept. 1999).
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tions’ predictions for those sales. 793 The Commerce Department
thought it necessary to provide a list of the goods included in the
three companies’ estimates. There is a significant difference between
the goods categories included in the different estimates, making any
comparison illogical. Interestingly, it is there noted that Forrester
(whose predictions are used) “normally includes travel in its overall
retail spending estimates.”794 In this particular set of predictions,
that was not included. But International Data Corporation’s predictions (also included) did include travel spending. IDC’s prediction for
2000 of $37 billion contrasts sharply with Forrester’s $7.3 billion
prediction. Travel services are generally not subject to sales tax. One
wonders if the Forrester figures so often cited by tax authorities are
from one of Forrester’s “normal” estimates, 80% or more of which
could be untaxable travel services.
Federal Legislation as Violating the Constitution
The National Governors’ Association’s Web site contains at least
one release that takes the position that legislation introduced in
Congress “violate[s] the Constitution by stripping the states of the
power to decide what happens entirely within their own borders,”
and that “[Congressman] Kasich’s and [Senator] McCain’s proposals
are clearly unconstitutional.”795 One will look a long time to find a
provision in the Constitution that says Congress cannot pass legislation that has some effect within the states. That is why the article
quotes from a Supreme Court decision (McCulloch v. Maryland796) in
support of the statement that taxing is a fundamental power of
states. Perhaps the Web site’s author should read the entire cited
opinion, and quite a few others by the Supreme Court, all of which
say that the Federal Government can enforce rules that limit states’
“fundamental” powers. 797 The power to tax may be a fundamental
feature of government, but the Constitution delegates to Congress
power to regulate various things, including “[c]ommerce . . . among
the states;”798 it also provides that laws adopted by the Federal Government (within the limits of the authority delegated) is the “su-

793. Id. at app. 5 A5-18 n.10 (Retail Sales of Tangible Goods: Analysis and Case Studies).
794. Id.
795. NATIONAL G OVERNORS ASS ’N, HOW ARE WASHINGTON POLITICIANS TRYING TO
VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION?, at http://www.nga.org/Internet/Federal.asp (visited Apr. 10,
2000).
796. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
797. See, e.g., id. at 326-27 (explaining that governments have fundamental powers,
and when the state and the federal government powers collide, the state must surrender to
the federal government).
798. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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preme law of the land.”799 Which means that the Constitution authorizes the legislation the governors say would violate the Constitution.
Perhaps the substance of the bills under attack is not wise, but unfortunately (perhaps), the Constitution does not allow only wise legislation. Ironically, it is a Supreme Court decision that says the states
cannot do what they want in this arena.
On “Discrimination” Against “Main Street” Business
A common theme of state officials and parties who support them
is that “exempting” Internet-mediated sales from sales taxes “discriminates” against “Main Street” business. 800 There are a number of
spin items in those statements. One of the more important (because
it is almost subliminal) is that the complaints are aired in a manner
calculated to invoke a mental picture of a small town’s main street
lined with brick-facade buildings and retail stores that have been run
by generations of the town’s leading families. That is not where the
states’ sales tax revenues are produced; such retailers probably produce a very small percentage of those revenues. The bulk of the revenue comes from stores like Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and mall-based franchise and department stores, most of whom are setting up their own
online sites. The second fallacy in the argument is that the Internet
sales are subject to different rules, which they obviously are not.
Sales or use tax is owed on Internet-mediated sales. To the extent
use taxes are not collected, it is because the state-resident purchasers are not paying the legally owed taxes.
Discriminating Against the Poor
A relatively new wrinkle is that the “exemption” of Internetmediated sales from sales tax discriminates against lower income
families. That is supported by somewhat reliable statistics showing
that persons with lower incomes tend to own fewer personal computers. (One wonders how many thousands in research dollars were
spent to reach that less-than-surprising conclusion.) Thus, the spin
goes, lower income people cannot take advantage of the “exemption.”801 The statistics do not show the proportion of low-income persons that can or do access the Internet through computers at work or
at the local public library. The spin does not mention that politicians
have pledged to lessen the “digital divide” by spending a lot of money
799. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 165 (“The [federal] constitution . . . declares, that
the constitution itself, . . . shall be the supreme law of the land . . . .”).
800. See, e.g., NATIONAL G OVERNORS ASS ’N, HOW ARE WASHINGTON POLITICIANS
TRYING TO VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION?, at http://www.nga.org/Internet/Federal.asp (visited Apr. 10, 2000). In this publication, legislation introduced in Congress is blamed for the
discrimination. In other locations, other things are blamed, frequently the Quill decision.
801. See id.
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to make computers more accessible to those who cannot afford their
own.
On the Continuation of the Mail-Order Fight
The National Governors’ Association Web site, in describing its
sales tax simplification proposal, states that the issue results from
the Supreme Court decisions in Bellas Hess and Quill.802 Those two
decisions concerned out-of-state mail-order sales, and the NGA
makes a clear link between those and Internet-mediated sales. As
the text demonstrates, states have been trying to force out-of-state
sellers to collect use taxes for sixty years, with some success. Yet
they have consistently failed when out-of-state sellers have no significant activities or properties in the state, that is, catalog sellers.
The tax collectors’ arguments have not changed; they have simply
substituted “Internet” for “mail-order.” What has changed is the
number of dollars predicted to go uncollected. Those predictions have
persuaded states to make higher profile efforts—and spend money—
to obtain a change in the applicable law. Perhaps they should spend
the time and effort to educate the real taxpayers and enforce those
taxpayer’s obligations. A few states have lines on their individual income tax returns on which the taxpayer is supposed to enter the use
tax due for purchases during the preceding year. One wonders how
often any attempt is made to audit that portion of an individual’s return.
On a “Level Playing Field”
Everyone involved in the political rhetoric states that “a level
playing field” is all they want. Another nice mental picture is invoked, but—How many major league pitchers would really like to
have a level playing field? It is another spin. What a level playing
field would look like is as subjective as “what justice is.” Perhaps the
remark is being made with tongue in cheek, but the Advisory Commission “Business Caucus” called the states’ bluff on this “argument”: There is more than one way to level the field.
The Business Caucus proposal included a suggestion that the nonInternet sale of products also sold in digital form (computer programs, books, video, audio, and so on) be exempt from sales taxes.
Rather obviously, if both types of sales are exempt from tax they are
just as equal as if they were both subject to tax. That, of course, is
not the level that the tax authorities want.

802. NATIONAL G OVERNORS ASS ’N, SALES TAX SIMPLIFICATION: THE ISSUE , at
http://www.nga.org/106Congress/SalesTax.asp (visited Apr. 11, 2000).

